IRAN

MELVIN GOODMAN, Center for International Policy Senior Fellow, January 28, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: While considering our reactions toward Iraq, what actions do you think the United States should take towards Iran? Are there steps the United States should be taking to appeal to broader segments of the Aram and Muslim communities? If so, what would you recommend?
GOODMAN: Clearly the U.S. has not done enough to improve our relations with Iran and have even missed some opportunities. It would not be easy to improve bilaaterals with Iran but we don’t even try. We should also be doing a better job of getting our message to the Muslim countries. Abolishing USIA several years ago was an absurd idea…thank Sen. Helms for that one.

LINDA MacINTYRE. Frontline Correspondent, May 3, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: How can we reach out to the Iranian youth? Is there some sense among the young that Americans embrace all religions and that democracy has its merits?
MacINTYRE: That is a very good question.
We found universally that young people are curious about the U.S. They like North America. When we were in Iran we were a Canadian, a Scotsman, and a Jewish American who made no effort to hide either condition. He was probably more interesting to the Iranians than any of us. They have an instinctive fondness for North America that has to be with their sophistication who were very Western for many decades. As Persians, they have an incredible culture. That gives them a world view that is more advanced than the more tribal attitudes in other places there.
I’d suggest that anybody who wants to explore some sort of contact get in touch with Sen. Biden, who has been preaching about the need for closer connections among young people and professional people---who want better cultural relations.
CZIKOWSKY: Is there any reason why Iran could eventually become an American ally?
MacINTYRE: Many reasons. Iran is pro-Western (culturally). It shares the same interests as the U.S. in terms of stability, sensible management of petroleum resources, and the population has an open warmth for Americans. So, notwithstanding the state hard line Islamic apparatus, the reality of the people of Iran is very different.

STEVEL COLL, Washington Post Managing Editor, November 10, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: I found it very interesting the comments that some young people in Iran believe the United States can assist in producing positive change within Iran. How widely exposed are the young to American ideas and culture, and how accurately, in your opinion, do you believe Iranians understand American culture?
COLL: Intriguing questions. Satellite television, the world wide web, and other forces of globalization do connect Iranian students to American ideas and culture pretty thoroughly. So does the enormous, fluid Iranian diaspora, which has a large base in the United States. Yet at the same time Iranians are relatively isolated; their travel is limited, sometimes by their government, sometimes by their means. The students I talked to understood American and European political ideas with impressive specificity, yet there was also a bracing naïve earnestness about their sense of American ideals.

RITA HENLEY JENSEN, Women’s eNews Editor and SHADI SADR, Women in Iran Editor in Chief, May 19, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Please explain more to readers what Iranian women face when they attempt to state their opinion about their role in society where they are given limited opportunities to speak out against a society which has expectations about their silence.
JENSEN and SADR: As you know, Iranian society is patriarchal and it’s natural that women have difficulties expressing themselves or earning equal rights in this type of society. Patriarchy, in terms of a system, exists everywhere—in the laws, in the policies, in the home and everywhere else.
CZIKOWSKY: What is the status of abortion in Iran? Is it difficult to obtain an abortion within Iran? When an abortion is performed in Iran, how skilled are the surgeons? Do you have any information on the rate of complications and/or deaths associated with abortions performed in Iran?
JENSEN and SADR: Abortion is illegal, and is also a crime. The women, the doctor, and any one who assists in the abortion will be prosecuted. The only abortion that is legal is if, in the first trimester, it is determined that the mother or the child’s life is endangered by carrying the child to term. Regardless, the rate of abortions increases by the day. Home abortions, conducted by midwives or secretly in doctor’s offices, are the norm. Because it is illegal, there are no records or statistics about abortion in Iran.

THOMAS W. LIPPMAN, author, June 14, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: How does the Saudi government, as well as Saudi dissidents, view their relationship with Iran and the role of their country in relation to Iran? Now that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and no longer has to worry about Iraq, is there concern that Iran’s increasing dominance may pose threats to Saudi stability?
LIPPMAN: Very good question, with no simple answers. The Saudis and Iranians cooperate, politely if not warmly, on many issues of importance to both countries, such as OPEC oil quotas and the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. On the other hand, Iran is a Shiite power that has challenged Saudi Arabia’s position as leader of the Muslim world, and there have been serious tensions, especially in the 1980s when Saudi Arabia supported Iraq in its war with Iran. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran would be a source of deep concern in Saudi Arabia—even to the point that some Saudis believe the country would seek to acquire its own nuclear arsenal to balance the Iranian threat.

