IRAQ

LES GELB, Council on Foreign Relations President, February 21, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: I would appreciate your thoughts on the possibilities of what might result if America were to invade Iraq. What is the strength of the Iraqi military forces? Should the Iraqi government be overthrown, what would be the likely future directions for Iraq? How would such an invasion be greeted by the international community?
GELB: I think Saddam has virtually no support in the world and very little in Iraq itself. I think Bush is right that Saddam is evil. And virtually everyone would like to get rid of him. The Bush Administration needs to explain far better than it has how it will generate diplomatic and military support for the military campaign against Saddam, and ensure victory. One example: once Saddam thinks we’re coming to get him, he isn’t going to sit there and do nothing. What are we prepared to do if he threatens terrorist attacks in the United States or against our friends in the Gulf or our friends in Israel?

TED CARPENTER, Cato Institute Defense and Foreign Policy Studies Vice President, October 8, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Do you believe the American public fully understands the potential for casualties in a war with Iraq? Also, do we have an exit strategy and long term goals for Iraq in a war with Iraq? What should we hope for in a post-war Iraq, and how do we get the Iraqi public to support a subsequent government that is willing to work with the United States?
CARPENTER: The growing uneasiness of the public (reflected in recent polls) suggests that people are concerned about potential casualties. The reality is that no one can predict how the war will go. There are simply too many variables: the loyalty of the Iraqi military, whether Iraqi forces opt to hole up in cities and force the U.S to wage urban warfare, whether Saddam uses chemical and biological weapons (and whether he can use them effectively), to mention just a few of the more important variables. This conflict could be a cakewalk similar to the original Gulf War, or it could turn into a very messy, bloody conflict.
The U.S. does not have a clear exit strategy. Most experts believe U.S. forces will have to stay in Iraq for years to stabilize a post-Saddam regime. Iraq has no democratic traditions or institutions, and even holding that artificial country together in the race of secessionist impulses by the Kurdish and Shia populations could take some doing.

BENJAMIN CARDIN, Member of Congress, October 11, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: If we go to war with Iraq, we should expect Iraq to fight back. Are we prepared to take casualties, are we prepared to withstand their retaliations, and are we prepared to remain for the long-term to stabilized Iraq with a government that respects both us and its own people?
CARDIN: We all hope that President Bush will follow his stated intent and seek United Nations support for actions against Iraq. I think that is our best hope to avoid unilateral military action, which I believe could lead to many consequences that the questioner raises. If we proceed with the support of the international community any military action would have far less risk and we would have the support from the region to rebuild Iraq, which will be necessary.

VERNON LOEB. Washington Post National Security Reporter, October 16, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What should be our long term strategy in Iraq? After Saddam Hussein, what steps could and should the United States do to encourage an Iraqi government that both respects its own people (unlike Saddam who killed many of his own people) and that will engage in peaceful relations with others?
LOED: Boy, those are tough questions. Assuming the U.S. invades Iraq and topples Saddam, I guess our long-term strategy should be focused upon helping to rebuild the country and fostering democratic elections that make it possible for some kind of representative government to come to power. I suppose I’m kind of outlining the process followed in Afghanistan, but with much more robust nation building. I don’t think a U.S, interim government would be a good idea at all.

TERRY NEAL. Washingtonpost.com Chief Political Correspondent, October 18, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Do you believe the American public has a firm understanding of the tensions in the Middle East and the possible reactions of the international community, especially other nations with large Islamic populations, should we go to war in Iraq? Do you think most people have memories of the previous war and thus believe this will be another relative easy war to win? If this turns out to be a costly war, do you think American support of military actions will remain firm?
NEAL: Yes, I believe they do. I think what people disagree on is to what extent the reactions of the international community matter. Some conservatives, in particular, believe that the United States, by the virtue of being the world’s lone superpower and economic leader, should lead and others will follow. These same voters are the most likely to be unconcerned about cries from Europe and elsewhere about American unilateralism. When you talk about “the last war”, I’m not sure which one you’re talking about. People of my generation (I’m 35) have no real recollection of Vietnam. But they know about the Gulf War, the conflicts in the Balkan, the war in Afghanistan. But I think most people understand a war in Iraq would probably be more costly and difficult than any of those conflicts. The real debate in this country is about whether these risks and costs are worth what we might accomplish.

DENNIS ROSS, former U.S. State Department Policy Planning Director, November 12, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What is the opinion of Saddam Hussein among Arab countries? Are some nations in fear that he may attempt to spread his influence throughout the Arab world? Is there much fear of American intervention spreading beyond Iraq? How much support does Saddam Hussein have outside Iraq?
ROSS: Saddam has very little support outside of Iraq. He is known throughout the Arab world for what he is: a very brutal dictator. But there is also a tendency in the Arab world to oppose outside powers imposing on Arab leaders. A history of colonialism an outside domination fosters a deeply held attitude in this regard. However, should a U.S.-led coalition succeed quickly in removing Saddam, and as it likely the Iraqi people rejoice over their liberation, we will hear little criticism from the Arab world. Should, however, it take time to remove him and should there be many casualties among Iraq civilians, then it would be a very different story.

ROBERTA COHEN, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow, December 9, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: We are seeking assistance from Iraqi exiles in the battle against Saddam Hussein. How helpful can this be? When Saddam Hussein leaves power, can the exiles help create a stable government, will the residents of Iraq welcome their assistance, and will the people of Iraq welcome American assistance?
COHEN: There has been much skepticism about the ability of Iraqi exiles to unite and form a coherent government and secondly to find acceptance within Iraq following a change of regime. However, there seems to have been some progress to date. Exiles are talking more and more to each other at different gatherings. Most pertinent, the Kurdish Regional Government in the north of the country which now unites two principal Kurdish factions (after considerable conflict) in a workable government could offer an example for a more broadly based Iraqi government.

