AFGHANISTAN

MASUDA SULTAN, Young Afghan-World Alliance President, February 8, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What led you to form your Afghan-World Alliance? What are the messages you want to get out to the public?
SULTAN: We formed Young Afghan World Alliance in August after my trip to Kandahar. What I saw there was unbelievable---there was so much poverty and sadness. Not only that, people were living in constant fear of the Taliban. We decided we MUST take action. Everyone who had been to Afghanistan seems to feel the same way.
What we are seeking to do is raise awareness about the plight of the Afghan people, foster understanding between Afghans and Americans, and what we would love to do is build a school in Kandahar (former stronghold of the Taliban000and no coincidence that it was). This school will offer a world-class education, an opportunity for children that show potential in the public education system.

MACK OWENS, U.S. Naval College Strategy and Forces Planning Professor, March 4, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Some state our objective in Afghanistan should be finding Osama bin Laden. Others see a need to create political and economic stability within Afghanistan along with a government that respects its own people. What do you see as the role for our commitment of American troops within Afghanistan? What should be their objectives and when should troops be withdrawn, in your opinion?
OWENS: I think we need to do both. I believe that an international peace keeping force is necessary to ensure stability in Afghanistan. I don’t think we should necessarily provide the force, but we should participate and coordinate the effort. I believe we’ll have some presence in Afghanistan for some time.

BARNETT RUBIN, New York University Center on International Cooperation Director, June 25, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: How much authority and loyalty will this national government have over the various localities? Do residents tend to follow their local leaders more, and how much relevance do the people place on national leaders? Finally, how unified is the nation behind this national leadership: are there significant parts of the country that can be expected to be uncooperative?
RUBIN: This answer will also deal with a question about international “peacekeepers”. (Technically, the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, is not a peacekeeping force, because it is not enforcing or monitoring an agreement and it is not organized by the U.N.)
Even before the conflict, the central government was weak in Afghanistan, but it had no real competitors either. For almost 25 years now, the government structures have been destroyed, and people either fought against them or allied with them to their own advantage, or threats, and to attract foreign aid (also a survival strategy). Power became more or less fragmented (hence the title of my book, “The Fragmentation of Afghanistan”.
Today the central government does not control the rest of the country directly, In some areas (above all Heart) powerful regional warlords have consolidated power by controlling economic resources (keeping the customs revenue, drug trade, emeralds, etc.) and using this along with U.S. aid to build up militias. The government cannot pay people because it has little money, there is no functioning banking system, the roads have disintegrated, and road security is perilous (so you can’t safely transport cash in large amounts). This is not the result of any real surveys, but my impression is that people generally would prefer to have orderly, legal rule by the central government than rule by guns, even if the guns are wielded by people of the same ethnic and regional background. But no one is willing to disarm if they are afraid of being attacked by someone else and they do not see an alternative.
Extension of ISAF would be very helpful to this process.. Nonetheless, I am told that some major warlords (Haji Qadir from the east, Khalili from the center, and Dostum from the north) have agreed in principle to hand over revenues to the government. Ismail Khan still refuses, and he has the most.
But these people do not challenge the government’s legitimacy. That challenge, if it comes, is most likely to come either from Qandahar (also represented slightly in the government) or the Panjshiris themselves. The latter are split, and the conflict over the Qanoonis appointment may be just the beginning.

