MILITARY ISSUES

LORA LUMPE, Foreign Policy in Focus Analyst. May 20, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What is the degree to which foreign trainees learn about covert operations? If we were to end or restrict this training, what affect might this have on reducing torture and abuses when these students return and then inflict them on their own civilians?
LUMPE: The U.S. military teaches over 4,000 different subjects to foreign militaries. Some of these are quite benign---like English and combat medicine---but interrogation techniques, commando skills, and counterinsurgency doctrine are also taught. In my view, we should not be providing lethal military training to any foreign militaries that have a record of severe human rights abuse. This year the U.S. government is seeking to provide such training to at least 51 militaries that It (the State Department) has identified as having a ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ human rights record. For such countries, in my view, we should be providing training in the Laws of War and human rights legal obligations.

RICK YOUNG, “Frontline” Producer, May 24, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Many of these situations are a complete mess, In Liberia, the situation has been so confusing that it has been reported that fighters will switch sides depending on whether it is daytime or nighttime. What can outsiders do to best minimize this chaos? Will cutting the supply of arms into such volatile regions help, and, if so, how can that be accomplished? YOUNG: Cutting arms supplies is a start. Right now Sierra Leone has the largest U.N. peacekeeping mission in the world---more than 17,000 U.S. troops are in a country the size of South Carolina and there’s an opportunity for peace. They just had elections very recently and all of these are hopeful signs. But one of the ironic tragedies of Sierra Leone is that it is both the poorest and least developed country in the world---largely because of the last decade’s civil war---and at the same time one of the richest countries in natural resources---in this case diamonds. And as long as there are natural resources to fight over and the government is not sable and in control the prospects for war and further bloodshed remain. All of that is enflamed by a constant infusion of more arms and that’s why stopped the arms and cutting illegal shipments to the region is critical.

CAROL D’ESTE, author, May 30, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Have you joined in the speculations of possibilities if the Normandy invasion had been delayed? Eisenhower’s advisors were so split on what to invade. What do you think was the ultimate reason Eisenhower chose when to invade?
D’ESTE: This entire question is thoroughly discussed in the book (“Eisenhower”).
The decision to launch the invasion was solely predicted on the weather and the fact that they had a very narrow window to time in which to launch the invasion. There were very limited options. The ultimate decision to invade on June 6th was the weather. It was actually scheduled on June 5th and they couldn’t bring it off. Eisenhower’s decision was one of the most courageous and difficult made by a military commander in a time of war.

JAMES BRADY, author, September 19, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Over the years, Parade magazine has featured some great stories on military heroes: people who usually did what was needed under the pressure of the times. What are the factors you see that create a great soldier?
BRADY: One hero I always think about was my own company commander in Korea, Captain John Chafee who later became Governor of Rhode Island, Secretary of the Navy, and a U.S. Senator. The reason I admire Chafee so much is that he was a rich young man and a star of the wresting team at Yale who dropped out to join the Marines as a boot, the lowest rank of course, in 1941, when Pearl Harbor was attacked. Chafee fought throughout the Pacific War and after graduation went to Harvard Law School. Then when Korea came along, poor Chafee by now a married man with a child on the way, was called back into the Marine Corps and ended up fighting yet another war. He never complained. He never pulled a string or used his connections. He just did his job as an officer and a gentleman. I think of John Chafee as a great American and a wonderful Marine.

TRACY WOOD, former United Press International Vietnam War Reporter, and ANNE MERICK, former ABC News Vietnam War Reporter, September 25, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Looking back, what lessons should we learn from the Vietnam War? Did we enter the war with a firm objective and were we ignorant of how to combat the enemy? Did we lack an exit strategy? To me, it is a shame that so many veterans have been ignored of a war they bravely fought when it was the errors of our leaders that created the public dissatisfaction with that war.
WOOD: In terms of today, where we are right at this minute, the critical lesson is why exactly are you going to go to war and what are you going to do when you get there. Vietnam was a war where they kept “winging” their policy, meaning it wasn’t thought out---they couldn’t get out and they couldn’t stay in because they had no policy. Today there’s sort of the same parallels you see from a distance. The U.S. went in Afghanistan in a hurry but now we don’t know what to do now that we’re there. We don’t know whether to help them rebuild the country or whether we should get our or whether we should put more troops in so that the country is more secure. We have no policy in Afghanistan right now. And now we’re talking about Iraq and we’re talking about taking out Saddam Hussein but I don’t have a clear sense of what we do next. Do we keep U.S. troops there to keep the peace? Or do we just go in to strike Saddam and get out right away. There are the parallels and policies that need to be thought out.
MERICK: I believe we should give serious consideration to the question of nation building following any military involvement.
CZIKOWSKY: How did you both wind up in Vietnam? Is this an assignment you asked for? If so, what was your motivation to go there?
MERICK: Yes, I asked to go to Vietnam/ It was a major story of the time and every journalist wants to cover a major story. Just like 9/11 was a major story in this country.
WOOD: No, I had no expectation I was ever going to go to Vietnam. I was working for one of the wires in New York and studying Chinese and expecting to go to China/ Nobody was going to go to Vietnam because the war was winding down (March 1972). And then the North Vietnamese launched their Easter Offensive and they had to send somebody quick and I was the next to go to Asia, so two weeks later I ended up in Vietnam.
The foreign editor at my news organization didn’t want to send a woman because he felt that women shouldn’t cover war. At that point I knew I had to absolutely go.

RICK ATKINSON, author, October 8, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: World War II veterans are getting old, and their stories are being lost. Are there places that are collecting and accepting the remembrances of these veterans?
ATKINSON: Yes, that’s a good question and it’s an important issue. The U.S. Army’s Military History Institute, which is located at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. has been gathering thousands of individuals reminiscences from World War II veterans for more than a decade now. The other services, as well as the Library of Congress, have similar programs, though not as ambitious.
CZIKOWSKY: Are there lessons from fighting in North Africa in World War II that should be noted in preparing to fight in Iraq today? ATKINSON: I think there are a number of lessons germane to both today’s military and to today’s confrontation with Iraq. President Roosevelt’s most important ambition a year after Pearl Harbor was to maintain the best coalition possible, because he recognized in modern war, the best “team” wins. In his private New Year’s Even toast at the White House on December 31. 1942, Roosevelt lifted a glass of champagne first “to the United States of America” and then to “the united nations”, meaning the 26 countries that then comprised the Allies.