BIANA JAGGER, human rights advocate, January 16, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: What general sense are you getting from government officials in Iraq? Do you believe they are stalling for time and appear deceptive? Do you believe they are trying to be open and honest and genuinely wish to avoid war? Do you hear any negative comments against members of people of other religions and racial groups amongst the people you’ve met in Iraq, or do you see a willingness to reconcile and unite a nation?
JAGGER: I am leaving with a profound impression that everyone in Iraq that I met wants to avoid a war. They are aware that this war will be descimating. I met one minister who is a Kurd, the Minister of Health. I met the Speaker of the House, who is a Shiitte. I met with academics who were Catholics and of other religious denominations. I was not aware of a religious persecution; however, I cannot make a conclusive statement and it is for that reason that I came to urge the Iraqi government to allow an official delegation from Amnesty International Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations to assess their human rights records.
CZIKOWSKY: Do the people you meet seem to be speaking freely, or is there fear they may face consequences if they say anything critical to you? How much open discussion are you finding amongst students and the general population in Iraq?
JAGGER: We have been able to have an open dialogue—difficult at times—with academics and Iraqi students where myself and my colleagues have asked extremely difficult questions either to politicians, government officials, academics, students and average Iraqis. We have asked extremely difficult questions, often on camera, and we have been given answers. I can only speak for what I saw and that’s why I think it will be important for visitors to come and engage in a dialogue with government officials, academics, students, and the average Iraqis to continue an open dialogue.

MEL GOODMAN, Senior Fellow, Center for International Policy, January 21, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: With so much international focus on Iraq, aren’t they effectively contained against striking against anyone else? What possible offensive military strategies remain for Saddam Hussein?
GOODMAN: The CIA believes that Saddam Hussein is contained, and I agree. Indeed, CIA Director Tenet believes that the best scenario for Iraqi use of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) is in the wake of a US invasion. So our policy appears to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

MICHAEL KAZIN, Professor of History, Georgetown University, January 21, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Saddam Hussein may be a threat, yet he is contained. He would not dare strike anywhere, for he would face strong retaliation. I think many are opposed to a war because there is no need for war unless a real threat emerges. Why strike an enemy who is unable to make a first strike? I think this explains quite a bit of the anti-war sentiment. What do you think?
KAZIN: I agree. The Administration’s decision to seek UN sanction has also, as some conservatives argued at the time, helped make a case against US military action. Many Americans wonder how much of a threat Saddam can be with hundreds of inspectors swarming all over his country.

ANNE APPLEBAUM, Washington Post Staff Writer, February 6, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: How is Saddam Hussein viewed in other countries? Stephen Pelletiere, a CIA analyst, stated a few days ago that it may have been Iran and not Saddam Hussein who used chemical weapons to kill large numbers of Iraqi Kurds. If this is correct, the real threat to world peace may be from the Iranians, more so than the Iraqis. How does the rest of the world sit in the conflicts between Iran and Iraq?
APPLEBAUM: There are plenty of people, including many in Washington, who are more unnerved by Iran’s nuclear program than by Iraq’s missing anthrax. Still, different threats required different responses, and Iran represents a different threat from Iraq. I don’t think even the most hawkish person in the Pentagon is suggesting an invasion of Iran.

KEN ALLARD, Adjunct Professor, National Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, February 14, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Perhaps Saddam Hussein is minimally complying with United Nations directives. Yet, as long as he is complying, even belatedly and suspiciously, would the United States do severe damage to our international reputation if we attack Iraq while they are under compliance with international standards?
ALLARD: The U.S. now faces a tough choice-at what point does it conclude the U.N. is simply a weak reed that cannot be counted on to do more than endlessly debate. That it is indeed the feckless debating society that Bush has warned against. And that unilateral military action is the only way. If so, it would not say very much about the future of the U.N.

RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN, Washington Post Foreign Correspondent, February 24, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: What is the mood of the Iraqi people, as you have seen? We are receiving conflicting predictions that Iraqis will greet American soldiers waving American flags to reports that civilians are taking arms and preparing to fight American soldiers. Perhaps a bit of both will happen. What is the dominant feeling towards the United States amongst the Iraqi people?
CHANDRASEKARAN: Good question—and I have to say it’s one of the toughest to answer. I’ve spent weeks trying to understand just how the Iraqi people would react to a possible U.S. invasion. Given that it is very difficult to speak to people without government officials present—and even if I could, people here often are too scared to speak only—it’s almost impossible to feel like you can get candid responses.
That said, one Iraqi told me the other day, in a private, whispered comment, that Baghdad would respond in a “half and half” way—that is to say, half the populations might welcome U.S troops while another half might choose to mount some sort of opposition. I know U.S. officials believe American troops will counter only minimal resistance here. That may well be the case. But I tend to think there will be pockets of opposition. How strong they are is impossible to tell now. But U.S. officials also should not expect lots of people to be lining the streets, saving American flags. Most people probably will be hiding indoors, afraid to express their feelings too open until they are certain of the new political dynamics.
CZIKOWSKY: I am concerned for your safety (in Baghdad). How safe do you feel?
CHANDRASEKARAN: For now, I feel plenty safe. In fact, Baghdad is probably one of the world’s safer cities in terms of street crime directed against foreigners. But if a war starts, all bets are off. There are concerns about getting hit by bombs, exposure to possible weapons of mass destruction and getting caught in score settling that might occur if the government falls. Foreign journalists here are trying to take steps to prepare for these eventualities.

PHILLIP GORDON, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, February 28, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: What economic stake, if any, does France have in a war with Iraq In how much trade do France and Iraq engage? Also, and perhaps this is more of a personal comment: while many Americans are criticizing the French for their position on Iraq, shouldn’t we also consider that there may be some validity to their position?
GORDON: I think the French economic stake is less important than most Americans believe. France used to have major commercial dealings with Iraq, but that was more than a decade ago. In the mid-1990s, France was a leading partner for Iraq in the oil for food program, but now they’ve fallen to around 11th place in dealings with Iraq. French imports from Iraq account for around 0.3% of French overall imports, and exports to Iraq about 0.2% of overall French exports, so it’s hard to see how that effects French foreign policy. Iraq owes France around $5bn in debt, but the French know they’ll never get that money while Saddam is in power. And while French oil companies reportedly have reached agreements to develop the Iraqi oil industry if sanctions are ever lifted, the French know that this will also not be the case so long as Saddam is in power. So I don’t think commercial interests are irrelevant, but they’re far from being the driving factor. Indeed, I think if all France cared about was oil or trade they would get on board for the war and simply insist on part of the booty—but they’re clearly not doing this.
As the second part of your question, I do think they have some serious arguments about how hard it will be to impose stability on Iraq and how invasion might lead to more terrorism. That’s why we’re wrong to simply say “it’s about oil”, excluding the possibility that maybe the French (like most Europeans, including those who have no commercial interests in Iraq) genuinely think invading Iraq is a bad idea.

