INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

JAMES BAMFORD, author, May 1, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Many of us are still trying to figure out Tom Ridge’s role in Washington. How much authority should a Homeland Security office be provided? Should a Homeland Security office how the power to order the FBI. CIA, NSA, and other agencies to do as they ask on matters of homeland protection?
BAMFORD: My own opinion is that the Office of Homeland Security was a quick kneejerk reaction and probably should be eliminated. It is just one more thing to slow down and complicate an already complicated process. Also, by merging domestic and foreign intelligence collection there is great room for abuse. It should also come under Congressional oversight.

BOB ZOELLICK, United States Trade Representative, August 13, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What are potential new trade markets for the United States? Is it expanding into countries such as China, or emerging markets in Africa, and, if so, where do you see other emerging trade markets?
ZOELLICK: Because the U.S. is about 25 percent of the global economy we want to try to open markets everywhere. We would like to operate globally, regionally, and with individual countries which are called bilateral agreements. We are pursuing free trade agreements with countries in Latin America, southern Africa, Asia, and perhaps Australia as well.
We are pursuing a global trade agreement in Doha Qatar. That is the international negotiations that failed to launch in Seattle in1999. In addition we last year completed the joining of China and Taiwan into the WTO which activated the lower tariffs of the agreement the U.S. has with China.
We look to expand markets in Asia, Latin America, but we also want to extend trade ties in Africa.

JEFFERSON MORLEY, washingtonpost.com World Editor, October 14, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: One of the most important elements of the Cuban missile crisis was the importance of diplomacy and understanding to which messages to reply, which to ignore, and the ability to allow both sides an out without ruining each other’s reputations. Would you please tell us about the diplomatic channels that existed during the Cuban missile crisis?
MORLEY: President Kennedy used a wide variety of channels, public and private, to respond to the presence of nuclear missiles in Cuba. These included vigorous use of the United Nations and the Organization of American States to enlist their support and public support in countries overseas. Via his brother Bobby, the President also sent private messages to Soviet diplomats in Washington.

THOMAS S. BLANTON, National Security Archive Executive Director, October 16, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What lessons on diplomacy are to learned from studying the Cuban missile crisis? Wasn’t a significant part of diplomacy in this crisis the choice of the Kennedy Administration to ignore an antagonistic Russian communication and respond to a more conciliatory communication, thus setting the level of discussion toward conciliation? Are there other lessons you would mention?
BLANTON: You’re put our finger on a key moment. JFK and his advisers are debating what to do about the two letters and thinking, well, we’ve got to respond to the tough one, that says the Soviets will only pull out if the U.S. pulls out of Turkey. At this moment, Tommy Thompson, longtime Russia expert, former Ambassador to Moscow, knows Khruschev personally, says, he’s let’s give him a way out, he wants to be able to say he saved Cuba, let’s ignore the Turkey letter and give him a pledge of Cuba. JFK did both, the pledge on Cuba publicly (with conditions of course) and the Turkey deal secretly. The main lesson is they achieved Khruschev’s pullback by putting themselves in their adversary’s shoes, they avoided backing him against the wall, and they looked for alternatives short of war---what at best is a crude instrument of policy, sometimes necessary to be sure. As JFK commented on the tapes, we’re not going to have a very good war if we out later we could have gotten the missiles out by trading ours in Turkey.
CZIKOWSKY: After the fall of the Soviet Union, did any more Soviet papers regarding Cuba become public? Also, hasn’t Cuba recently released more of its own documents? What interesting details, if any, have you seen emerge from the papers from the other side of this crisis?
BLANTON: There was a brief golden age of openness in the Soviet archives, from 1991 to 1993---ironically corresponding with the brief openness in the CIA archives. For the conference this past weekend, the National Security Archive’s Russian specialists, led by Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya, unearthed more than a thousand pages of new Soviet documents, such as actual military orders that gave local commanders authority to fire tactical nuclear weapons in an invasion came, then took that authority away at the height of the crisis because Moscow feared were getting out of control. Plus the Cuban government declassified nearly a thousand pages of its files, including all its defense agreements with the Soviets, long lists of all the equipment the Soviets gave them, transcripts of Castro’s very difficult meeting with Soviet emissary Mikoyan---amazing stuff. What’s really is the Cuban sense of constant threat from the U.S., or put another way, our covert operations that were meant to deter Castro from subverting the hemisphere actually compelled him to accept Soviet missiles. For the Cubans, they call the crisis “the October crisis”, in effect the crisis of the month. From the new U.S. and Soviet files, you can see both Kennedy and Khruschev being reckless before the crisis, JFK with his covert operations and Nikita with his secret deceitful missile deployment, and both of them immediately going totally cautious once the crisis broke, knowing the world was on the brink, both looking for a way out.

AMANDA PIKE, PBS Producer, November 1, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Maybe this is a question with no answer. How does a leader kill or let a third of his nation die? What leader can turn to his people and think for the good of our nation, many of you will die? What kind of legacy does such a leader expect? When someone’s ideology allows massive deaths, why doesn’t a leader begin to question such an ideology?
PIKE: You raise a fascinating question, though as you say, there are no easy answers. One of the things that surprised me most in talking to the remnants of the Khmer Rouge was their continued commitment to what they see as the original ideals of their revolution. The educated men who make up the upper ranks of the movement say that they were patriots were truly believed that their new independent government would better the country. I do believe that most of the people we met had the nation’s best interests at heart---many fought for years at great personal risk to try and make a difference. What is so confusing and heartbreaking is how their struggle went so quickly and so horribly wrong---and why these men stayed with the movement for decades after the atrocities became known.