DAVID KAY, Former United Nations Weapons Inspector: December 16, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: How accurate are inspections capabilities? How possible is it that weapons of mass destruction can exist and remain kept without detection?
KAY: Good question. Chemical and biological programs can easily be embedded in peaceful activities. The same plant that makes pesticides can with very little new effort produce nerve agent and then switched back to pesticide production. Our inspection technologies continue to lag. This is the reason that defectors and interviews are so important to unmasking these programs. Nuclear programs are harder to hide, but it is not impossible.

CHRIS HEDGES, journalist, New York Times
CZIKOWSKY: What do you suggest are the spiritual and emotional costs of war? Similarly, what are the spiritual and emotional costs of negotiated peace?
HEDGES: The spiritual and emotional costs of war are terrible, for war in its essence is about betrayal. It is the betrayal of the young by the old, betrayal of soldiers by politicians, and betrayal of idealists by cynical and powerful interests that think only in terms of profit. War is in the end death. This is what war is and when you embrace it too long it destroys you. The ancient Greeks and Romans knew that war was a god. The god of war began by calling for the destruction of the other but war always, when pushed to end, (read the Iliad) ended in self-destruction.
But pacifism, like cynicism, can be a way to avoid the ethics of responsibility. This is the hard part. I am not a pacifist. I supported the intervention in Kosovo and Bosnia. We failed as a nation by not stopping the genocide in Rwanda- for if the Holocaust taught us anything it must be that when you have the capacity to stop genocide and you do not you too have blood on your hands. So I am all for peace, but not for pacifism.

LEE FEINSTEIN, Director for Strategic Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, February 5, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Why do we seem to be militarily prepared to go to war with Iraq, who is unable to use its weapons without being devastated, when there is North Korea which we know has weapons and a desire to someday overrun South Korea? I know different situations require different responses. Please explain why we need these different responses.
FEINSTEIN: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright used to answer these kinds of questions by saying “we don’t have a cookie cutter foreign policy”. And she was right. Different circumstances require different approaches, as Powell has said in this instance. In the case of North Korea, however, the Administration seems to be betting that time is on its side and that this crisis can wait until after the showdown with Iraq. But the odds on that bet are getting longer each day, however, as the North edges closer to restarting its nuclear capability.

MARC SIEGEL, Professor of Medicine, New York University, February 13, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: How are soldiers treated for prewar stress? Is there any danger in overmedicating our troops?
SIEGEL: You’re right. The use of anxiolytics (Valium, etc.) could make a solder groggy when he/she might be going into combat, which is problematic. Therefore, the treatment is not likely to be medicine but emotional support. I realize the military may be short on emotional support. This area obviously needs work in the military

MICHAEL LARIS, Washington Post Staff Writer, February 18, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Isn’t it so ironic that while we fought against racism in World War II, we practiced it here at home? Did you learn more about the feelings of African-Americans who wished to join their fellow soldiers in that war, but were so denied?
LARIS: One of the stunning things about doing the research was digging through the old Black papers, which were filled with terrible stories of lynchings and wonderful stories of courage in the face of incredible slights. One of the important themes in the papers was this idea that achieving equality, or moving toward it, in the military would bring about change in the rest of society. Once World War II started, the notion was described in shorthand as Double V, victory abroad and at home.

ANTHONY SWOFFORD, author, March 21, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Every Marine I’ve met has a strong tendency towards punctuality. You were late for this. Shall I presume you have a legitimate excuse for being tardy?
SWOFFORD: Sir, I do have a legitimate excuse for my tardiness. I’ve done fifty push-ups, as well, and forty bends-and-thrusts. Punishment enough?
CZIKOWSKY: In the military, one is trained to kill when so ordered. In battle, some freeze. There have been studies that find some never fire their weapons. Others seem to snap. What mental conditioning did you undergo to fit into that requirement? How did you find your fellow soldiers do with this mental training?
SWOFFORD: The mental training is an extension of the practical training…they are intertwined. Because you know how to use your weapon, you are capable of dealing with the other end, the mental end. Also, it’s necessary to demonize the foe.
CZIKOWSKY: It is the duty of a soldier to disobey an unjust order. How well do the Marines train you to understand that?
SWOFFORD: The Marine Corps stressed from early on that unjust orders should be disobeyed, and indeed, that the Marine should suffer punishment and even death before obeying an unjust order.

GWEN IFILL, Moderator, “Washington Week” TV show, March 27, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: It has been written more eloquently by others such as Chris Hedges, yet there have been fears expressed that the media presentation of the war with Iraq may be deluding the public and making us insensitive to the death and destruction that is happening, yet not being shown. Is this something you fear as well?
IFILL: I do worry about becoming desensitized in the face of so much information, so much horror. But as long as we have human beings covering (and reading) the news, I think it is ultimately not going to happen.

LISA DE MORAES: Washington Post Television Columnist, March 27, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: What do you think of television views seeing the ultimate reality TV show: the war in Iraq? I believe most of us believe the war won’t be over until we see Jeff Probst extinguish Saddam Hussein’s torch. Author Chris Hedges raises an interesting point: he fears viewers are becoming desensitized towards war. It comes across like a video game. We don’t see the horror of war. Do you thoughts on how television is presenting the war, and how viewers are taking war coverage?
DE MORAES: I agree with concerns that it comes across like a video game which is why I think it is important for TV to show the pictures of the dead soldiers. People need to see how horrible it is, not just the gadgets and the awesome snaps of bombing at night.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, May 14, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: The internal debates between the Defense and State Departments are out in the open. Yet, it appears to be the Defense Department whose views are prevailing within the Bush Administration, or am I wrong on this? How far can Secretary Powell be pushed, or is he fighting back, or does it appear he continues to go along as a “good soldier”? Is it good to have a military run by civilians and a State Department run by military people when the advice from experts in both departments is so varied, or is this leading to clashes that are only confusing our policy decision makers?
PRIEST: On the first part: Yes, it does appear Rumsfeld prevails within the Administration, big time. Powell, as far as I can tell, still believes in being a team player. As to the second part—yes it is god to have civilians run DOD (that is enshrined in laws and the democratic tradition of civilian control of the military). Having State run by former military is indeed a quirk. But it is one that reflects that the four stars at DOD (of which Powell was one once) gained a sophisticated view of the world after the Cold War ended and really came to appreciate multilateralism—or at least regional approaches to conflict prevention—much more so than Cold Warriors who sat out the 1990s—that would be Rumsfeld.