RICHARD MORIN, Polling Director, Washington Post, and CLAUDIA DEANE, Assistant Polling Director, Washington Post, February 4, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Isn’t it interesting that so many politicians have doubts about war with Iraq, yet they are fearful of expressing their doubts too strongly over fears of public reprisals, even though so much of the public has similar doubts? When will our politicians courageously at least catch up to the public sentiment?
MORIN and DEANE: Republican politicians are leading a party that is very unified on the war-about nine in ten Republicans support an invasion of Iraq, even without the support of the U.N. It’s Democratic leaders who are in a box. Most Democrats currently oppose the war.
It has been interesting to see the increased partianship on war in recent months. Majorities of both parties as late as six weeks ago supported taking military action to topple Saddam Hussein.

MICHELE FLOURNOY, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
CZIKOWSKY: How long after a war with Iraq should American troops remain in Iraq? Once troops leave, what are the odds of the new government collapsing and being overthrown by anti-American activists? If troops remain, how much would this encourage anti-American militancy?
FLOURNOY: It’s not clear how long American troops should stay in Iraq, but I believe our exit strategy should be driven by the achievement of our objectives, not by a present timeline. Their presence will be absolutely critical for a couple of years to maintain a secure and stable environment while the Iraqi military and police are vetted, reorganized, retrained, and redeployed. In principle, we should seek to transition security functions back to Iraqi institutions as soon as we are confident that we have capable, civilian controlled institutions that are respectful of human rights in place.

ARIEL COHEN, author, Heritage Foundation, March 5, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Russia has a long term relationship with Iraq and reasons to fear terrorism. What is the sense of the Russian people on what the Russian government should do in the Middle East?
COHEN: The Russian people don’t like Saddam Hussein. He reminds them too much of Joseph Stalin who murdered over 20 million Russians.
CZIKOWSKY: What are the internal political risks to the Turkish government if they allow American troops to launch a strike from Turkey? What would American economic assistance do for the Turkish economy, and how do the Turkish people view such offers of assistance?
COHEN: The Turkish economy will further suffer if (the) American assistance package will not be forthcoming. The Turkish people want American assistance and they need to understand that the U.S. needs Turkish bases and transit to get to Northern Iraq. I believe the Turkish government is stable enough to survive that challenge.

PETER FEAVER, Political Science Professor, Duke University, March 6, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: What are your thoughts on the argument that there is no need to invade Iraq while we have them contained and they are at last busy trying to hide their weapons and are thus unable to use them? Or, if they appear they are going to use them, then there will be fairly unanimous consent that we strike then? What is the need to invade Iraq now?
FEAVER: I found Kenneth Pollack’s op-ed on the containment question (in the New York Times) fairly persuasive on this point.
The real problem of imminence is that it takes quite a while to mobilize/deploy U.S. troops to the region. So what you are asking is will we be able to state with confidence that roughly six months from now the threat will be imminent and so we better move now in order to be in a position to deal with the threat when it is imminent then.
If what you are suggesting is that U.S. troops now in the region stay in place indefinitely so that they would be ready to go quickly if the threat ever did become imminent, you are raising other problems. It is important to note, however, that the French/Germans et. al., are not really doing much to make it easier for the U.S. to maintain that ready deployment posture for the indefinite future. On the contrary, they are working hard to undermine support for the U.S. deployment/threat of force, and this is contributing to the sense of urgency you hear from the Administration.

ROBERT G. KAISER, Washington Post Associate Editor, March 7, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: George Bush appears set on going to war, no matter what. In looking back at all his statements, he has never deviated from a course toward war. Maybe I am wrong. Is there anything, in retrospect, that indicates he seriously considered closing the avenues towards war? Maybe he’ll surprise even me, and this whole time it has all been a ploy to corner Saddam Hussein into destroying his remaining weapons. Yet, if war starts, won’t most historians conclude President Bush was set on war from a long time?
KAISER: Interesting question. You know, if Bush had been trying from day one to intimidate Saddam (or his senior colleagues who could deal with him effectively, and still might), I think we could say he probably would have acted precisely the way he has up to today. In other words, the best way to pursue a strategy of trying to get him out of office through intimidation would be essentially identical to the best way to pursue a war against him. I think we’ll know for sure pretty soon.

JAMES RUBIN, Former U.S. State Department Advisor, March 12, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Let us take a hopeful look at this conflict. We successfully maneuver Saddam Hussein into realizing that adhering to our demands is his only alternative to war. He decides to agree to our demands. What is the bottom line he has to do to avert war?
RUBIN: It looks like the latest draft of the U.N. resolution will require him to very quickly reveal the biological weapons, the chemical weapons, the delivery systems for such weapons, and show he has made a fundamental decision to disarm without war. I think we should all hope for that but it would be unreasonable to expect in these final days.

JOHN FELMY, Chief Economist, American Petroleum Institute, March 14, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: For all the people who want to boycott French products, maybe we should first consider boycotting Iraqi products? Why do we still import oil from Iraq?
FELMY: Prior to the strike in Venezuela, we imported about 8-9 percent of our oil consumption from that country. With that loss, the industry sought alternative sources to supply American consumers and…our refineries. Some Iraqi and Venezuelan oil are similar in properties, so U.S. companies bought Iraqi oil under the U.N. Oil for Food program. Our companies are committed to supply consumers with the petroleum they need to get to work, educate their children, heat their homes, and enjoy the benefits of the U.S. economy.