MARK HERTSGAARD, author, November 20, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Does American television distort the American images in the eyes of foreigners? Is so, would you please give some examples and discuss any possible consequences from these distortions?
HERTSGAARD: Of course American television distorts foreigners’ views of life in the United States. I think of a young South African man I interviewed for “The Eagle’s Shadow”. He was a bus driver and loved everything about America. His view of our reality, however, was based almost entirely on the soap operas as “The Bold and the Beautiful” and hip-hop music videos, so it wasn’t a terribly realistic perception. At the end of our conversation, he was telling me about the township near Cape Town where he lived and he complained about all the street gangs and crime. Then he brightened and asked me, “Did you know that every township in South Africa has street gangs named after your country?”
“Really?”, I said.
“Yes,” he replied. “One is called the Young Americans and the other is called the Ugly Americans.”
“What’s the difference?” I asked.
“The Young Americans dress like Americans”, he said. “The Ugly Americans shoot guns like Americans.”
\ I actually open my book with this story. To see the U.S. as a very rich place that shoots lots of guns is surely not the most sophisticated analysis, but it’s a fair shorthand for how many foreigners view our homeland. And it’s drawn to a large degree from American television, which in the past ten years especially has come to dominate the world.
CZIKOWSKY: What are children in different countries taught about the United States? I recall reading an autobiography of someone who grew up in Afghanistan who wrote the reason why protestors proclaim American as the “Great Satan” is because that is what they were taught in school. They were taught that Islam is the one true religion and that leaders of Christian nations and Israel are agent of Satan. Did you find similar teachings amongst people you interviewed? If so, do these teachings stick with people in adulthood? HERTSGAARD: Yes, there are these teachings abroad, but in my experience this is really a minority. Most outsiders are taught much more fairly and comprehensively about the United States and I must say, they know much more about us than we do about them---to our loss, I think.

JAMES LINDSAY, Council of Foreign Relations Director of Studies, November 11, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Bush campaigned in 2000 stating he was not in favor of nation building. Now, he is faced with dramatic decisions that, if they are not “nation building”, are close to it in Iraq and Afghanistan. Should the United States engage in nation building and, if so, under what circumstances should it become so involved?
LINDSAY: The Bush Administration has never been a big proponent of nation-building. That was a clear message in the campaign. It’s an approach the Administration has stuck to in Afghanistan, where despite the rhetoric American reconstruction efforts have been modest. (The White House’s original FY04 budget request didn’t request any money for Afghanistan).
In the case of Iraq, the White House went to war on the assumption that is wouldn’t have to get into the business of nation-building. The expectation was that Hussein’s government could be removed but the rest of the government apparatus would remain intact. Events proved otherwise.
This has pushed the Administration toward greater involvement in Iraq. Still, the general drift of Administration policy has been to try to get out, again notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary.
The United States clearly has a strategic interest in seeing Iraq succeed. The open question is whether we have the capacity to make that happen.
CZIKOWSKY: To me, it appears the Bush Administration prefers to develop foreign policy without extensive consultation with other nations. In acting unilaterally, don’t we temporarily gain what we want yet, in the long run, we are losing respect through the world which will complicate our future endeavors in foreign relations?
LINDSAY: That’s always the risk with unilateralism. President Bush’s calculation is that because others understand that the United States is a uniquely just great power that eventually they will come around to accept what we have done even if they dislike how we do ii. Right now we have what is in effect a large-scale test of this proposition.

LEE HAMILTON, Former Member of Congress, November 19, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What specific actions do you believe President Bush and Congress could do to better improve the role of the United States in the United Nations? Also, while I support the United Nations, there are many critics of the United Nations. How could the United Nations be useful towards encouraging world cooperation and reducing conflicts? HAMILTON: I think in short the answer would be that you want the U.S. to engage the U.N, pay our dues, to make it a better U.N. We have to explain to Americans the important, the successes, and the failures of the U.N. We have to speak up for the U.N. and let people get a realistic assessment. Criticism comes because the U.N hasn’t lived up to our ideals, but it doesn’t understand the criticism, many of the beneficial activities of the U.N. and it deserves our support.
The President has to take the lead in strengthening the U.N. Every President has voiced support as an effective tool of U.S. foreign policy. That’s sometimes limited to one speech a year, though, and it is important to speak up more about the importance.
The Congress and the President have to work out a better process to deal with the U.N. Congress often complains about activities of the U.N., lack of consultation from the President re: U.N. commitments. There has to be a lot better communications.

ROBERT KAGAN, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate, November 14, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: When you discuss European interests, how do you define such interests? Do you look only at the economic policies of the European Union, or do you also include England and Eastern Europe? Where do the economic interests of England, the European Union, and Eastern Europe coexist and where are they in conflict? Further, what differences and similarities exist amongst the economic interests of the nations within the European Union?
KAGAN: Your very smart questions require an essay-length response. I can’t do them justice here. When I discuss European interests, I am not addressing specifically economic interests but general national interests. In fact, I don’t talk that much about ‘interests”, I think, I talk more about ideas and fears and aspirations. In that regard, there are clearly differences within Europe, between East and West, on either side of the channel, etc. It is always a risk—as I have been reminded about a million times by now—to try to talk about “Europe”. (Which is funny, since Europeans themselves constantly talk about “Europe”).
Obviously, Europeans have conflicting economic interests—on farm policies and subsidies, for instance. And now with the unraveling of the stability pact regulating European budget deficits, it will be interesting to see how “Europe” holds together. I suspect it will survive.

NOAM CHOMSKY, Linguistics and Philosophy Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 26, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: You are very critical of our current policies. If you could change United States foreign and military policy, what would you make as our primary objectives? Should we have a role in providing economic assistance that may have mutual benefits and should we engage in military operations that prevent genocide?
CHOMSKY: We should surely provide economic assistance that has benefits (I don’t know why “mutual” enters). And there is no shortage of examples. To take just one, at least 3,000 children die every day in Africa from easily preventable diseases, and with funding so slight that we wouldn’t even notice it, we could easily end this catastrophe. As for preventing genocide, yes, I think it would be legitimate to use force to do so, and I even know of a few cases. In the post-World War II period there are two real examples that might qualify: India’s invasion of East Pakistan and Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. In both cases, the U.S. strenuously opposed the actions to terminate huge atrocities, and punished India (and particularly Vietnam) for doing so. I don’t know of any cases remotely comparable. If you have Kosovo in mind, I’d urge that you look at the massive Western documentation on the topic, which is quite decisive. You can find some reviews in books of mine, including the most recent one, “Hegemony or Survival”, but you should not take it on faith, but check the original sources, which is not hard.