TAMIN ANSARY, author, September 6, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What is the life of farmers in Afghanistan like? It appears to be a very hard life. How much of the agricultural crop is converted into illegal substances? It was recently reported the United States would not spray to kill such crops so as not to disrupt the local economies and destroy the lives of Afghan famers. Would it be possible for the U.S. to subsidize Afghan famers for destroyed crops or to subsidize converting to other crops? Would Afghan farmers agree to such a thing?
ANSARY: Farmers have a hard life now because of the drought (which is entering its seventh year, I believe) and because so much of their agricultural land is laced with landmines. The traditional irrigation systems have also been destroyed, and in their place, everyone who can is digging “deep wells”, which could lead to an ecologically catastrophe in years to come. With so little cultivable land, a lot of farmers can only survive by planting opium, because a small amount of that can provide as much money as a whole farm’s worth of wheat used to provide. The solution to all this in the long run is to clear the landmines and rebuild the irrigation systems. In the short term, yes, some subsidizing might be in order.
CZIKOWSKY: Do you find greater acceptance and/or less discrimination of who you are in American or in Afghanistan? What differences do you see in the two cultures towards tolerance towards others?
ANSARY: Throughout my life I have found more tolerance for my crazy, mixed-up cultural identity and general individual strangeness in America than in Afghanistan. But when I went back to Afghanistan this summer, I was gratified to see that everyone I met, really everywhere---in the city, in the countryside---just accepted me as an Afghan, simply because I said I was one, and because I could speak the language. Still, I think tolerance towards others is a central---and precious---premise of American life and one reason why I value this country so much.
CZIKOWSKY: Please tell us more about Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. How large is his following and what are his capabilities in striking back at the United States? Does he sponsor terrorism?
ANSARY: In the Eighties, Hekmatyar led one of the two largest Mujahideen parties, Hizb-i-Islam. The other---and his deadly rival---was Jamiat-i-Isllam, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud. Hekmatyar was most effective at getting money from foreign donors, and people tell me his was the most disciplined and well-organized party. Numbers I don’t know. When I was in Pakistan, he put out one of those “night letters” (i.e. anonymous board-sides pasted to walls during the night) in which he said he believed he could drive the Americans out of Afghanistan by killing 600 of them.
CZIKOWSKY: What is needed to “win the peace” in Afghanistan? What steps do you see as necessary to stabilize the country behind a government respected by its people and trusted by the international community?
ANSARY: The International Community, with the U.S. taking a part, should stay in Afghanistan as peacekeepers. Those countries that have pledged to Afghanistan in the meeting in Japan earlier this year should start delivering some of that money. Outside forces should agree to let Afghanistan determine its own course and find its own way culturally, and should police each other to make sure that all parties comply with this agreement---that would be a good start.

WILLIAM L. NASH, Retired United States Army Major General, September 11, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What will it take to create a stable government in Afghanistan that has popular support? What role should the United States have in creating such a stable government?
NASH: I’ll take the second one first. It’s my judgment that the U.S. must provide political, economic, and security leadership in the rebuilding. The most important ingredient is time. Time in terms of development programs that address the democratic issues in a country that has little tradition of democracy. In terms of the economic infrastructure. In terms of indigenous security by and for the people of Afghanistan. Associated with time is patience because all will not be smooth and we must be determined to succeed.
When I say time, I think we should think in terms of five to ten years as a minimum. We’ve been in Bosnia for nearly seven years now. Building democracy and a secure environment is not a quick fix.

ZAMA COURSEN-NEFF and JOHN SIFTON, co-authors, Human Rights Watch, December 19, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: We hear the reports about the mistreatment, first about the Taliban and now this. Yet, without seeing it on film (which sometimes the press does get and show us), it is hard to understand exactly what is happening. Would you please provide some exact examples of what is happening?
NEFF and SIFTON: In Western Afghanistan, the local leader, Ismail Kahn, has censored women’s groups, intimidated outspoken women leaders, and sidelined women from his administration in Herat. Restrictions on the right to work mean that many women will never be able to use their education. The Herat government has even recruited schoolboys to spy on girls and women and report on so-called un-Islamic behavior. In some instances, police under Ismail Khan’s command have questioned women and girls seen alone with men, even taxi drivers, and arrested those who are not related. Men caught in such circumstances are usually taken to jail; women are brought to a hospital, where police force doctors to conduct medical exams on the women to determine whether they have had recent sexual intercourse, or if unmarried, whether they are virgins.
Our report contains additional stories about abuses across the country that have occurred over the last year. We are concerned not only about Ismail Khan, but about many other local leaders.