ANTHONY SWOFFORD, author, March 21, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Having been on the scene, what are your thoughts as to how many people died during Desert Storm? One Defense Department estimate was 100,000. One analyst states that estimate may be low. An Iraqi source claimed 1,500 died. That is quite a range of difference. How much damage did you witness, and which end of the estimates do you feel is the most accurate?
SWOFFORD: I witnessed a lot of carnage that was a result of the bombing campaign, from the SA/Kuwait border to Kuwait City. Lots of corpses.
I gathered the following from a newspaper report about a month ago. A woman named Beth Osborne Daponte, now at Carnegie Mellon University, was researching Iraqi deaths at the end of the war, and her numbers were as follows—12,000 direct civilian deaths, 70,000 subsequent civilian deaths, 40,000 dead soldiers.
As I recall, she was doing this work for the DOD, and got bumped when she came up with these numbers.
She also claimed that due to the uprisings in the north and south of Iraq, 30,000 died,
Her number now, for overall dead, is 205,000.

VERNON LOEB, Washington Post Staff Writer, March 21, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Actual conversation overheard:
A: “What’s on television?”
B: “The news series updating the war on Iraq.”
A: “Is that still on? When are they going to cancel that show?”
How long do you expect this war might go on? Further, do you believe that the public is getting insensitive towards war the more it is shown on TV? During Viet Nam, there seemed to have been the reverse result, although that war wasn’t being shown 24/7.
LOEB: At this moment, I don’t think it’s going to last that long. I don’t see the non-stop television coverage making people insensitive to the war. People watching television right now are getting a real sense of the incredible violence of aerial bombardment. If there is ground fighting, people around the world should get a very up-close-and-personal sense of that as well, with over 500 reporters embedded with U.S. forces. I personally find it far more preferable that people get to witness this, than not. As voters and taxpayers, we elect the people who decide whether to take the nation to war. Thus, voters and taxpayers need to understand, as best as possible, what war is all about.

TIMOTHY D. HOYT, Associate Professor, U.S. Naval War College, March 24, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: As it has been reported we don’t have the resources to feed and house large numbers of POWs, our forces have been telling some surrendering soldiers to just go home. Wouldn’t we get more soldiers to surrender if it was known they could get decent food and shelter from the Americans and coalition forces, instead of just being sent home?
HOYT: I think one of the main reasons we’re not getting large numbers of prisoners is because unlike Kuwait, the Iraqis know they can just “melt away” and go home. In Kuwait, they were surrounded on foreign soil, and were in a hurry to get out of that situation.
Certainly food wouldn’t hurt, though.

KARL VICK, Washington Post Foreign Correspondent, March 25, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Have you been able to interview many civilians? If so, what are their reactions to the war? In particular, what impressions are you getting from civilians from different ethnic groups, if you’ve had the opportunity to talk to people from different groups?
VICK: Civilians aplenty here in Sulaimaniya. But they’re pretty much all Kurds. In fact, I spent an hour the other day with a kid, 19, who had never even met an Arab.
The Kurds are in the unusual and rather luxurious position of watching an Iraq war on television. Mostly al Jazeera. They seem to think it’s not going well. Or not quickly enough. “I’m not worried, put people are”, one official told me today. The Arab sat. chancels are tending to emphasize Saddam’s defiance, the POW footage, and other elements that reinforce the skeptical perspective.
But the Kurds also seem to have embraced rather more enthusiastically than other publics the Bush Adm’s extremely enthusiastic and confident predictions of about a one or two week war. Suli, as the city I’m in is known, for sure, has been on a roller coaster. It nearly emptied out the first day of bombing. On the second, as armored columns bounded toward Baghdad, the evening street scene was all smiles and gamboling. And the pickups piled with clothes and mattresses were coming back IN to town.
Mercurial is a word.

JOSEPH BRAUDE, author, March 25, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Iraq is composed of several ethnic groups that have historically fought with each other. How likely can any central government command the respect and cooperation of most of the Iraqi people? Further, how well will most groups accept a government they feel is imposed by America and our coalition allies? What would you recommend our government do that could best gain public support throughout Iraq for a democratic government that respects human rights?
BRAUDE: Although difficult, I believe it is possible for a pro-American central government to hold the country, given scenarios of autonomy and a redistribution of wealth to the south and north. A response to the question of how to gain public support for an American initiative would be lengthy. But I will make a few points:
- The regional dynamics pose a complex challenge. An effort to cut down oligarchs and foster new elites in Iraq may net a loss of capital for Sunni elites as well as gains for Shi’is and Kurds, neither of whom form a traditional base of support for regional nationalist ideas. This may anger individuals in the center and predispose them to seek support from the region around them in making problems for the nascent government. Our ability to address these challenges through public diplomacy is unfortunately limited. But America must face up to this challenge. From a rhetorical point of view, it’s important to present our plans through the prism of economics, and not colonial identity politics, e.g., it’s not about cutting down a particular ethnic or religious group; rather, it’s about spreading opportunity and fostering new elites.

MARTIN SCHRAM, author, March 25, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Under what conditions do you believe Saddam Hussein would use his weapons of mass destruction? Is he more apt to hold out until he thinks he is militarily cornered? Or do you think he might use them to gain advantage during war, even though their use would confirm he was lying about them?
SCHRAM: I believe Saddam will use—or try to use—his weapons of mass destruction when he feels cornered, trapped, about to be defeated, caught or most likely, killed. I believe he will try to drop chemical weapons on Israel as his inhuman parting shot. We must remember that whether or not people believed this was the right waro or the right time to fight this war, there can be no doubt that Saddam is as bad and as brutal as was his hero, Joseph Stalin.

JAY COUPE, President, Coupe Associates, March 26, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: At first, I avoided asking this question, because I didn’t wish to draw attention to it. Yet, I have now heard several times on television commentators discuss how the black smoke that Iraq is burning to try and confuse missile attacks on Baghdad will not work because our updated weapons are not affected by the smoke, unlike some missiles during Desert Storm. When I first heard this, which was mentioned while Iraqis were digging the holes before the war started, I was stunned. Why is potentially sensitive military information being made public, especially when it seemed Iraq was unaware of this (for if they were, they wouldn’t be wasting their time digging the holes and subsequently burning the oil to create the smoke). Am I wrong, or should information such as this not be made public?
COUPE: The protection of our forces should be an overriding consideration in granting media access to military action. I am convinced that virtually every American journalist in the field understands and respects that requirement. However, the fact remains that foreign journalists are also embedded with some of our troops. I believe that the field commanders are giving explicit direction to journalists as to what they can and cannot report. This remains a matter of concern and we cannot permit our security in the field to be compromised in any way.