GWEN IFILL, “Washington Week” moderator, May 29, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Has any news reporting organization attempted to connect the degree to which our foreign policy is influenced by economic interests? I am not one of those who believe oil is the only issue driving how we respond. At the same time, we can’t deny that our national economic interests are not considered in how we prioritize which countries receive our attention. For instance, our support of attempts to replace the government in Venezuela was a short few day story and has been since ignored. Yet, when one considers the countries where we have supported regime changes-Venezuela and Iraq and now possibly Iran-one can’t wonder why these countries get attention while other brutal regimes (and I don’t deny that Iraq and Iran are brutal regimes) elsewhere in the world receive less attention from our government.
IFILL: One can wonder, indeed. And we can cover it all, which we try to.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, June 25, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: From an American perspective, little attention has been focused on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. These are nations with struggling economies, poor human rights records, and are impacted by regional instability. What is the latest status of these countries and should the United States be paying greater attention to these countries?
PRIEST: The United States is paying greater attention to these countries, largely in the field of counterterrorism, which means increased funds for intelligence and military equipment and training, particularly to Uzbekistan. The programs, I believe, are still quite small in Turkmenistan, which has a dictatorship with no minimal freedoms. Others are thinking about non-military aid, but the trickle of assistance is still quite small.

MEL GOODMAN, Center for International Policy Senior Fellow, September 11, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: As a general, but important, philosophy for how we handle international relations, wouldn’t it be better for our international standing if we diverted more of our military spending to direct economic development assistance that directly assists the people of other countries? I know these general discussions are usually dismissed for being too simplistic. Yet, I believe we would improve our standing, lessen the fears of those that fear us, reduce the threat of terrorism in the long run, and improve our own economic standing if we would become the humanitarian assistance country, rather than just the country that can impose its military will on most others. Is this a good general direction to move, or am I being naïve?
GOODMAN: I totally agree with you so perhaps we are both naïve. Military power is a blunt instrument and until we address root causes of terrorism, we will continue to make the mistakes that the Israelis, for example, continue to make. Irresponsible use of military power, whether on the West Bank or Baghdad, will create a better terrain for terrorism. We have totally underfunded the foreign economic aid and assistance programs for this country…plus the Department of State and the Agency for International Development…and devoted far too much to Defense and Intelligence. And we are now paying a terrible price for these decisions.

JIM LAYCHAK, Pentagon Memorial Fund, October 3, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: It is nice a tribute is being developed. What was the process that allowed this to happen, and how did each of you become involved in the creation of this tribute?
LAYCHAK: The Department of Defense through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ran a design competition process that began in November 2001. I, along with 11 other family members, were asked to participate as a kind of focus group or steering committee to that process. That’s how it started.

STEPHEN IVES, filmmaker, November 11, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: How would you compare and contrast today’s war reporters from those from previous times? Do you see war reporting as a progressively improved learning experience for the occupation, or does it seem to be radically redefined with each war, or perhaps some combination of both?
IVES: What you see when you look at war reporting over the last one hundred years is a set of common themes which recur again and again. Ultimately, war correspondents reflect the existing attitudes and ethos of the culture which they are a part. Technology has often played a dramatic role in changing the way wars are covered. For example, Edward R. Murrow’s revolutionary use of radio during Word War II, the impact of television in Viet Nam and now satellite technology in Iraq. But ultimately, reporters are struggling to do the same job—somehow transmit the reality of war in a way that is still palatable to the American public.
CZIKOWSKY: What do you believe were some of the great embarrassing secrets that governments kept from war correspondents in history? It seems to me that, after every war, much about each war is discovered years later. Do you believe reporters are getting better at getting at the truth of the story today, or, as war has become so much more complex, is it now more difficult to learn what is happening on battlefields?
IVES: In World War I censorship was near total and although reporters were only miles from the front, the real horror was never reported. And this is not a trend that has disappeared. One of the big stories in the first Gulf War was the story of the incubator babies. The idea that retreating Iraqi troops had raided Kuwaiti nurseries, carted off the incubators and left the babies to die on the cold floor. This was a news story that obsessed the media and was played over and over again. It turned out to have been completely unsubstantiated and the first Bush Administration helped disseminate the story by hiring Hill and Knowlton, a Washington based PR firm to disseminate the story by producing a phony witness who testified in front of Congress that turned out to be the daughter of the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United Nations. The press only broke that story years after the war.