MARC KAUFMAN, Washington Post Foreign Correspondent, March 26, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: How does one destroy the roots of terrorism within Afghanistan? Some have claimed if we could help eliminate the poverty and improve the economy of the country, the economic conditions that breed terrorism would be removed. Yet, more recent terrorists were found to be from middle classes, and even have families. What can the United States do to best help rebuild Afghanistan and win the public support that will remove the conditions that tend to breed future generations of terrorists?
KAUFMAN: The roots of terrorism are deep in Afghanistan and, alas, the U.S. helped plant them. What the mujahideen fighters did to the Afghan government of the 1970s and the Soviet army would now be considered terrorism, but that whole effort was bankrolled by the U.S. This is one of the terrible ironies of the whole Afghan-Taliban-al Qaeda story-that so many other nations (and self-proclaimed leaders) have used Afghanistan for their own purposes, and the Afghans have suffered so much for it. But remember-none of the men who attacked the U.S. on Sept. 11 were Afghan, and there does not seem to be any groundswell of support for Islamic militants in the country now. This is a wide-open place, where security posts are less than impressive and there are always back ways into every city, yet the number of attacks has remained quite small. There were two attacks in Kabul in December that seemed to be suicide attacks, and a few more in other parts of the country. But that kind of action is, generally speaking, not in the Afghan character right now.

JOHN FEFFER, Editor, Foreign Policy in Focus, August 13, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: What is the latest news on achieving political and economic stability in Afghanistan? A short time ago, this was a priority and it seems to have since been a lesser concern. The press reports I have read indicate that American assistance has dropped and that Afghanistan appears to be in disarray. Is this so? How bad, or good, are things in Afghanistan? Are we delivering on our commitments to the people of Afghanistan? Is there something we should be doing different? (And I won’t even ask about not finding Bin Laden.)
FEFFER: A good question. As you have probably read, the Taliban remains a political and military force in Afghanistan, the central government is weak, and U.S. aid has been minimal. George Bush promised early on that the U.S. government on his watch would not engage in nation-building. Alas, this seems to be the case—the U.S. government has made promises to rebuild Afghanistan but has not delivered the goods. The reasons are many for this. The administration has certainly been distracted by the war in Iraq. We’re also dealing with a large budget deficit that promises only to get larger. But perhaps the deeper issue, which Ahmed Rashid addresses in his chapter in “Power Trip”, is that the U.S. has fundamentally misinterpreted the politics of Central Asia. The administration is supporting strong-arm leaders in the region in order to stabilize U.S. influence there. But instead we’re only strengthening Islamic fundamentalism.
What can we do that’s different? A very tough question. Certainly we should not promise nation-building without supplying the funds to make it work. Even critics on the right—such as Miall Ferguson—have criticized Washington for trying to maintain an empire on the cheap. But it’s not only money. As in Iraq, we have to support indigenous political institutions that represent the various tendencies in Afghani society. And these institutions have to be independent rather than simply handmaidens of U.S. policy in the region.
CZIKOWSKY: We often get so involved in the details of policy that I think it helps to step back sometimes and consider our more general philosophy of foreign policy. We are a nation which, at least to many foreigners, is a military power and which is respected or feared for our military capabilities. When we provide assistance, it is often in response to our economic interests and economic development is generally targeted to assisting foreign nations develop products and industries which are involved in international trade. The benefits often then indirectly help the country’s residents as their economy strengthens.
While we do provide some direct humanitarian assistance, and our recent increased commitment to fighting AIDS in Africa is an example, humanitarian assistance is a relatively small portion of our foreign assistance. My question: if we substantially changed our foreign assistance strategy and targeted it towards helping the economic welfare and health of people across the world, wouldn’t we not only achieve more benefits to more people, yet provide us with an image of humanitarian benefactors that makes the world more comfortable with the United States? This would benefit us in reducing some (although certainly not all) breeding grounds for future terrorists and reduce the fears of some nations that they must arm against us (and, thus, we reciprocate by arming against them). Further, with a more productive and healthier populace worldwide, we would have stronger markets for our goods and, with our image improved, American goods would receive warmer welcomes. I know this is a general outlook, yet it seems to be one that has been ignored by the current administration. Do you have any comments on whether we could use greater humanitarian assistance to ease some long term international difficulties?
FEFFER: Your argument is a very compelling one and should, if we took seriously the rhetoric of the current administration, appeal to the “compassionate conservatism” of George Bush. As you rightly point out and as we discuss in the conclusion of “Power Trip”, the U.S. currently provides only a fraction of 1 percent of outlays to foreign assistance (even though according to a recent poll, Americans believe that we give away as much as 20 percent!)
In the wake of 9/11, Congress too concluded that an increase in foreign aid was vital in addressing the economic and political conditions that underpin the support of terrorism. But the current administration has largely ignored Congressional advice.
Much of the U.S. foreign assistance is military. The large portion of non-military aid is tied to purchases of U.S. products and the opening of foreign markets to U.S. goods. In both cases, the U.S. government uses aid to reward allies that support U.S. foreign policy (e.g., support exemptions for U.S. soldiers from the jurisdiction of the ICC).
So I would support an increase in foreign assistance, but also a transformation of that assistance so that it better answers the basic needs of people around the world.
By the way, for a good summary of the hazards of U.S. development assistance, check out “Betraying the National Interest” by Francis Moore Lappe. Although the book came out in the 1980s, our foreign assistance programs still suffer many of the same flaws that the book outlines.