NICHOLAS DE TORRENTE, Executive Director, Doctors Without Borders, March 26, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: The issue of whether Iraq has chemical weapons remains. If it turns out they do have, and they use such weapons, are medical facilities prepared to deal with such an attack?
DE TORRENTE: This uncertainty is a major concern. Humanitarian organizations have been in a situation where they would be in a position to respond to such weapons affecting civilians. We have done our best to prepare our teams for this prospect (self-protection) but we are clearly unprepared, as are all organizations, to deal with this kind of problem affecting civilians on a large scale. We reiterate that all illegal weapons and weapons with indiscriminate effect (that do not distinguish between civilians and military) are not to be used by either side.

DAVID WILLIAM EBERLY, Senior Ranking Allied Prisoner of War, Gulf War: 1991, March 27, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Did you witness any violations of international law by the Iraqis? If so, what were they? If not, do you fear there might be violations this time, as Iraq has stated they fell this war violates international law and thus they seem to hint they may not feel bound by the international laws to which they previously agreed?
EBERLY: Yes. Under the Geneva Convention, there were four distinct accords including humane treatment, photography, and two others. All four were violated 12 years ago and we have already seen similar actions in the past week, most notably the use of a clearly designated hospital as a barracks for Iraqi soldiers and storage of ammunition and chemical warfare suits.

MEL GOODMAN, Senior Fellow, Center for International Policy, March 28, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: If this war is only going to lead to more instability and possibly more terrorism, and if bringing democratic peace to Iraq is a far-fetched idea, what was the purpose of this war? Why did we attack a country that may have been a threat, yet, as long as it was hiding its weapons and posed no threat, there was no need to attack?
GOODMAN: You have raised a serious question and issue. My fear all along has been that this war is a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you have developed a scenario that involves Iraq’s use of WMD, the greater proliferation of terrorism and WMD, and greater instability in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, then invade Iraq. Remember that CIA Director Tenet warned the President and the Congress in October that the most viable scenario for Saddam Hussein’s use of WMD would be to counter a U.S. invasion. Clearly this war does not represent military force as the last resort, and we have underestimated the fact the Saddam Hussein had been successfully contained for the past 12 years.
CZIKOWSKY: How is information brought to the attention of decision makers in Washington? I ask this important academic question because it seems to me that much of what you are mentioning was known to laypeople such as me who read reports from you, the Brookings Institution, Roger Hilsman’s book on Iraq, etc. To me, it is obvious that the Republican Guard is strong and that guerilla warfare has to be a concern. Why doesn’t this information seem to reach the President and the people around him making decisions?
GOODMAN: It is very difficult to get contrarian ideas to any Administration, particularly the Bush Administration. They are a tight and tiny group of policymakers and they are victimized by their own groupthink. On the other hand, President Kennedy excluded himself from the Cuban missile crisis executive committee because he wanted to make sure that ALL opinions were heard. It is obvious that the President receives his policy broadcasts on a very narrow band of frequencies. Very unfortunate.
CZIKOWSKY: What are your thoughts on the announced plans to rebuild Iraq with $30 billion in aid? Does this assistance appear targeted in the proper manner, or are there important aspects of rebuilding Iraq that would help stabilize and revitalize the country that are being missed?
GOODMAN: Don’t expect this country to invest $30 billion in rebuilding Iraq. The current supplemental appropriation of $75 billion includes $2.4 billion for reconstruction. The Bush Administration should be turning this task over to the U.N., but thus far has been unwilling to do so. Another calamity is out there waiting for us on this one.

ROBERTA COHEN, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, March 28, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Are there numerical estimates on how many people need assistance with food, medicine, and other important supplies, and how many are being served and how many are not being reached? If we can finally reach all who need help, how much more food and supplies is required, and are these supplies readily available?
COHEN: Most of the Iraqi population, an estimated 16 million people, are completely dependent on food aid from abroad and have been for many years, because of 12 years of sanctions and Saddam Hussein’s policies. 400,000 metric tons of food have to be shipped in every month in order to feed the population. Even before the war, this was the largest humanitarian assistance program in the world. Iraqis reportedly have 5 weeks of food stockpiled but that probably doesn’t apply to everyone. It is urgent that more food be provided. In addition, in Basra and other cities in the south, the people have been without water for several days, although efforts are being made restore the water systems.

ANDY SHALLEL, Founder, Mesopotamia Cultural Society and Peace Café, April 10, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: I feel sorry for many Iraqi Americans. Many fled the brutality of Iraq to come to America only to be treated suspiciously as supporters of the regime from which they had escaped. How do people cope with this ignorance and, on the other hand, is there some understanding that there are some legitimate fears that there might be Iraqis in America sent by the Saddam Hussein government and thus there is a need for caution within our country?
SHALLEL: A reported once asked me about sleeper cells in the U.S.-I asked her to write about American sleeper cells in which our civil rights are eroding while we are asleep.
Iraqi Americans are being questioned by the FBI and other agencies. There is certainly fear from these tactics. Some Congressmen have suggested internment camps as an option (Coble-N.C.)
Iraqi Americans love the U.S. and are some of the most educated and productive citizens.

LEWIS MATSON, U.S. Central Command Spokesman, April 10, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: No war goes as planned, as this war was no exception. The key often are the contingencies that were in place and how well the military adjusted to the situations they faced. How well do you believe our forces adjusted to contingency plans?
MATSON: One of the key aspects of the plan—its ability to remain fluid, its ability to change to circumstances, it was developed more as a chess game—if he does this, I’ll do that.
The commanders now have that freedom—we watched them adjust on the fly—I was very impressed with the way they did this. The key to making this work was the effort of the 101st and the 82nd to follow behind Armor and secure the towns that had been passed over—they did tremendous work here securing Najv, Karbala, Samawah and Massariyah, as well as the Marines up through the center—the 1st Regimental Combat Team took an important job of securing the right center up toward Al Kut—this was critical but got little attention.