SHARON WEINBERGER, Defense Daily Writer, March 29, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: I presume much of the information regarding the isomer bomb is theoretical. Is that correct? Assuming an isomer bomb can be built, how much damage would there be over how large a range of land? How could, if at all, someone under attack from an isomer bomb protect oneself?
WEINBERGER: Yes, the isomer bomb is a theoretical concept. Assuming it worked (and that’s really a huge assumption) how much damage it would do would depend, like all weapons, on how big the yield was and how the bomb was designed. The more isomer material you put in. the more yield you would get, presumably But then there are lots of intervening question-how much isomer would you “burn” in an explosion. What is the efficiency of the energy release? How much radioactive isomer material would be released? There are all important questions. I suppose if you take Darpa’s two kiloton hand grenade as a serious concept, then you can a visual idea of the destruction. The 1945 bomb dropped over Hiroshima was about 14 Kilotons—so the hand grenade is about one-seventh of that. Although keep in mind, the hand grenade has provided a great many chuckles, laughs, and jokes at the nuclear weapons labs. As to how to protect yourself from an isomer bomb—I’ve never really thought of that one. I strongly suggest writing to Darpa’s very helpful public affairs office with that question, and let me know what you find out.
CZIKOWSKY: If an isomer bomb could be built, what is the level of difficulty for someone else, perhaps China or North Korea or Iran, to potentially figure out how to then also build one?
WEINBERGER: Well, first, there is a huge dispute over whether an isomer bomb could be built. There are simply so many basic science questions, let along engineering challenges that make this end product unlikely, I would argue. It is also very, very, very expensive. One former senior Pentagon official said something like: by all means, we should encourage North Korea and Iran to spend all their money on isomer bombs—better than nuclear weapons, which they really could build. He was being sarcastic, but his point is well taken. What on earthy would North Korea do with a $38 billion bomb that is constantly decaying and shielded with heavy amounts of protective material? How would they deliver it? Where would they store it? And that assumes it triggers. That assumes you can get a chain reaction. That assumes you learn how to mass produce it. I’m not too worried about a North Korean isomer bomb. And although I have a great deal of respect for Tony Tether, I really am not worked about his isomer suicide bombers. That’s a little bit silly.

DAVID LIPSKY, author, May 11, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: What do you think of “The Lords of Discipline” which was a (fictitious?) tale about hazing and driving away supposedly “undesirables” from a military school? Did you witness hints of hazing or plans to convince disliked students to leave West Point?
LIPSKY: I think “Lords of Discipline” was a good movie and a much better book. I liked Pat Conroy’s “My Losing Season” last year too-he went to Citadel and obviously had a mixed experience, both good and bad, things he hated, things he loved and misses. Some of it—I’m sure you had the same sense reading “Lords”—had the ring of stuff that must have, in at least a partial sense, happened. But of course Conroy’s a good enough writer so he could make even fictional things have that sense of truth.
I didn’t witness hazing at West Point; Gen. Douglas MacArthur, when he was Superintendent of USMA in the early part of the last century, had tried to get rid of it; other Supes tried to do away with it periodically.
General John Abizaid, who was Commandant when I arrived in 1998 and is now the head of Centcom down in Florida, really began to enforce the no-hazing policy in the mid-90s, and now it’s gone. A thing of the past. I have seen some Plebes who miss it—what they saw as a big test—go up to upperclassmen and say, essentially, “Please haze me.” They especially wanted to be ordered to do a “White Tornado”, which is where you eat all the condiments on your mess hall table.
I did see George Rash took a lot of “why don’t you leave” questions, especially during his first two years. What’s funny, and fair-minded, about the cadets at West Point, is that when they saw George live through it and improve, they began, almost against their will, to root for him. By the last year—it was a real fun thing to write about—most of his classmates were cheering him on. They’d say “George is the biggest miracle we’ve witnessed here.”

TOM MALINOWSKY, Human Rights Watch Advocacy Director, May 12, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: I have heard of an interrogation description where a person withholding information is given heroin for a week. Then the heroin is replaced with sodium pentothal. Is this a good interrogation technique, and is it permitted or does it violate Human Rights Watch standards?
MALINOWSKY: I’ve talked to many people with experience conducting these kinds of interrogations, and none would say this kind of treatment works. The prisoner would say anything to get relief, but not necessarily the truth. And any hope of establishing the right kind of rapport with the subject would be lost.
As for whether it’s right or legal, the answer is obviously not. And again, all we have to do is imagine how we would feel if this were done to an American held prisoner overseas. Our military relies on the Geneva Conventions to protect its own, which is why within government it is often the uniformed military leadership that is most insistent on upholding these standards.

HANIS KARPINSKI, 800th Military Police Brigade Commander, May 14, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: It is the duty of a soldier to disobey an illegal order. Are Reservists provided the proper instruction to recognize when an illegal order has been given, in your opinion? KARPINSKI: Yes. The soldiers are all trained and knowledgeable about the appropriate way to follow orders and in certain circumstance what to do if they believe an order is wrong. These soldiers (in the Iraq prison abuses) from their statements that have been published are saying the orders were correct and they did not follow the orders blindly. They questioned the people who were issuing the orders and they were reassured and convinced somehow that these were the right things to do.

GUY WOMACK, lawyer, May 14, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: It is the duty of a soldier to disobey an illegal order. How does a soldier distinguish between an order that is legal or illegal? WOMACK: That’s the most important question in the case and the way I answer it is that it’s based on common sense and experience. In this particular case (Guy Womack’s client) Spec. Graner had been at Abu Grahib Prison and had witnessed the methods used by intel officers both military, other government, and civilian contract employees and the things that he did are in accordance with what he saw there.
If a soldier is asked to do something that he believes to be illegal, he should seek to clarify the order to make sure he understands it and if it is illegal, he must refuse to obey the order. Based on what he had seen at Abu Ghraid, Spec. Graner did not believe this to be an illegal order.

ELIZABETH HILLMAN, Rutgers Law School Assistant Professor, May 19, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: If soldiers thought they were following legitimate orders from those in command, what are their duties to obey or disobey an order that is in fact illegal? What are the responsibilities of those who issue illegal orders, and do you think we have a system willing to discover who might have issued illegal orders?
HILLMAN: Soldiers must obey orders unless they know them to be illegal…so it’s a judgment call that’s difficult to make, especially for those of low rank and little experience.
Those of higher rank appear to have been under great pressure to produce results from the interrogations—those officers are in a different situation, since they ought to be in a position to question the legality of directives more rigorously than those will less experience, education, and training.

WINSLOW T. WHEELER, Center for Defense Information Senior Fellow, August 23, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Shouldn’t much blame historically be placed on the Defense Department and our political system? The Defense Department long ago realized the way to increasing funding is to split operations across Congressional districts. The Defense Department was not designed for efficiency; it was designed for political expediency.
WHEELER: Yes. DoD is heavily involved in the pork process.