PAUL ZEITZ, Global AIDS Alliance Executive Director, December 1, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Noam Chomsky (see previous question) stated the costs to Americans of combating infectious diseases in Africa would be so slight we wouldn’t even feel it. How much would it cost to properly fight infectious diseases in Africa, including HIV? What do you see as preventing us from making that commitment?
ZEITZ: Noam Chomsky is correct.
UNAIDS estimates that we need $10.5 billion per year starting by 2005.
WHO estimates that an additional $5.5 billion is needed to achieve the goal of putting 3 million people on treatment with lifesaving AIDS medications by the end of 2005.
WHO has global estimates for TB control of 3 billion per year and Malaria control at 2 billion per year. So in total we about $20 billion per year to control these diseases of mass destruction. We are calling on the U.S. government to provide 1/3rd of the total costs, or our US fair share based on the fact that we control 1/3rd of global wealth.

TONY MENDEZ and JONNA MENDEZ, retired Central Intelligence Agency agents, February 25, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: It is stressed that students interested in CIA work should learn foreign languages. Yet, unless the language is native to you, isn’t it hard to learn a new language without an accent that would be detected by a native? Is there special training for emersion in language skills for CIA recruits seeking to work in foreign countries? Or, are such recruits usually then hired primarily for translating documents?
MENDEZ and MENDEZ: There are lots of different language requirements in the intelligence community. The CIA itself has a very robust language program, teaching and testing to the highest levels. Yes, there are special schools that take it further, The Monterey Institute in California, for instance, where they do total immersion and get very good results. A friend of ours at the agency, a very senior man, had both Chinese and Russian language skills, tested at a “5”, which at CIA means native proficiency. Some people are better at the skill than others—but every can at least learn to operate in a language.

NEELY TUCKER, Washington Post Staff Writer, February 26, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Foreign adoptions can be difficult, you hopefully for those who stick with it, ultimately rewarding struggles. A friend of mine also had an involved foreign adoption. While I don’t know all the details, it required her living in another country for several months while various political and administrative difficulties were settled. She, too, plans to write about her experiences. My questions: what were the most difficult aspects about writing about your experiences? Did you find it emotionally draining, or perhaps it was emotionally helpful to get your thoughts collected and to express them?
TUCKER: The most difficult part of the book, as you surmised, was how emotionally draining it was. I wrote in three months flat, locked in a room on my parent’s farm in rural Mississippi. I had grown up in that room, and my Grandfather, who came to live with us in his later years, died in it. Writing there, day after day, surrounded by my own history, and so many memories of the war and conflict I had witnessed, came back to me in waves that I could not have foreseen. I would ride around at night for hours after writing, just trying to clear the pressure in my head. At the end, I suppose it was very therapeutic. A lot of demons let loose and, one hopes, banished.

ROBERT E. HUNTER, Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, March 29, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: What are your thoughts on concerns that expansion of NATO may make it more difficult for NATO to reach a consensus on how to act? Since some military actions require quick decisions, how well will NATO be able to balance consulting its member nations while making responsive actions?
HUNTER: It may seem that the larger NATO becomes—as of today, it has 26 members, only five years ago it had only 16—the harder it will become to take decisions, which, as the questioner knows, are always taken by consensus: indeed, NATO never takes a formal vote. But what seems obvious may not be so. In the first place, the new members are deeply devoted to the same principles as the existing members—in particular to preserving and extending security in Europe. Furthermore, NATO has always been most effective when there is vigorous debate about (what) it should do—and not do—against a background of knowledge both that having an alliance that works is critical to all and that, when it has taken a decision, NATO has never failed in what it has set out to do. Thus, with 16 members or 26, the task is the same: for all the allies to become convinced that a particular course of action is important; and for their there to be effective leadership—and a reputation for probity, good judgment, and commitment to allied security—remains vital to the alliance; and this administration like those before it must husband that resource. If it does so—in particular to move beyond the crisis of the last year, then the number of allies will not be that important.

DAN FROOMKIN, wasingtonpost.com columnist, April 21, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Is there a sense that Colin Powell will not be back for a second term in the Bush Administration (assuming Bush wins reelection)? If so, I have trouble balancing this with Secretary Powell’s statements that he admired a previous State Department Secretary who remained loyal to both his President and his principles even when his principles dissented from his President. If this is so, why would he then quit when he has a chance for another term of arguing for his principles? If he wishes to remain and it is known he won’t be rehired, why doesn’t he resign in protest now?
FROOMKIN: Well, it does seem pretty obvious that Powell would not serve in a second term. But he ain’t a quitter.

STANSFIELD TURNER, Former Central Intelligence Agency Director, August 11, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: What would be the advantages and the difficulties of having one person in charge of all our intelligence operations?
TURNER: The military have a great need for intelligence, including tactical intelligence which should not be run by a central, national authority, e.g. scouts on the right flank.
We also need to ensure that differing interpretations of the intelligence data are free to percolate upward.