PAUL KENYON, Frontline/World Reporter, May 25, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: What are the Iranian government’s goals in developing its military abilities?
KENYON: I believe the Iranian government wants to sit at the top table. Pakistan gained its position through a weapons program disguised as one for energy, so there is a precedent. I really don’t think there is a history of Iran being expansionist…but there is the Hezbollah issue of course.
CZIKOWSKY: Do you think it is a mistake for the U.S. to indicate it may make pre-emptive strikes on sites developing nuclear weapons? Does this increase the danger that a country, such as Iran, may decide it is going to be struck and therefore they have a right to make a preemptive strike themselves, say on Israel?
KENYON: It’s possible but unlikely because Iran would prefer to play the whole thing diplomatically. For a country saying it is not interested in nuclear weapons to launch what would be seen as a preemptive strike against Israel would lose it the support it has from many countries away from Europe and the U.S…problem is we always think through that prism: U.S. and U.K. interests…however…even South Africa is sympathetic to the plight of Iran at the moment, as are several other neutral countries.

MICHAEL FLETCHER, Washington Post Staff Writer, August 3, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Rep. Curt Weldon claims Iran is perhaps months away from developing nuclear weapons while other reports claim they are ten years away. What is the White House’s reaction to these divergent reports and what is the White House’s response to growing Iranian influence within their region?
FLETCHER: I think you saw evidence of the Administration’s attitude toward Iran just before their Presidential elections when President Bush basically called the democracy there illegitimate. As you know, Iran’s government is really a theocracy, where ruling clerics essentially have veto power over the elected government. Ironically, though, the question of acquiring nuclear arms seems to be a question of national pride for many Iranians, be they reformers or fundamentalists. From their viewpoint, it would put them on equal footing with other nuclear powers in the neighborhood, including Pakistan and Israel.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, August 4, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Have you read Rep. Curt Weldon’s book (“Countdown to Terror”)? If so, do you believe his source “Ali” appears credible? He claims the CIA is not paying attention to Ali’s warnings. I can’t believe the CIA would dismiss these warnings, especially when passed along to them from a Republican Armed Services Committee Vice Chairman, or if they are ignoring these warnings, then there must be some difficulty they know of with the source. Do you have any observations?
PRIEST: Yes. Since I wrote an article about this, I do have some backgrounds on it. I think the CIA investigated this and do not think he’s credible. Ali has also given some interviews in which he says he is getting his information second hand.

WILLIAM J. DAUGHERTY, CIA Officer held hostage in Iran, March 20, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: I was shocked to learn that you have not received compensation. As one of the millions of Americans who feared daily for your safety, I think we owe you our gratitude and sorrow that your work put you into that danger. What is the argument against compensating you, and why has it taken so long for the issue to arise?
DAUGHERTY: The argument for not compensating was the provision of the Algiers Accords—the ransom agreement that the U.S. government negotiated under duress (sign these accords or we’ll execute your hostages)—that took away our right to sue. President Carter fully intended that there be an alternate method of compensation, but later administrations did not follow through. The “token detention payment” we received in 1986 declared us to be POWs. But we were not in a war with Iraq, we were all diplomats accredited to Iran, the Iranians gave us permission to be there, and Iran and the U.S. still had full diplomatic relations. To consider us as POWs was ludicrous. I would note that the Algiers Accords enabled the U.S. banks with investments in Iran to be reimbursed 100 cents on the dollar, and the U.S. corporations were likewise compensated through a tribunal in The Hague. We are our families—who arguably suffered more than we did—got the shaft. Again, it’s a matter of fairness and holding Iran accountable for its actions.
CZIKOWSKY: Cheney opposed compensation because he did not want to upset the Iranians? Isn’t this just another of a series of indications that the Administration has some obsession over Iraq while totally ignoring the perhaps greater threat in Iran?
DAUGHERTY: Another good one. The number of Americans killed by Iranian terrorism is around 300, and the number of wounded double that. The number of Americans killed by Iraqi-sponsored terrorism from 1979 to 2002 was ZERO. Which member of the axis of evil did we invade? A side note: a Professor I know and respect spent a good part of the 1990s is Beirut, where she got to know members of Hezbollah and Hamas. They all told her that they expected the U.S. to hit them and Iran, and hit them hard, after blowing up our embassy in Beirut and the Marine barracks (241 Marines died). When the Reagan Administration did NOTHING (despite warnings that terrorists who attack Americans would receive “swift and effective retribution” in welcoming us back to the White House in 1981), the terrorist groups then realized they could kill Americans and take them hostage with no penalty. We now want to penalize them, at least financially.
CZIKOWSKY: You stated you don’t want Federal funds to pay for the compensation. Yet, if Congress were willing to provide the compensation, would you urge Congress to appropriate the funds? It seems to me you and the other hostages deserve compensation for the time or torment while in duty to our country.
DAUGHERTY: Any measure that would provide compensation from the U.S. Treasury should—no, MUST—be accompanied by a law directing that whoever is President when the day comes to reestablish relations with Iran MUST, as a part of that new relationship, require the Iranians to reimburse the USG. But I’m not convinced there aren’t sufficient frozen terrorist funds in the US, Iran and others, to cover this.