SARAH CHAYES, Afghans for Civil Society Kandahar Director, October 31, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: What is the current political situation in Afghanistan? To what degree are tribal warlords regaining influence? How strong or weak is the central government?
CHAYES: It would take a book to answer this one. But in brief, tribal warlords have been regaining influence steadily since the fall of the Taliban, due to their disproportionate control over weapons and money. The central government remains very weak, and the ordinary people feel a bit left in the lurch.

CRAIG CHARNEY, Charney Research President, July 30, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: What do people in Afghanistan think of the United States? I know there are numerous factions with different views. Yet, is there a sense of disappointment that we pledged to help rebuild the country and then seemed to have turned our attention elsewhere, or is there still hope and a belief that Americans will return and offer constructive assistance, or is there a sense that Americans should have as little as possible to do in Afghanistan?
CHARNEY: In very broad terms: most Afghans like the U.S. The majority are favorable to the U.S. and the U.S. military in Afghanistan. However, this is not true in the two regions that have seen most of the trouble, the South and Northwest, where pluralities are unfavorable to both.
International assistance and the U.N. are generally quite popular in Afghanistan. Although there are some complaints that aid workers live too high off the hog, the main complaint is that people want more help. They are clear they do not want the U.S. or U.N. out, to judge by what we saw in our research.

TRAVIS FOX, washingtonpost.com videographer and PHILIP KENNICOTT, Washington Post staff writer, October 8, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: How do candidates and political parties reach voters in Afghanistan? Does the public seem well informed about the candidates? Is support for candidates essentially divided along support within different communities, or are candidates making appeals across a broad base of the Afghan population?
FOX and KENNICOTT: Everyone we’ve talked to certainly is aware of the election and is planning to vote. It’s been difficult to get at many of the reasons why each voter selected a particular candidate. In terns of getting the message out: There are campaign posters plastered everywhere we’ve been. Radio is widely listened to in this largely illiterate country and it is the primary source of news about the election, Television plays a much smaller role as do newspapers.

SAM KILEY, PBS Frontline/ World Producer. April 11, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: How many countries have sent troops for NATO in Afghanistan? What proportion of the troops are American and what proportion are British?
KILEY: There are 37 nations that have contributed troops to Afghanistan. The troop numbers keep changing, but I think there are about 15,000 U.S. troops in the NATO command, the largest force, the second largest force is British with around 2,500 followed closely by the Canadians. But I discovered that among the most admired troops were the 40 soldiers contributed by Estonia who were such ferocious fighters they were attached to the British to keep an eye on them.
CZIKOWSKY: Isn’t this a village by village struggle? Do the villagers really care who governs them by force?
KILEY: Most Afghan villages in the remote areas probably neither know nor care who is in power in Kabul so long as they are left in peace. The problem is that very few are. NATO and the Afghan government want to win this war to prevent Afghanistan returning to Taliban rule and becoming a base once again used by international terrorists. The Taliban wants to win because they believe that the Afghan government is a collection of traders in the pay of foreign infidels.

KAREN DeYOUNG, Washington Post Associate Editor, January 29, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: Afghanistan strikes me a country that is a collection of strong local leaders. Has the country been more or less able to function as a cohesive unit in recent years, or is it collapsing as an organized unit? About what percent of the communities fall under different types of leadership?
DeYOUNG: Afghanistan has never functioned as an organized unit. It’s a collection of tribes that at times in the past have managed to co-exist. It’s not a question of collapsing but rather of trying to create something that hasn’t existed.