SUSAN RICE, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, April 11, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Now that a government has fallen, who is in control? Who sees to it that the police force shows up for work, that whatever utilities are operating continue and that the ones that are down are repaired, that food is shipped, etc.? How much is the country in disarray, and what will it take to at least restore order, utilities, food?
RICE: Under international law and the Geneva Conventions the U.S. is, as the occupying power, in fact responsible for controlling and at least in the short term governing the country. The country does indeed appear to be in disarray and the task of restoring law and order and basic services is an enormous and daunting one. The U.S. and Britain seem not to have sufficient forces in country yet to protect key civilian infrastructure like hospitals and to prevent widespread looting. Undoubtedly, we will seek to salvage as much of the former policy force as we can find and who are acceptable to the people of Iraq, but we should expect that the process of forming new policy forces will be difficult and slow and in the meantime those tasks will fall to coalition forces. Our reluctance or inability to fulfill that responsibility could well be the biggest short-term impediment to achieving our objectives of stability and eventually democracy.
On the humanitarian side we have failed thus far to do as we set out to-to win hearts and minds through effective provision of key goods and services. We need urgently to find ways to restore electricity and water and make sure it is distributed effectively.

LAITH KUBBA, President, Iraq National Group, April 11, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: How possible would it be to create a Kurdish state, or perhaps a Kurdish subdivision of Iraq with a fair amount of autonomy, out of northern Iraq? How much will Turkey object, and how much influence have they lost over the matter by not joining the coalition? How much objection would the rest of Iraq have to a Kurdish state, and how could such objections be settled?
KUBBA: In view of history and regional politics, it would be harmful to the Kurds to push for a separate state; however, their national aspirations as Kurds need to be addressed and can be addressed through a decentralized state system. In the long term, Kurds can benefit most if Iraq is secular and democratic rather than a confederation of an Arab and a Kurdish state.
The most worrying issue on the Kurds comes from Turkey. As they legitimately see a Kurdish state in Iraq as a threat to their national security. There are more than 10 million Kurds bordering Iraq and they will seek a separate state too.
There are minorities within the Kurdish region who strongly object to a separate Kurdish state as well as many Kurds who also see their interest served best within Iraq rather than a separate Kurdish state.
CZIKOWSKY: What are the dangers of a sovereign Iraqi government reverting to a dictatorship? How well can the different factions within Iraq hold together and prevent disintegration of power?
KUBBA: In the long-term, the best buffer against dictatorship is a well-developed civil society. In the short-term, America should prevent a military takeover in Iraq.

KARL VICK, Washington Post Foreign Service, April 16, 2003
CZIKOWKSY: What is the mood of the Kurdish people you’ve met, and what are their expectations? Do you believe that, once again, they have fought hard in initial hopes that a Kurdish state will be granted with expectations of being denied again, or do they see hopes for some type of greater autonomy? How will they react if they do not receive as much as they had hoped?
VICK: Kurds: Happy.
My sense is that they’ll state that way if they don’t loose the autonomy they’ve got. As a tribal leader in Chamchamal, a grubby little frontline town about an hour from here (Sulaymaniyah) put it to me: “We’ll take federalism and then try for independence later!” I can’t imagine that later is coming any too soon: what do you need a flag and an army for if you’ve got your rights and your culture (and no Turkish army to fight) in a free and democratic Iraq?
Now to get one…

PETER BAKER, Washington Post Foreign Service, April 15, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Do we have early indications on how the prisoners were treated? Were there violations of the Geneva Convention, and, if so, are there suspects who have been found and are being held responsible?
BAKER: The US maintains that the airing of a videotape of their interrogation was a violation of the Geneva Convention. If as the POWs say the Iraqis deliberately moved an artillery gun into their prison to attract enemy bombs, that too would be construed as a violation. I’m sure that Army debriefers are going through the full accounts of their captivity and may identify other violations as well. But at the moment, we know of no identifiable suspects to purse.

SHIBLELY TELHAMI, Professor for Peace and Development, University of Maryland, April 16, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Saddam Hussein envisioned himself as the future leader of the Arab world. Now that he has been removed from the picture, what is the current status of others seeking to emerge as leaders of the Arab world? Is Iran encouraged to fill any vacuum, or are they sufficiently worried about attracting American attention that they may be somewhat silenced? Or, perhaps, the Arab world is so diverse that it is not useful to think in terms of anyone hoping to provide it a unified voice?
TELHAMI: Unlike President Nasser of Egypt in the 1950s and 60s, very few people in the Arab world saw Saddam Hussein as a true potential leader of the Arab world, at least since 1991. I do no think that there is a vacuum created by his demise. I think the real problem in the Arab world now is that the political order in place for the past several decades have repeated failed to address vital crisis including the war in Iraq. In that sense, there is a pervasive sense of weakness and helplessness and disguist with states and international organizations. Unfortunately, that could well play in the hands of militant non-state groups that would exploit the anger and the despair.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, April 17, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: How well, from what you can tell, was Defense and Central Intelligence information used during the war? There seems to be independent streaks within Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush where they tend to follow their instincts and they appear to ignore some important intelligence reports. Is this an accurate description?
PRIEST: That’s a good way to put it. They definitely did not follow some of the intelligence community’s thinking on links between Iraq and Al Qaeda (minimal) or on lots of the worst case scenarios about invading Iraq (paramilitary violence, suicide bombers and anti-American terrorism in Middle East).

VERNON LOEB, Washington Post Staff Writer, May 14, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Have there been any independent counts on the number of civilian casualties during the war with Iraq? What have been the civilian deaths in total from American interventions, and how hard is it to win over the support of a population that may be happy that we rid them of a dictator yet have also caused them harm?
LOEB: I have seen no independent counts of civilian casualties in Iraq that have been made by investigators on the ground in country. Certainly, killing lots of civilians would only make winning the peace that much harder. My hunch is that the U.S. did not kill large numbers of civilians, and, in fact, took considerable pains not to. But I do think it is important that somebody—journalists or NGOs or both—go in there and try to determine, as precisely as possibly, how many civilians were killed.