JOHN HUTSON, Former Judge Advocate General, August 25, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: General Karpinski earlier seemed to state she had been out of the loop and was unaware of prison abuses. Now it is being alleged she knew or should have known. What do you think?
HUTSON: Respectfully, and without knowing all the facts, I think she was as derelict in the execution of responsibilities as any officer could possibly be.
CZIKOWSKY: Does the military adequately conduct background checks on its personnel? I ask because there have been press reports of at least two people alleged to have abused prisoners in Iraq who were charged to have previously been abusive prison guards in America, including one incident where a prisoner died in Connecticut. If the military didn’t check, why didn’t they? If they did check, were they seeking abusive prison guards?
HUTSON: The background checks for enlistment are fairly cursory. For security clearances (Confidential, Secret, Top Secret, that sort of thing) it’s much more indepth. I believe that the abuses we have seen require that we re-evaluate how we are recruiting soldiers.

RENAE MERLE, Washington Post Staff Writer, November 16, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: How is it that a person in charge of procurement (Darleen Druyun) should operate without supervision? Were her decisions checked or audited by any supervisor or third party or independent source? How long was she able to award contracts improperly before anyone noticed something was amiss?
MERLE: Druyun was supervised by a political appointee, the Air Force acquisition chief. But there has been a lot of turnover in that position and it can take awhile to get someone confirmed by Congress, so there were stretches when there was no one filling the acquisition chief position and Druyun was basically running the office herself. The other thing to remember is that it would take some time for any acquisition chief to get familiar with the hundreds of programs the Air Force was managing. They would have to depend on Druyun’s judgment and advice for guidance.

STEVE COLL, Washington Post Associate Editor, February 8, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Of lessons some analysts and reporters have noticed is that Osama bin Laden is very good at telling people what he is going to do before he does it. He does not give the details of when and where his followers will strike, but he does like to warn a particular (to him) aggressor, and he always then strikes somewhere against that aggressor within a few days of such a warning. Assuming you accept this premise, do you believe Osama bin Laden would provide any warning if he possessed a nuclear weapon, or do you believe he would strike without warning?
COLL: Interesting. He presumably does this to prove to his followers that he’s the Man, the Conjurer. He might wish to ensure credit to himself if he was aware of another big attack of any kind. Of course, it might be that the next big attack, whatever it’s character, will be carried out independently, even if it is inspired by bin Laden in some way. That’s been the prevailing pattern.
CZIKOWSKY: Your article did an excellent job on describing some of the potential dangers that an enemy without borders and without a government could make an attack resulting in enormous loss of life. The question now is: how can we best monitor these hard to define organizations of terrorist groups and what should we be doing to best detect when and if these dangerous weapons are smuggled into our country?
COLL: A lot of what we’re doing to protect borders and cities from radioactive material isn’t publicly disclosed, but you get the impression that they’re working on it and have made some progress. There was a great anecdote published in the Washington Post some time back about a guy who had a heart procedure, a routine checkup that involved injecting him with some radioactive material. As he was driving back to his office, he was pulled over by very anxious Secret Service types. He had beeped their equipment, apparently. So that’s reassuring, I suppose.

RANEY ARONSON, PBS Producer, March 2, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: With body armor, we have fewer casualties, but more survivors who have serious injuries, including limb losses. The good news is we have less deaths, but then we have more survivors with nightmares. Does the military have enough psychologists, psychiatrists, and counselors available to dealt with this surge of soldiers needing assistance? What more, if anything, should the military be doing?
ARONSON: Such a great question—and you’re absolutely right—advances in body armor has saved lives but brought home soldiers with injuries that are very difficult to deal with. There are places that do have incredible therapy for folks who have come home injured. One of those institutions is Walter Reed in Washington, D.C. But there is much more that could be done—and the Army is the first to say that they could use more help. I interviewed a high ranking Army psychiatrist who said over and over again that she really wishes more mental health professionals would join the Army to help our soldiers.

VIVECA NOVAK, Time Magazine Washington Correspondent, May 9, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Did anyone in the military or government ever say anything to the affect of: if we treat people like this, I certainly hope an enemy never treats out captured soldiers like this? Isn’t one point of showing restraint to our prisoners is to set an example to the rest of the world how we, especially that of a democracy seeking to show others how good democracy is, expect all people to be treated?
NOVAK: You’re correct—that’s what the Geneva Conventions are all about. The primary reason to be part of them, in the view of many, is to ensure that our solders are humanely treated if and when they are taken prisoner.

WILLIAM ARKIN, author, May 19, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: If a country such as North Korea is led to fear a preemptive strike, what is to stop such a country feeling justified to make a pre-preemptive strike on Japan or Guan or somewhere else?
ARKIN: I’m not sure that North Korea or Iran, largely isolated and cut off from an open and frank dialog with the U.S. doesn’t already believe the worst, expect the worst. That to some degree drives their policy. We should not be blind then to the impact what it is they believe about us, and the impact of our specific actions. To merely interpret their actions as aggressive without trying to understand where they originate is counterproductive.
CZIKOWSKY: How certain are we that this order won’t instead mean that countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons will only hide it better?
ARKING: Countries that are developing nuclear weapons already practice as much “operational security” as they can. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea are all cases in point. But in the case of Iraq, we also made many assumptions that proved wrong. I wouldn’t want to see another preemptive U.S. strike based on the same groupthink and poor intelligence. So the bet thing is to take advantage of military preparedness (and war plans) and a clear declaratory policy to try to convince other countries that they should understand the implications of taken actions that would threaten the U.S. or its allies.

DON EDWARDS, Retired Army Major General, June 14, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Karl Rove will never let a draft happen. At least the Bush Administration learned one lesson from the Viet Nam War: do not stir people’s opposition to the war by forcing people’s children to die in the war that they don’t understand. Yet, will there soon be no option left? Colin Powell has indicated we are losing the war in Iraq and the Generals state we don’t have enough troops. Again, how far away are we from having no option but to institute a draft?
EDWARDS: There will not be a draft and you have discussed the reasons. The reality is we are stretching our Soldiers and Marines painfully.