RONALD KESSLER, author, August 12, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: We have read the spin from both sides. Either CIA employees are exuberant because “one of their own” has been named to lead them, or CIA employes are upset that a person so critical of them may be in charge. Of course, with so many employees, both sentiments could exist. What do you believe is the prevalent mood within the CIA regarding the possibility that Porter Goss may be their boss?
KESSLER: Some are a little troubled by the fact that Goss occasionally has made unfair criticism of the agency, but overall I think the employees are positive about him because his overall record shows that he understands intelligence and that he will make changes that are responsible.
CZIKOWSKY: If Porter Goss is replaced as CIA Director, does he intend to return to politics: perhaps even to seek to win his Congressional seat back? I haven’t read if he’s been asked this. To me, this is important, as it indicates whether he considers his political career as a fallback to his administrative career. If this is the case, might it indicate that he will be keeping more attuned to the political of his actions than if he has decided not to return to politics?
KESSLER: I think it would be unfair to ask any prospective government official what he plans to do next, assuming he even knows the answer. What is important is the person’s track record and I think he has shown himself a thoughtful and objective person in this field.

MARK SHAPIRO, FRONTLINE/World Correspondent, August 20, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: As the U.S. refuses to sign various international treaties, in addition to invading Iraq without widespread international support, is there less respect for the U.S. as we seem to be a country that does as it wishes without consulting the international community?
SHAPIRO: One word answer: Yes.
CZIKOWSKY: What are your forecasts for how the future of international trade as our lifestyles changes to an informational society?
SHAPIRO: Disputes over trade issues will continue to accelerate as the international legal hallmarks of our time…
That said, I think our reliance on imports is increasing…and hopefully there will be some cultural-reverb from that as U.S. comes more attuned to realities of the world. Already see it in emergence of Spanish as second language of the U.S.; of increasing emphasis on foreign policy in current Presidential debate; number of student studying abroad; number of great music bands from distant locales finding popular reception here; same with films; and then there’s always Ikea to give you the feeling of Scandinavia. Not necessarily in that order.

DAN MORGAN, Washington Post Staff Writer, October 18, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Why has no one noticed the inconsistency of the Bush foreign policy where they decline to negotiate directly with North Korea in order to preserve the negotiating efforts of foreign nations, yet then refuses to recognize the negotiating efforts of other nations when it comes to Iraq?
MORGAN: The President argues that he is being a “multilateralist” in the case of North Korea, by bringing in other parties, such as China. Yet, the Administration has resisted creating such a multilateral group of neighboring countries to work on the Iraq situation, i.e., Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia—and maybe even Iran. So the Administration’s view of multilateralism does seem to shift on a case by case basis. For example, the Administration generally has taken the view that economic sanctions are more effective when applied by a group of nations acting together, rather than one alone. Jimmy Carter’s solo grain embargo of the Soviet Union after the invasion of Iraq is ofen cited as an example of the folly of unilateral sanctions.

MEL GOODMAN, former CIA analyst, November 15, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: To me, a fault of the current Administration is they neglected to consider analysis that contradicted the policies which they had already decided to adopt. By now seeking the resignations of people within the CIA who question their politices, what dangers are there towards compromising independent analysis? Is there now a fear that the analysis must agree with already drawn conclusions and, if so, doesn’t this hurt the very nature of why we need independent analysis?
GOODMAN: I totally agree. The major problem at the CIA, which the agency refuses to concede, is the politicization of intelligence on Iraq and then the absurb defense that George Tenet and Stu Cohen (the chairman of the phony October 2002 estimate) made to the media and to an academic audience at Georgetown University, where Tenet is not Professor of International Diplomacy (please!!!) We need some integrity in the process and you don’t need to apply additional funds or additional reform measures to introduce integrity. We are back to telling truth to power.

MICHAEL SCHEURER, former CIA analyst, November 23, 2004
CZIKOWDKY: What are your thoughts on the recent forced resignations within the CIA? Is this sending the wrong message: that analysts who do not send reports that agree with Administration policies might be in trouble? Or, does this not affect the manner in which intelligence is gathered, analyzed, and presented to the President and his advisors?
SCHUERER: The major resignations to date have been senior operations officers and both officers, Mr. Kappes and Mr. Sulkcik, were distinguished officers and the agency is poorer for not having them. They were probably the best leaders we had in the directorate of operations in a decade. That said, there are certainly other officers at senior levels across the intelligence community who need to be removed because they are risk adverse and more bureaucrats than leaders.
Nothing that Mr. Goss has done to date will necessarily skew the intelligence product but surely the situation requires watching.

PATRICIA HARRISON, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, November 29, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: What is your outreach for cultural and educational exchange programs in Islamic countries? I believe many Americans lack an understanding of the Islamic and, vice versa, many in other countries do not understand Americans. What are you doing to allow such an exchange of understanding which, over time, can lead to greater dialogue, perhaps in future generations?
HARRISON: I agree with you that there is a lacking of understanding going in both directions. In fact, my bureau is charged with the mission of “increasing mutual understanding”. And you have really hit the nail on the head when you say we need to create a dialogue with future generations.
My primary focus as the leader of this bureau has been to reach out to younger audiences. Through our Partnership For Learning program we work in partnership with people of good will, youth influencers such as clerics, teachers, journalists, coaches, counselors, women’s organizations to ensure that the successor generation has the tools needed to meet opportunity.
We have hundreds of high school students studying in the United States from countries with significant Muslim populations in the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, and Africa. We’ve started a new undergraduate program for students from the Middle East, and through our Culture Connect program we are sending prominent American cultural artists, musicians, and athletes to countries around the world to engage and interact with youth.
If we sustain this outreach to a younger more diverse group, we will be able to build on these relationships for the long term. Our goal is to increase mutual understanding, mutual respect between Americans and those of other countries through exchange programs. At the same time, we are using all the tools of technology as well to connect further. But nothing beats face to face. Long after the official program is over, our exchange participants have told us they continue to talk with, meet with, exchange views with the Americans they met on their program. In the process, Americans who host people from other countries are enhanced by the experience as well.

BRUCE SANFORD, attorney, and VICTORIA TOENSING, author, January 12, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Is there anything akin to an Internal Affairs division within the CIA? What internal monitoring does the CIA have on itself?
SANFORD and TOENSING: The CIA has an Inspector General (IG) responsible for internal investigations.