STUART EIZENSTAT, former Deputy U.S. Treasury Secretary, March 20, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: If businesses are able to tap into compensation from Iran, why can’t individuals be compensated?
EIZENSTAT: Please understand that under the Hague Tribunal process in The Netherlands, both individuals and businesses have pursued claims—and have recovered a total of some $2.5 billion. The U.S. government obligated itself to recover U.S. property taken in Iran.
CZIKOWSKY: You favor $1 million per person for compensation, and they received $50 per day plus education consideration. Isn’t there a gap between these two figures? How much have the hostages received, and if it is less than $1 million, would you have no objection to raising their compensation so it totals $1 million?
EIZENSTAT: Yes. The amount they received form the 1980 and 1986 legislation is very inadequate. I would favor giving them $1 million total, deducting the amounts they have already received. However, I would favor this only in the context of compensative legislation providing the same payments to other victims, past and present, of international terrorism.

MARK BOWDEN, author, May 9, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: What are your thoughts on the (1980) rescue mission? In retrospect, it is easy to pinpoint the failure as they should have sent one more helicopter. Yet, at the time, the decision was to keep the number of helicopters at a minimum to avoid detection. Without having known the bad result in advance, do you think that was a wise gamble, or was it being too cautious?
BOWDEN: I do think the mission was so complicated it had only a very small chance of success. I think all of the decisions about the force were carefully weighed to increase that small chance…to no avail.

DAFNA LINZER, Washington Post Staff Writer, September 1, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: I know Bush will never debate a foreign leader, yet I wonder what would happen if they would just sit down and talk. Is that ever a possibility? If Bush is an evangelical Christian, isn’t there a benefit to learning to understand your enemy and seeing if there is a way to resolve your problems peacefully rather than aggravating them to the point where war is the only option?
LINZER: Hi there, you’re right, there’s no chance that Bush would engage in a debate with Mahmoud Ahmadinajad but it sure would be fascinating if he did.
There was a serious of secret discussions between Bush Administration officials and the Iranians between the fall of 2001 and the spring of 2003. They collapsed over a few issues: A bombing in May in Saudi Arabia, and a proposed swap—some al Qaeda guys in Iranian custody for some Iranian militants operating in Iraq under U.S. authority.
After things went south in the talks, the rhetoric on both sides started hearing up again, spurred by the IAEA investigation of Iran’s nuclear program.
That said, Secretary Rice said a few months ago that the Administration would be willing, again, to sit down with the Iranians if they suspend the nuclear program. The Iranians have indicated they might do that, but not as a precondition for talks—so we have a bit of a stand-off on timing and wills at the moment.

ROBIN WRIGHT, Washington Post Staff Writer, August 15, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: What are the Revolutionary Guard Corporation’s business interests? Is this move more (designating them as terrorists) symbolic or can they be financially hurt by this action?
WRIGHT: It may take quite a while before any designation actually has serious impact on the Guards’ business interests. But it could certainly make foreign companies that do business with them think again.
CZIKOWSKY: Other than the expected outrage, what is the Iranian reaction to this? DO they see this as a standard political move, or do they see this as an act of provocation?
WRIGHT: Iran in a proud country with a great civilization and history and they do not like to be seen as pariahs. The psychological impact may hit first.

GREG BARKER, Frontline Producer, October 24, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: What are the thoughts you’ve heard from experts should Iran develop nuclear weapons? Would one expect they ever will use them, or isn’t it more the threat that they have them might allow them to bully the region? If Iran were to use nuclear weapons, wouldn’t there be swift international retaliation?
BARKER: That’s the big question. Many experts argue that at its highest levels the Iranian regime is ultimately rational and is trying to extend Iran’s influence across the region to further their national interests, not to pursue some kind of ideological agenda. If that is the case, these experts argue, then the regime would never actually use the weapons themselves. Others say that given the Islamic Republic’s history of supporting terrorist groups, it’s not worth taking the chance that they would exercise restraint if they had nuclear weapons.

FRED KAPLAN, Slate columnist, December 6, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: What are your impressions of Iranian society? I believe there is a genuine interest within Iran in our culture and that many Iranians hope we may improve relations. I hope, over time, these desires will filter upwards and that future Iranian leaders will be open to better relations. What do you see are the possibilities that this could happen?
KAPLAN: I have never been to Iran. However, a few journalists and scholars who have been there several times tell me, on a street level, it-or at least Tehran—is one of the most pro-American places in the world. That said, the current regime has shown tremendous resilience for 30 years now. The mullahs have suppressed any dissident group that has started to gain a foothold. They have pushed aside any politician who starts to put out feelers to the West. The West—and not just George W. Bush—must bear its own share of blame, perhaps for not picking up on some of these feelers quickly enough. Still, chances for an effective reformer rising to the top and actually accomplishing reform seem slim. Furthermore, even the pro-American masses do not want the American government to intervene in their domestic politics. Memories are still very strong of the CIA’s overthrow of Mosaddeq in 1953.
CZIKOWSKY: What are the concerns that, even if Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, that they may be positioning themselves to rapidly change towards developing nuclear weapons—especially if they could do so with another country, such as Pakistan or China?
KAPLAN: This is a good point. The NIE does address it. The document says, “we continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate to high confidence it has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon.” Not exactly airtight, but there it is.