JULIETTE KAYYEM, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government Lecturer, July 11, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: How does our behavior serve as an example to how we hope other countries will detain their detainees? Do we have a responsibility to lead by exaple on how we hope others will behave? Shouldn’t we be concerned that others may feel that they need not follow usually guidelines when detaining Americans?
KAYYEM: I recognize your argument and it is one I tried to address. You are right to be concerned that how we treat others, we will also be treated; that when we abrogate the rules, nothing stops others from doing the same. But, regarding this issue, I think we have overstated the impact of our detention and interrogation policies on the world. Sure, they have not done us any good. But, I believe that tings have gotten so bad—Iraq, terror threats, an unknowable al Qaeda—not because we have violated some norms (but due to complicated, and in my opinion, bad policy decisions). So, in the end, I don’t like what our lack of politics has turned us into (including our military).

JOSH WHITE, Washington Post Staff Writer, August 3, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: I don’t know why brutal interrogation tactics are used. Not only do they makes others in the world lose respect for us, but it is my understanding that most experts agree that there is very little value of information derived from such tactics. Are you aware of anyone in the military who claims otherwise: that (disregarding their legality and impropriety) that these tactics are useful in obtaining any good information? If not, why are they being used?
WHITE: This is certainly a matter of intense debate, and there are policymakers who believed that giving this latitude to interrogators was important and necessary. A report on the detention operations in Iraq in late 2003, by retired Col. Stuart Herrington, made exactly this pint, that treating detainees badly doesn’t yield the best information. Sometimes people will say whatever it takes to get out of abusive or painful interrogations. When these cases were unfolding in Iraq, there was intense pressure from senior officials to get intelligence about Saddam Hussein and about the insurgency. It’s unclear whether these tactics yielded better information.

COLBY BUZZELL, U.S. Army Specialist, March 15, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: One soldier I know described the war as hours of extreme boredom interrupted by occasional moments filled with extreme intensity. It is hard to imagine the confusion of so many life and death decisions happening all around you simultaneously. How would you describe war?
BUZZELL: War is mostly boring.

P.W. SINGER, The Brookings Institution Senior Fellow, June 12, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: How are children recruited to serve in militaries? Are they forced into it? Do parents object? Have you interviewed a child recruiter, and what are their thoughts as they recruit children?
SINGER: Children are recruited through all sorts of means. Some are abducted. Typically, recruiting parties from rebel groups of the like are given conscription targets that change according to need and objective. Some, like the Tamil Tigers, even use sophisticated computerized population databases to direct recruiting efforts, so they target the communities that have the most children. All children are not automatically taken, but only those who meet certain criterion. Those judged too small are often killed in order to intimidate both the local populace and the new recruits. Once caught, children have no choice; usually they must comply with their captors or die.
To maximize efficiency, both state armies and rebel groups target the places that they know children will be both vulnerable and in the greatest number. The most frequent targets are secondary schools, marketplaces, and refugee camps. Sudan is an example of where this happened. In many ways, these tactics echo the naval press gangs of the Napoleonic era that used to sweep through a harbor looking for able bodied men to serve. Now, it’s children. Another difference is that abductions are not just about building out one’s force, but are also instruments of war. Abduction raids often like to rape and looting rampages.
Some children choose to join an armed group of their own volition. However, to describe this choice as “voluntary” is misleading. Leaving aside that they are not yet of the age considered able to make mature decisions, many are driven into conflict by pressures beyond their control, usually economic in nature. Hunger and poverty are endemic in conflict zones and children, particularly those orphaned or disengaged from civil society, may volunteer to join any group that guarantees regular meals. The same factors may also drive parents to offer their children for combat service.
Structural conditions may also oblige children to join armed organizations. If surrounded by violence and chaos, they may decide they are safer with guns in their hands. Revenge can also be a particularly powerful impetus to join. Lastly, some groups may take deliberate advantage of adolescence, a stage in life where identity is still defining. Through propaganda or media distortion, violence may be glorified or fictions created to induce children to self-identity with an organization. This took place in places ranging from Rwanda to Palestine.
CS recruiters do so not merely because they are evil or mean spirited, but usually for a thought our reason. They view children as assets. They see children as cheaper and easier to recruit (they will also fight for causes that adults can’t be convinced to, such as for a warlord), easier to force to follow your orders, and less costly to lose. Indeed, in may places (Congo and Myanmar for example) our research came across recruiters who preferred children as fighters because they would follow orders that adults wouldn’t.

EDWIDGE DANTICAT, author, September 25, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: What are your thoughts on how a country should lead by example and not torture? Granted, even if an enemy does not respect a country’s policies that they will not torture when such an enemy tortures and ills captives, it is till best overall for our captives if we are human when we capture their fighters. Shouldn’t we be leading by example to help reduce the use of torture by others?
DANTICAT: That is certainly a crucial side to this, especially as there are so many U.S. citizens vulnerable to capture in Iraq and other places. Senator McCain, who probably knows more about torture than any of us, has been very eloquent on this point, I think. At least previously.

KAI BIRD, The Nation Contributing Editor, September 26, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Have you ever spoken with people who were considering what should happen should Germany or Japan developed the atom bomb first? I have heard some who argued there were suggestions that we would have given up half the country and made the Mississippi River our military fighting line. Have you ever heard what military planners were thinking?
BIRD: Well, the answer is no. Good question, though. What a terrible prospect, but you’d think there would be some contingency planning for it. But I’ve never seen anything in the archives about this.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, October 12, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: We on the state level know that our National Guard has been stretched too thinly: if there should be a major disaster in Pennsylvania, too many of our troops are overseas for an adequate response. I also read about the Generals who criticize that there are not enough troops in Iraq to achieve our military objectives and how we’ve already lost parts of the country, perhaps permanently. Now that Iran and North Korea see we are stretched, they appear to be more likely to act in defiance of any American threats. So, what are the plans, if any, to deal with the lack of troops? PRIEST: Recruitment bonuses and new Madison Ave-created advertisements. It’s not exactly a long term plan, but it is supposed to help with recruitment targets—for a pretty penny. I don’t see a long term plan.