DAN FROOMKIN, washingtonpost.com White House Briefing Columnist, March 23, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Are the neocons extending their power or are they being shoved out of the State and Defense Departments into less influential positions?
FROOMKIN: I would tend to believe the former. But it’s worth keeping an eye on.

PETER DENNIS, former Foundation for International Dignity Legal Aid, April 12, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: From your perspective, do you believe these (sexual misconduct) incidences were primarily localized in Sierra Leone, or do you believe there is an institutional inability of the United Nations to provide proper supervision and that this may be only part of a widespread problem that exists in many other U.N. establishments?
DENNIS: Well, I am not a U.N. insider. My experience with the U.N. has pretty much been limited to my time in Sierra Leone. I do think that I see some pattern though, and that is what led me to the article. It was actually after the news that Mr. Annan had vetoed the internal report on sexual misconduct by the former U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees that I hit a breaking point. It seemed ridiculous to me that while sexual abuse allegations were coming from Congo, we were learning that the head of a U.N. organization was allowed to keep working in the midst of his own sexual misconduct. What kind of message does that send? During Mr. Lubbers tenure the report on sexual abuse surfaced in Sierra Leone, along with allegations of sexual abuse among refugees in Burma the following year. If the U.N. was really serious about sending a message of “zero tolerance” that must apply to all!

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, July14, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: What is the law on exposing CIA agents? I recall a radical political group once incorrectly exposed me as an agent for the CIA (I believe that was one of their attack methods.) Is claiming someone works for the CIA an expression of free speech, or do they risk being charged with a crime even if it is false? Or, if it turns out they accidentally are correct, can they then be charged with a crime
PRIEST: The law was written after that case you cite. But it expressly says you must know that you are exposing someone who is covert. You can’t be charged with a crime—and neither can the media—if they accidentally name someone. The Washington Post’s policy is not to name someone who is still undercover. I believe that in the Plame case, we did not name her until much later, and after consultation with the agency. Although, just to show how imperfect these safeguards are, I believe the Post syndicates the Novak column and that Novak’s naming of her was distributed by The Post syndicate. The Post does not view the naming matter as a Freedom of Expression issue. Same goes for some other, highly sensitive national security matters. Other concerns come into play and the calls are made at the highest levels of the paper, in consultation with the reporters involved.

ROGER COATE, University of South Carolina Political Science Professor, Septe,ber 14, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Do you see much hope that the United States will allow itself to be in a position to make emergency actions to prevent genocide by sending food and supplies to threatened people with troops to guard threatened people without making a political statement on taking sides in a dispute? It seems to me that there should be a response to protect civilians anywhere against mass death without having to worry about the political consequences of such actions.
COATE: Permit me to rephrase the question, “Do you see much hope that the members states (especially the P-5) will allow the U.N. to…” The problem is not the U.N., it is the major member states, and, most importantly, the largest and most powerful member state, the USA. This you should ask Mr. Bolton.
CZIKOWSKY: What are your thoughts on the United States agreeing to be subjected to the World Court?
COATE: International law is based on reciprocity as its binding force. Americans, more than almost any other people (except perhaps Europeans), need a stable and well functioning international legal order---one in which reciprocity prevails. That is what is really at stake. It is the ability of American civil society and the private sector to operate effectively in the global environment. (The U.S. orientation toward ICC is another matter. In the military realm the U.S. is not just a superpower but a Giant with a big “G”.)

DAFNA LINZER, Washington Post staff writer, September 19, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Why don’t our leaders seem to realize that it helps to lead by example? I am not suggesting that we dismantle our weapons, but shouldn’t we realize that when we’re the ones with the weapons and we’re the ones that invade countries in their region, that other countries are going to get nervous? Indeed, when we declare a country a part of an axis of evil, aren’t we guaranteeing they will begin acting defiensively?
LINZER: I have a few thoughts on this. President Bush’s “six of evil” speech in 2002 isn’t talked about that much in the United States anymore but it is still very much on the minds of people outside this country. Some experts outside government think it has really hurt the administration’s ability to convince countries to jump onto its Iran policy and frankly, the North Korea one, too. I’ve heard others make the interesting argument that the Bush Administration would have more success if it spent more time trying to assure countries about their peaceful intentions and commitment to diplomacy.

MOHAMMED MAMDANI, Muslin Youth Helpline Founder, November 16, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: It has been said that a lot of the religious and political repression that has been supported by Muslim adults in various countries has failed to be supported as strongly by the young. Do you think that, as young Muslims become older, they will be more open to less restrictive lifestyles and governance and more open to alternatives?
MAMDANI: I think it’s inevitable that young Muslims across the Western world will adopt aspect of their new surrounding culture and become more open to new ideas. However, before we can hope for the emergence of a new generation of integrated young Muslims we as a society need to ask some difficult questions. To what extent is discrimination halting the progress of young Muslims? To what extent are young Muslims given a chance to articulate their concerns and hopes for society? Why is there an expectation that Muslim youth must leave integral parts of their identity and faith to be considered integrated? Is diversity a policy ingrained in the hearts of people or just a politically correct statement used by governments? Sadly, it is rarely considered appropriate to question whether WE as a society are creating obstacles for the integration of Muslin youth.

THOMAS CAROTHERS, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Democracy and Rule of Law Project Director, March 7, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: To what degree do you believe that the resistance in non-democratic countries to democratic values is less an objection to the idea of democracy and more fear of the imposition of foreign values that goes against their traditions and cultures?
CAROTHERS: Governmental elites in some regions, especially the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, say they are resisting democracy promotion efforts to defend their national security, but in most cases they are basically using that excuse to maintain their own anti-democratic power.
Citizens of some countries, particularly in the Middle East, do worry that calls for democracy by the West are more about cultural imposition than about political change.