SWANEE HUNT, Former U.S. Ambassador to Austria, May 22, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: There are people in Iraq who have theological objections to women serving in government. To what extremes do such people appear willing to go to defend their beliefs, and how can an American presence help to assure that women will not be prevented from serving in government?
HUNT: Your question is extremely important. Some Westerners think of Islam as having one interpretation. Since there are literally hundreds of variation of Christian faith, we should be able to understand that there are many different interpretations of the Koran vis a vis women’s roles. Only the most extreme on a very long continuum would say that Islam prohibits the full involvement of women in public life.
Whether the extremists will use violence to try to frighten women and moderates away from public positions is partly determined by the signals the U.S. sends. If we bring women into full participation in the current peace process, it is more likely that the notion of excluding them later will seem preposterous.
Iraqi women must have the opportunity to negotiate their social and political positions with Iraqi men. Our job is to ensure an even playing field not only for women, but all parts of the society. It’s too easy for the screamers to get onto the agenda, and more modulated voices to not be heard.

WILLIAM BRANIGIN, Washington Post Staff Writer, May 22, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: You reported on Desert Storm as well as the past war with Iraq. Did you find any striking differences in how reporters covered the two events? Was the military more cooperative during either of these wars? Do you believe you had a better overall awareness of what was happening during one of these wars?
BRANIGIN: I did indeed cover Desert Storm, and there was a world of difference between that coverage and the latest. We did not have sat phones in the field during the Gulf War, there was an unwieldy pool arrangement, and the stories were censored. The military was much more cooperative this time around and pretty much let us do our thing. I think the result was much better coverage.

SAM KILEY, FRONTLINE/Word reporter, May 30, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Among the Kurds you have met, how do they seem to feel the prospects are for their future? Are they worried about the directions the next Iraqi government might take towards them? Do they believe America will protect them (even though we have failed them in the past)? Do they think much about what Turkey might do? Are they optimistic they will be provided a fair degree of autonomy, or are they fearful they will be disappointed again? Or, is it too soon after the war for most Kurds to start thinking that far ahead?
KILEY: Generally speaking, they’re optimistic that they will get some federal autonomy. They remain extremely suspicious of the Turks—who have threatened to invade N. Iraq to prevent a Kurdish state. But some are beginning to realize that a Kurdish state might not be the best answer—they would be very vulnerable to Syria, Turkey, and Iran. They are optimistic about the Americans because they have administrations in N. Iraq that have managed to function with some degree of democracy and respect for human rights. By no means perfect, but they realize that the areas under their control at the moment are the safest and best-run parts of Iraq.

JIM WILKINSON, Strategic Communications Director, Central Command
CZIKOWSKY: How well are public services being restored? Are public safety services about normal? Has looting been contained to a point where the public can feel safe? Does everyone have the electricity and the usual public utilities? Finally, who is actually making governing decisions, and is there a definite plan to phase these decisions to others?
WILKINSON: The situation in Iraq improves every day. In many areas Iraqis already have more power and water than they did before the war under the Saddam Hussein regime. On the looting front, we must remember that Saddam Hussein released thousands of criminals from his prisons into the Iraqi streets just before the war. It will take some time to round up these criminals who have been responsible for much of the looting. Our forces conduct roughly 2,500 patrols a day and every day they are arresting those who loot and otherwise cause trouble.

VERNON LOEB, Washington Post Staff Writer, July 9, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: The White House has admitted they accidentally used false information that Iraq was purchasing materials for weapons of mass destruction. How does false information get passed along so far, didn’t anyone disagree and if so who decided their objections should be ignored, and what steps could the White House do to see they use better information from now on?
LOEB: I think false information made it into President Bush’s State of the Union address because the CIA did not formally pass along a review of the situation it had commissioned. And other concerns about the veracity of Iraq’s alleged attempts to buy uranium from Niger were unheeded. To some extent, I think, these concerns weren’t passed along or given appropriate weight because the people writing the speech very much wanted to prove that Iraq had a state in pursuing nuclear weapons.

RICHARD LEIBY, Washington Post Staff Writer, July 14, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: What were your impressions of (Sabih) Azzawi (who states he was tortured by the Saddam Hussein regime)? How truthful do you believe him to be? You obviously found his stories interesting enough to be worthy of an article. Yet, it would be hard to confirm what he says, and even people who could confirm it would have reasons to deny it. What do your instincts tell you?
LEIBY: My instincts told me he was an honest cop. So did my observations. His wounds provided good evidence that he had been tortured by the regime. I watched him interact with ex-Iraqi Army officers and saw how he gained their respect. He clearly had a lot of credible connections, as an ex-street cop would. I went to his neighborhood and met his family. I never uncovered a contradiction to his account. All of this led me to conclude he was not a fabricator.

PETER STOTHARD, author, July 18, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: What was Tony Blair’s thinking on how war should be conducted against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq? Was he in basic agreement with the American war plan, or were there any major differences? If there were differences, what were they? To me, it sees we fought a bold war knowing we might be cornering an enemy with great retaliatory potential, especially if it was thought they had weapons of mass destruction. How concerned was Tony Blair that England might suffer serious retaliation for the war?
STOTHARD: I was with Tony Blair in his apartment preparing for “Prime Minister’s Questions” and the issue came up about an al Qaeda threat to a British nightclub. Normally in those conversations he dealt with every point with his staff but on this point, he just said “Hmmm…”(And a long sigh.) Of course he knew there was a risk. But he also thought the risk of not acting against Iraq was much greater. So yes, he knew there was a risk.
On the war plan, you need to remember that the British Prime Minister is not the commander in chief. Whereas George Bush is in command of American force and with all the war planning to match, in the British Prime Minister’s office there were just two little maps of Iraq on an easel. I think most British schools had more details of the terrain of Iraq than there were in the Prime Minister’s office where I was.