RUPERT SMITH, British General, January 18, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: What good is having over one-half of the world’s military expenses and having enough weapons to kill every person on Earth, and the technology to monitor every square mile of Earth, if the enemy is going to be a sniper or a planted bomb? As we modernize, our military enemy adjusts to our weaknesses. What will it take to strengthen our weaknesses?
SMITH: I cover this to a degree in my book (“The Utility of Force”). Essentially we must change the way we think about using military force. Our opponents are operating below the utility of our weapons in a tactical sense and strategically they act so that we tend to take military advantages which play to their advantage. We need to start by finding their weaknesses and then attack them.

BRIGID SCHULTE, Washington Post Metro Reporter, June 4, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Will the military accept children of illegal immigrants? SCHULTE: Technically, no. Military service regulations require that a recruit be a legal permanent resident or green card holder. Some undocumented recruits have gotten in, it’s later discovered, by using temporary work permits or other documents. Some have used fake IDs and, in one case, someone assumed a U.S. citizen’s identity.
Legally, however, Congress has given the military to recruit anyone they deem vital to the national interest.

ANNE V. HULL, Washington Post Reporter, June 18, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: To what degree were the problems of veterans health care limited to Walter Reed, and to what degree were these institutional problems that veterans health care was being neglected across the country?
HULL: They aren’t limited to Walter Reed but WR is supposed to be the gold standard for everything medical in the Army, including psychiatry. The first day’s story wasn’t about WR at all. It was about the difficulty getting accurate records, getting an accurate evaluation, and getting help.

NATHAN FICK, Center for a New American Security Fellow, August 13, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: How well do our leaders understand what it takes to fight the enemy in today’s war? I ask, because it seems as if many of the lessons from Viet Nam have been forgotten. I realize combat has changed, yet our military is established to fight another army. It took a long time to realize how one fights a guerilla organization in Viet Nam, and the outcome of that war demonstrates we never really figured out how to do it. Toda, the enemy in Afghanistan and Iraq is not the standard army that our forces have necessarily been taught to fight. As we are rushing to get troops ont the ground, how much training are they given, and what training is lacking?
FICK: I do firmly believe that our institutions are learning. Hopefully it’s not too little, too late. I agree with you that these lessons have all been learned before. Our manuals are written in the blood of our predecessors. As for training, the US military has a strong institutional process by which young Americans are trained and steeped in the culture before being deployed overseas. The typical Army or Marine private on the ground overseas is exceptionally capable. In an ear of global media, they have to be. The so-called “dumb grunt” doesn’t exist, if he ever did. Instead, we have the “strategic corporal”—young troops whose actions, for better and for worse, resonate on the world stage and have strategic repercussions. That training and indoctrination process mustn’t be allowed to erode. For what I’ve seen, it hasn’t.
CZIKOWSKY: In Iraq, the private solders are not accountable to Iraqi law. What are your feelings on this? Are private soldiers in Afghanistan accountable to Afghani law?
FICK: Accountability for private contractors is a major issue—both in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Clearly, the threat of being fired is simply not deterrent enough, especially in an environment where stress and danger are so real. One of the mistakes of the past several years has been out-sourcing traditional military duties. Hiring contractors to cook food may make sense, but hiring them to guard the US Ambassador or key Afghan and Iraqi public figures makes no sense. It sets a poor example for our troops in uniform, and actually exacerbates our personnel retention challenges as people leave the services to earn more money as contractors.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Intelligence Reporter, September 13, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Can nuclear weapons be moved without Presidential authorization? How did the weapons recently get moved “by mistake”?
PRIEST: They can be moved, transported, yes, but not launched. That’s how I understand it. But that doesn’t make this story any less of a huge deal. I still don’t know the answer to your question but am sure The Post will get to the bottom of it soon and maybe even put the story of the Front Page, where it deserves to be.

KEN BURNS, filmmaker, September 24, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Many people have noticed that the World War II veterans seldom spoke about what happened to them. What was it about World War II that seemed to let its veterans decide that it was best to remember in silence, and how where you able to break some of these silences?
BURNS: That is an excellent question. This is an unusually reticent generation. They went off and saw bad things, did bad things, and lost good friends. When they got home they have no one who could really understand what they had experienced and so they locked it away in the deepest recesses of their souls. Fortunately, in the sunset of their lives a few of them have realized that their memories are our inheritance and have graciously let us bear witness to their extraordinary stories.
CZIKOWSKY: Memories fade and people who lived through World War II should not be expected to remember details. Did you check the facts presented, or did you feel that was not necessary, knowing that viewers should understand that not all facts should be expected to be 100 percent accurate after all these decades?
BURNS: We verified with official military records the essential facts that we present in the film (“The War”). At some point, we have to trust as we do driving down the highway that the other won’t crash into us, that the most personal details and observations are, in fact, true. After six and a half years of working on the project, we feel we’ve got a pretty good ear for the difference between the tall tale, the embellished story, and real battle experience.
In the upcoming episodes try to watch their facial expressions and you will see that none of this is a pleasant memory or an exaggerated memory for these brave soldiers.