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Professor, March 17, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: The United States is a military goliath, but can we sustain that, even if we decide that it is our role to continue as such? We are no longer the world’s economic goliath. China’s economy (granted our per capita wealth is far greater) has or soon will surpass ours. The U.S. has a trade imbalance with substantial debt held outside of the United States. The military is not a sector of the economy that strongly benefits other economic sectors than do investments in other areas. Can the United States sustain continued spending on our military while the rest of the world invests in sectors that contribute more to their economic growth?
MANDELBAUM: I believe that the global role of the U.S. does face an economic challenge ahead but, as I argue in “The Case for Goliath”, it is likely to come not from the costs of the country’s foreign policies—the ‘imperial overstretch” to which Paul Kennedy refers to in his book “The Rise and Fall of Great Powers”—but rather from the rising costs of our entitlement programs—Social Security and Medicare—as the baby boom generation retires. The threat comes not from China but from prescription drugs costs.
CZIKOWSKY: If we act as a “goliath”, shouldn’t we expect other countries to believe we are acting as “imperialists”, and doesn’t our military presence often create more nationalistic resistance to our presence than our diplomacy would better achieve?
MANDELBAUM: Other countries may say they resent our presence, but they don’t act as if they do. Most countries welcome the U.S. presence. Some, of course, do not, but the U.S. is not present in those countries. The Japanese and South Koreans, for example, continue to play host to the American military even though the Cold War has long ended. This general acceptance, accompanied, of course, by criticism, is, I believe, important evidence in favor of my thesis—that the U.S. provides governmental services to the world.

KAREN DeYOUNG, Washington Post Staff Writer, October 2, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Did you learn if Colin Powell kept in touch with General Schwarzkopf while he was Secretary of State? I wonder what General Schwarzkopf thought of the current plans for the war in Iraq and whether he was able to provide any comments to Powell directly.
DeYOUNG: Powell and Schwarzkopf shared the Vietnam experience (both also in the Americal Division), something that has resonance in the psyches of both. But they are very different personalities and had a sometimes rocky relationship during the Bush I Administration and the Gulf War.

ROBERT KAGAN, author, October 31, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Do you see a guiding philosophy behind our nation’s foreign policy? Do our foreign policy implementers tend to see us as the police of the world and we expect the rest of the world to act according to our expectations? Has there been any shift in that the current administration seems to believe we do not need to answer to the international community? Especially since we seem to claim how we are acting in a Judeo-Christian manner which represents the majority (but not all) our nation, shouldn’t we follow our beliefs and statements with actual actions by providing greater humanitarian aid around the world? Indeed, if we acted more to help people, regardless of their politics and religion, wouldn’t we actually set an example and create greater respect and cooperation throughout the international community?
KAGAN: A very thoughtful comment and set of questions. I do see a guiding philosophy behind our foreign policy, rooted more in principles of the Declaration of Independence, however, more than in any religion. (Although one could argue that the principles of universal rights may have a religious underpinning.) We are not always true to this philosophy. Americans are capable of hypocrisy and selfishness, as are all other peoples. Yes, people would like aid. But they often bridle at what they regard as an imposition of American, or Western, economic and political ideas—the strings that come attached to the aid. Ever since the nation was young, Americans have offered what they regarded as the “blessings of civilization” to other peoples. This offer has been coupled, often, with certain demands and efforts to enrich Americans, as well. Others, whether the native Americans of the 17th and 18th centuries, or the conservative Islamists today, have seen this offer of assistance as a ruse, an effort at “peaceful conquest.” So it hasn’t always made Americans beloved—even when Americans have acted from their own point of view with the best intentions.

MAURA HARTY, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, November 20, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: I have never lost a passport, yet I know I am supposed to go to a consulate if I ever lose or have one stolen. What actually happens then? What is done to prove who I am, what paperwork is involved, and about how long do these cases take to resolve?
HARTY: It’s always a good idea to be sure you know where your nearest embassy or consulate overseas is when you’re traveling. If you are unfortunate enough to lose your passport, we’ll do our best to help you.
We’ll record your passport as having been lost, so no one else can reuse it. We also will be able to use an electronic version of your passport application to verify your identity and citizenship so we can issue a new passport. Normally, we’ll send a new passport from the U.S. within a week. If you have immediate travel plans, in some situations we can also issue emergency passports (limited in validity) directly from the embassy or consulate.
Good luck with your travels!

RICHARD L. RUSSELL, National Defense University Security Affairs Professor, May 9, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: How bad is the gap in language skills within this country? Isn’t it difficult to recruit people to work for the CIA because so few people speak Farsi, Arabic, Korean or other languages where the needs have jumped significantly in recent years?
RUSSELL: I look at the problem from the other side of the coin. In my view, the CIA and the intelligence community writ large do an overall poor job of tapping into the wealth of foreign language capabilities that we have resident here in the United States. Our country is loaded with first and second generation Americans who speak languages other than English at home. The CIA’s security vetting of potential personnel, in my view, much too readily dismisses individuals with hard language capabilities such as Arabic, Farsi, and Chinese because they have relatives still living abroad. That security barrier is simply too high though because no one is going to be fluent in hard languages without family, friends, and extensive living experience abroad.
CZIKOWSKY: Have you identified procedural aspects in the flow of information that, if corrected, could sharpen the abilities for policy deciders to better use intelligence analysis? For instance, I generally have read that field analysts usually provide useful information, but that problems arise as this information rises up through the ranks. Administrators and senior advisors attempt to fill in the blanks when making best guesses at what is not known. People in higher ranks of policy making then transform this analysis into actual policy actions, which often means transforming facts into opinions, which can mean that opinions more strongly favor some facts over other facts. What is your sense of the current flow of information, an dhow would you change that?
RUSSELL: There are several problems here. A major problem with writing analysis is that it must pass through too many layers of bureaucrats in order to get passed over to policy makers. There might be eight layers of management between working level analysts and the CIA Director. At the same time, more taskings for analytic products are generated from the top down, which often forces analysts to try to answer questions for which there is not a critical mass of intelligence. And CIA managers are increasingly micro-managing the process to compensate for their insecurities regarding an increasingly inexperienced workforce.

MARCUS MABRY, Newsweek Correspondents Chief, June 26, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Secretary Powell supposedly privately argued against Secretary Rumsfeld on a number of matters. What did Condoleeza Rice think of these debates, and how did she view Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld?
MABRY: It was one of the most fascinating exchanges of our three interviews. The Secretary of State told me point blank that she didn’t understand why Secretary Powell has been saying that he had less influence than Secretary Rumsfeld. She argued, for instance, that Powell had just as much access to Bush as Rumsfeld, which no one in Washington believes.
But, as always, she stuck to her guns and she just insisted her view was correct. It was amazing to see. But that kind of discipline—some would call it, delusion—is what makes Rice unshakeable and unrelenting. She sticks to what she needs to believe. That strength and determination carried her from segregated Alabama to the White House to being the most powerful woman of color in 230 years of American government. But it also gives her an un-surpassing faith in her own opinions and perspectives. It was one of the strengths that became a tragic flaw in the run-up to the war in Iraq: when she ignored the critics and doubters.
CZIKOWSKY: Does (Condoleeza Rice) take in good humor the storyline of Jack Donaghy of “30 Rock” dating her, does she view it as an insult, or might she not even be aware of this storyline?
MABRY: You know, I’m sure she’s aware. But I think it developed after our three interviews, so I don’t know. But she’s got a pretty thick skin. Though her friends and family described chapter and verse to me of how it’s not as thick as the outside world thinks it is. Still, that sort of thing wouldn’t bother her. She finds her dating-life speculations funny.

TIM WERNER, New York Times correspondent, July 24, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Is it true that, in order to hide the CIA’s budget from foreign powers, that Congress used to hide its appropriation under the Bureau of Public Roads line item in the budget?
WERNER: The CIA’s budget is buried in false and mislabeled line items in the Pentagon’s budget. In 1961, the new sign on the highway leading out to CIA headquarters (newly opened that year) read “CIA next exit”. This displeased the new Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, who lives just down the road at Hickory Hill. He was livid, and after several increasingly furious calls the sign was replaced by one reading “Bureau of Public Roads”.
CZIKOWSKY: What is the general flow of information between the CIA and the White House? I find it fascinating that recent accounts are that materials reaching the President today seem to reach him in far different routes than previous Presidents. Would you agree with these accounts, or do these routes change dramatically among Presidents?
WERNER: Every President differs in his desires for how he wants his intelligence served. Something Richard Helms once said comes to mind: “If we are not believed, we have no purpose.” After the 2002 WMD (weapons of mass destruction) debacle, it was hard for this White House to believe in the CIA. That may be why President Bush said in 2004 that the CIA was “just guessing” about events in post Saddam Iraq.

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, State Department Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion Committee Member, August 21, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: What is your reaction when democracy is accepted, yet that democracy elects a government we don’t like? What it terrorists win an election, or fascists win an election, or communists win an election? What should our policies be towards encouraging the continuation of democracy when the elected governments are ones our government does not like?
MURAVCHIK: That is a good question and a tough one.
I believe our policy should be that we will accept any electoral outcome, so long as the winners don’t themselves shut down the democratic system and prevent future elections. There is no way to guarantee it, but we should put that question in bright lights by means of our diplomatic actions from day one of the new government.
However, accepting the outcome of an election does not mean that we are obliged to give the winners our money. When Hamas triumphed in Palestine, it was in no way undemocratic for us to say: OK, you won, but we are not going to assist you unless you commit to peace.

JOHN BOLTON, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, January 30, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: Now that you have observed up close and participated with the United Nations, I am wondering what do you see that the United Nations does that you believe they are effective at doing? How do you believe they could build upon what they do well and become an even more effective organization?
BOLTON: As I explain in my book (“Surrender Is Not An Option”), I think the most effective UN agencies, by and large, are those that are financed through voluntary contributions by members governments, rather than through the system of assessed contributions in place in most UN agencies. The singly most important change we could make would be to move toward a system of fully voluntary contributions for UN agencies, which would allow us much more flexibility in where we provide funding and where we do not. It would also provide an incentive within the UN for better performance, which is basically absent under the “entitlement system of assessed contributions.
CZIKOWSKY: Are you aware of Peter Earley’s book that claims that Georgi Mamedov, Russian Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister, claims that a high level American advisor was “an extremely valuable intelligence source.” Is this the Russians attempting to cause confusion in our diplomatic circles or what is that all about, in your opinion and observations?
BOLTON: I know Mamedov well, and negotiated with him frequently during the first Bush term, as I describe in the book. I wish I knew who he was talking about!

PARAG KHANNA, New American Foundation Senior Research Fellow, March 25, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: How do you see China as fitting in with the countries of the Second World?
KHANNA: China is both a second world country in terms of its internal characteristics (level of stability, socio-economic divided, etc.) but is also a superpower in its own right in terms of its geopolitical activities and ambitions around the world. So it’s a unique case of a country I analyze internally (like other second world states) but also, of course, it’s a major factor in my geopolitical world-view.
CZIKOWSKY: Others have commented on how much of the world viewed the United States after the 2001 terrorist attacks, and how those views in many countries have changed dramatically since we sent troops into Iraq. Has your analysis included these rapid changes in attitudes towards the U.S. and, if so, what have you observed?
KHANNA: Definitely—having traveled to all these second world countries AFTER 9/11 I’ve seen very clearly how it has deteriorated America’s image and how very concretely countries are moving to partner with others as a way of hedging against excessive reliance on the U.S. as a partner who could, potentially, turn against it. This is purely rational and self-interested behavior and we should not expect anything else, especially after the Iraq War!