NAOMI WOLF, author, September 27, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Have you looked at the issue of building a paramilitary with the extensive use of private soldiers in Iraq? There is a force estimated of between 20,000 to 50,000 security forces, many of whom are soldiers of fortune, who protect businesses yet have a legal right under immunity from the President to engage in combat.
WOLF: I have a whole chapter (in “The End of America”) called “Developing a Paramilitary Force” which centers on Blackwater. You are so right about this threat. No one can take over a democracy, no matter how badly it is weakened, without a paramilitary force that bypasses the people’s representatives and I am sorry to say no democracy can resist the pressure on it of a would-be despot that has developed such a paramilitary force. Again, Mussolini was the innovator with his black-shirted Arditi and Hitler as so often picked this up by deploying his brown-shirted SA. If you want another historical parallel, you should look at how these leaders directed groups of angry young men to intimidate people counting the vote in southern Italy and in Austria. Blackwater is in superficial trouble right now for shooting civilians in Iraq. What most Americans don’t know is that Blackwater is already here at home—Homeland Security gave them a massive contract to patrol the streets of New Orleans after Katrina—and Jeremy Scahill reports that unnamed contractors did fire in the direction of civilians there. Blackwater’s business model calls for more and more deployment here at home—in the event of a natural disaster of in the case of a “public emergency”. Scarily, the President now has the power to decide what a “public emergency” is all by himself. This is exactly what the Founders were terrified of because they knew how abusive a standing army was to the colonists; King George’s men went through their possessions and raped colonial women. This is why the Founders swore that Congress should regulate military activity and why they made the National Guard answerable to the people. Blackwater’s close ties to the White House strip all of us of 2nd Amendment protections and endangers us all in a very personal way.

RICK ATKINSON, Washington Post Defense Reporter, October 17, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: About how many soldiers did you interview for your book (“The Day of Battle”), and did you find they were generally reluctant to talk about their experiences? I find it interesting that the World War II veterans, in my experience, generally are reluctant to talk about what they went through, and I was wondering if you found they were glad to finally have their memories told, or if many still require prodding to open up.
ATKINSON: To be honest, I don’t do a great deal of oral history collecting. I probably interviewed a couple dozen veterans for “The Day of Battle”. Obviously you’ll sometimes get that marvelous brushstroke of detail from an interview that you’d never find elsewhere: but even the most cogent vet today is in his 80s and there has been an interval of 60+ years between the lived event and the subsequent narration. I find the contemporaneous record so vast and compelling, including many oral histories conducted during the war, or shortly thereafter, that I simply don’t need to do latter day interviewing much. As for the reluctant of veterans to talk—sure, some don’t like to recall what in some cases were searing and painful. But in general I find them quite chatty, and of course even six decades later it can be extraordinarily emotional.

MARK KAPLAN, Portland State University Community Health Professor, November 12, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: We are learning of many of the difficulties that returning Iraqi War veterans have. What are your concerns about their long-term health issues?
KAPLAN: Excellent question. The focus so far has been on the immediate impact of the war. The hidden psychological injuries of war are very hard to document. We know that many World War II veterans still experience the trauma of war.

DAVID CYNAMON, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP Senior Litigator, December 4, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: I know this is not a legal question, but how do you believe this case (where David Cynamon is attorney for Kuwaiti detainees at Guantanamo), but how do you believe this case affects our international reputation? I believe we have an obligation to be the example of how democracy and justice works properly and one of the reasons why so many other nations looked to us was because of our fair treatment of our own citizens and even our relatively far better treatment of military and foreign prisoners. I fear we may be risking not only our international stature but possibly inviting retribution—or at least we will find we have less of a right to protest should our citizens be tried in other countries with legal and police processes we find offensive. What are your thoughts on this?
CYNAMON: The points you have made have been raised by others, including many former military officials who are concerned that we are setting a dangerous precedent that will be used against us by our enemies in future wars. Senator John McCain, who knows firsthand what torture is, has been particularly outspoken and eloquent on this point.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, January 17, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: How is research on the use of drones coming along? It seems to me the could play a larger role in surveillance, and that if we had more drones in the air we could tell more about whether routes are safe and gather greater intelligence on what is happening on the ground. What is limiting an expanded use of drones for intelligence purposes?
PRIEST: There’s not really a limit. Drones are the collectors of the century! They’re everywhere, they even come in the shape of dragon flies. I’m certain they will continue to proliferate in range, mission, and number.

KRISTIN HENDERSON, author, February 26, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: It was Barry Goldwater who stated that in a foxhole one only asks if the person in the same foxhole can shoot straight. During combat, it should not matter if the person is a man, woman, straight, gay, young, old but if the person can do the literally life and death job. It seems the people who have served in combat seem to understand this far better than the general public. If so, maybe the general public should let those who understand combat decide such things.
HENDERSON: In a democracy, the military is a reflection of the will of the people. To decide where we as a society want to go on this issue, what’s needed is a more active dialogue between the military and civilians who increasingly don’t have any direct military experience. It goes back to the military-civilian gap I wrote about last summer.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post staff writer, July 10, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: As one who has wondered why we don’t fly more drones, I found the news that an airplane in Afghanistan is being controlled by pilots in Colorado to be a fascinating story. What are your thoughts on the future of such aviation, and what it could mean to improve our fighting and intelligence capabilities without placing as many soldiers at risk?
PRIEST: Drones R Us should be the new Air Force motto. I don’t know if the Predator’s manufacturer is a public company—but if it is, buy stock! This is the wave of the future in a million ways. One reason you saw a change at the top of the Air Force recently was to get rid of leaders who still are resisting this. Drones can take pictures, gather whiffs of chemicals, and track plumes. Armed, they are doing the brunt of the work along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in other places where U.S. forces don’t want to be on the ground but still want to fire shots at the bad guys. The only real problem is that they bore the heck out of real pilots, because piloting them is like playing a video game.

THOMAS A. SCHWEICH, former Deputy Assistant State Secretary for International Law Enforcement Affairs, December 22, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: I share your concern, and I am worried there may be a further layer where, that not only is the military increasing its influence, it is altering its message to those that best suit the top military brass as opposed to unbiased reporting. I wonder if the people closest to the situation are having their messages filtered and altered by higher levels of military management so that by the time it reaches the White House, there may be distorted information. Have you seen this as a problem?
SCHWEICH: I did see sometimes that even the top brass at the Pentagon got filtered versions of what was going on, for example, with training Afghan security forces---designed to look like the Pentagon efforts were a resounding success while everyone else was failing. (In fact, for a long time, no one was succeeding.) That distortion made it to the White House and the Congress. I think that aspect of the problem is improving in Afghanistan. Generals McNeil, McKiernan, Durbin, and Cone really went a long way toward open and honest reporting of the situation.