FARRED ZAKARIA, Newsweek International Editor, May 12, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: America’s run at dominance was short-lived, especially compared to Rome, Greece, or even England. At the beginning of World War II, we were not even in the top ten of military powers, and we emerged from Word War II as the world’s largest military and economic power. Did our putting too much on emphasis on military slow our economic growth?
ZAKARIA: Not really, at least not in the strict economic sense. We have been able to have both guns and butter. And U.S. share of world GDP has been large (about 25%) for more than a century, so I don’t think our dominance has been short-lived. The unipolar era has been brief but that has been such an unnatural situation, never seen before since the Roman empire 2,000 years ago. The real culprit is not us but “them”. IN the book (“The Post-American World”) I call it “the rise of the rest”---everyone else finally growing their economies that is changing the world. The pie has expanded and while our slice is still large, it will shrink somewhat over time.

TIM SHORROCK, investigative journalist, June 3, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: Since we have essentially privatized much of our intelligence operations, how do we oversee that the contractors are not secretly in collaboration with a rival intelligence agency?
SHORROCK: We now spend about $60 billion a year on all intelligence agencies. It is important for readers to know that about 85 percent of that money is controlled by the Pentagon, which has command and control over the NSA, the NGA, the NRO, and the DIA, plus of course the individual intel units within the military.
And as I report in the book (“Spies for Hire”), about 70 percent of the budget goes to private contracts, covering the acquisition of everything from pencils to satellites.
CZIKOWSKY: I am among many who have questioned why there were not the correct protective vehicles manufactured and sent to Iraq and why there aren’t more drone airplanes patrolling in Iraq. The answer we receive is that long term contracts require the purchasing and use of resources according to previous agreements. Have you los sight of the importance of protecting our soldiers over protecting legal rights in business contracts?
SHORROCK: A few months ago, at a conference I heard a high-level military commander complain to an audience of contractors that they were trying to sell technology to soldiers on the ground that really didn’t help. He urged them to better understand the need of commanders and soldiers. Capitalism in my opinion has no place on the battlefield.

RAND BEERS, National Security Network President, August 27, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: Some foreign policy experts say we should only become involved in military engagements when our own interests are immediately threatened, or for humanitarian reason—such as to prevent genocide--, when our involvement would be effective, and when we have an exit strategy or options for how to conclude the engagements, and considering the consequences of such engagement on our foreign policy as a whole. Do you have a general series of conditions for evaluating when it is proper for us to engage militarily?
BEERS: I think this is a pretty standard comment by a lot of people who have thought have and long about this both before and since our engagement in Iraq. I’d start first and foremost with the effect of that engagement on our national interests, the direct effects on the safety and security of the U.S. That’s the first point where the U.S. should be prepared to use force. The second consideration, about genocide and humanitarian considerations, is a very important point at which we should look hard and see whether we’re prepared to move forward. In addition to the point about the clear exit strategy, I’d say we’d need the clear support of the American people, that we almost certainly should have friends and allies prepared to work with us in those situations, that we should have a clear idea of how we’re going to proceed—it’s not sufficient to say we’re going to put x number of solders into an area, we need to know what the plan is and how they’d be employed. That I think helps get us to your last point. Regarding a clear exit strategy—even a threat to the United States’ imminent being is justification for the President to consider force, but having said that, we should make sure we haven’t ignored other instruments of power before employing force, unless a time span makes that impossible. In Iraq, there were options other than the use of force to ensure any weapons would not be used against the U.S. or our allies. It was not an imminent threat—even the U.S. when challenged on that point acknowledges that. Even though a lot of Americans may have the impression the Administration used words like those. I think they tried to be careful not to.
CZIKOWSKY: In a poll of Presidential qualities, John McCain sees his biggest increase in support over Barrack Obama when the quality is asked as to whom the voters sees as better prepared to be Commander in Chief. How should Obama deal with this weakness?
BEERS: I think it is important for the American public to understand that bluster and heartened rhetoric are not solutions to international problems, just as use of force frequently is not. Sen. Obama should continue to convey this more reasoned approach, while at the same time not giving the impression that he’s unwilling to use force when it’s necessary. He has said, for instance, that he would be willing to go after bin Laden in Pakistan if their government wouldn’t. I don’t know any serious student of national security who would disagree with Obama on that. It’s hard to think about peaceful solutions to these conflicts because they aren’t as dramatic—wars avoided are less known than wars engaged in. It leads to the idea that warriors are the best defenders of national security, when in fact people who make tough judgments without necessarily having to resort to the use of force in the long run solve more conflicts than people who simply resort to the use of force as the first and always chosen solution.

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, former U.S. Secretary of State, November 6, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: There are people, like Warren Buffet, who presumable never would take an official position with the Administration, yet whose advice frequently might be sought and considered. Who do you believe might fill such roles in the Obama White House on foreign policy (i.e who should Obama call on as unofficial advisors)?
ALBRIGHT: I think there are a number of people who have been part of the senior citizen policy group he has had, but I’m not going to suggest who he should call on. He has shown during his campaign that he is interested in a variety of views and is a very good listener and is very good at assessing the value of different people’s opinions, and then makes up his mind based on a lot of important and very valuable information.
CZIKOWSKY: I think It is an important message for the rest of the world to realize that a woman born and raised in the Czech Republic can become U.S. Secretary of State and that a man with roots in African can become U.S. President. Does this have meaning in foreign governments and among people worldwide? What message are they taking from this?
ALBRIGHT: I think the message they’re taking---and we certainly saw that in worldwide reaction---is that people understand that America is a country with a wonderful history of accepting people as immigrants from different countries, that democracy works in America, and I hope people see how good American people really are---home generous and interested in what is going on in other countries and in cooperation more.