NOAH FELDMAN, New York University Law Professor, July 23, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Democracy is a concept compatible with Islam. What I believe makes many people in Iraq and other Islamic countries suspicious is the belief that foreign countries wish to change their system of government to make them subservient to foreign powers. How do we reassure the people in Iraq that they can control their destiny, yet they must do so in a way that respects human rights, the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, and that these ideas are crucial to their lives and not an imposed Western ideal?
FELDMAN: It’s natural for Iraqis and other Muslim and Arabs to be skeptical of a foreign presence in Iraq. The best and only way to reassure Iraqis of the coalition’s intentions is by actually creating the conditions where Iraqis can design their own institutions and govern themselves. No Iraqis that I met in the country argued to me that protection of freedom and equality were foreign ideas. To the contrary, Iraqis have suffered under oppression, and they want rights to ensure they are not oppressed again.
CZIKOWSKY: Iraq used to claim that democracy exists in their country. After all, Saddam Hussein was democratically elected, and with 100 percent of the vote. Does this make the Iraqi public cynical about elections, and how do we make them more assured that democracy can work?
FELDMAN: The Iraqis whom I spoke to fully understood that what they had under Saddam was not democracy but oppressive dictatorship. But they have not yet seen democracy in practice, and they will be discovering many things about democracy’s benefits and demerits in the near future. Democracy is no panacea. It is the worst system of government, except for all others, as Churchill is supposed to have said.
CZIKOWSKY: What type of economic development would be most useful to the Iraqi people, and what type of American and international assistance should be made available?
FELDMAN: Beyond ensuring that basic needs and services are satisfied, the best thing the international community can do is to speed the construction of Iraq’s infrastructure, including its oil infrastructure. That label the Rockies to earn the money they need for reconstruction on their own.

PHYLLIS BENNIS, Institute for Policy Studies Fellow, August 20, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: President Bush declared the war in Iraq over. Do you believe we understand the nature and extent of guerilla warfare in Iraq? In Viet Nam, we underestimated enemy soldiers and we did not know how to best combat guerilla soldiers. Do we understand our enemy in Iraq, or do you believe we have once again miscaluculated?
BENNIS: A great question. First of all the war is clearly not over, despite Bush’s on-board carrier photo op. I don’t know what is happening right now in Iraq is yet a full-scale guerilla war—but it’s certainly moving in that direction. You’re right about the parallel with our ignorance regarding Viet Nam—because there, we refused to acknowledge the nationalism and opposition to colonialism that undergirded the Vietnamese resistance in both northern and southern parts of the country.
In Iraq, certainly we have once again miscalculated. One of the big questions is who is “our enemy”? I don’t think Iraqis view Americans as their enemy, but U.S. troops are occupying their country, killing civilians, controlling their oil, failing to provide real security for anybody—those policies may at some point be enough to end the existing distinction between American people and the American government or American policies.
Unfortunately, some of the ideologues in control of the White House—the Paul Wolfkwitz-Richard Perle-Doughlas Feith-Lewis Libby etc. crowd—actually seem to believe their own rhetoric that “our troops” would be “liberating’ Iraq and would be greeted in the streets of Baghdad with flowers and rice…What a surprise when that turned out to not be true. But they couldn’t get past their own true-believer views that just getting rid of Saddam Hussein (which we haven’t done do far, we should remember) would be enough, and that after that everyone in Iraq would be happy, rich, would love Americans and everyone could go home and live happily ever after.
What a fairy tale.
Too bad so many lives had to be lost to prove it wasn’t true.

MICHAEL O”HANLON, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow, August 20, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: President Bush declared the war in Iraq over. Do you believe we understand our enemy in Iraq? In Viet Nam, we miscalculated the nature of guerilla warfare. Have we learned our lessons and now know our enemy or have we repeated our mistake and once again do not know how to combat a guerilla warfare opponent?
O’HANLON: I think we actually know how. The problem is, this is a tough guerilla enemy, and our technological advantages don’t apply as well, so we need patience and persistence, and some adjustments to our broader political strategy (a key part of any counterinsurgency effort as you know) as well.

VIVIENNE WALT, freelance journalist, August 20, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: I have received different answers to this question, so I wish to please request your opinion. Do you think we understand what we are facing in Iraq? Do we seem to be prepared to deal with the guerilla, or whatever you wish to call it, warfare that we have been facing? Or, do we seem to be repeating the mistakes we made in Viet Nam by not understanding what we were up against?
WALT: It’s hard to know who the ‘we’ is-when you travel around Baghdad you meet a lot of American soldiers who seem truly bewildered. They’re young, scared, and many have never left the U.S. before in their lives. They certainly don’t know what they’re facing here in Iraq. On a more official level, I think it’s fair to say the U.S. came into Baghdad in April believing there would be flowers and cheers all round. There has been a lot of that-but equally, there are a lot of people who truly dislike the U.S., even among those who also truly disliked Saddam.

SUSAN MANUEL, United Nations Peace and Security Section Chief, August 21, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: The facts that the United Nations has been attacked shows, perhaps, someone sees it as a symbol of oppression rather than as an organization providing humanitarian assistance. How has the Iraqi press been describing the United Nations, keeping in mind that the dissemination of news in Iraq is different than in many other countries. Do you believe the U.N. needs to do a better job of educating people as it its mission?
MANUEL: Yes, I was told this by Iraqis when I was in Baghdad last week: that few Iraqis know much about the humanitarian work the U.N. has been doing there. The U.N. clearly needs to do more to describe its work internally. However, with the limited staff allowed back since the war, domestic public information has not been a priority. Also, the media scene is quite chaotic: there are many new newspapers, but with very low circulation. There is the Iraqi Media Network, which is the communications organ of the CPA and not extremely popular there. There is a big surge of satellite dish purchasing, in order to watch Arab-language channels from outside Iraq, and they would have scant news on U.N humanitarian activity.

ROBERT BAER, Former Central Intelligence Agency Agent, August 22, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: I recall in Beirut in 1983 that there were concerns expressed by Rep. John Murtha and others that our troops were in an exposed position in a valley and that guards were ordered not to have bullets in their guns. The troops were wide open to a terrorist attack. Have we learned any lessons since then? When we see places that are vulnerable to attack, are we slow to respond because there are just too many possible targets, or what? If terrorists can find targets weakly defended to attack, why do we keep weakly defended targets?
BAER: Washington, like Lebanon in 1983, misassessed the situation in Iraq. We did not realize we were viewed as a combatant by a large segment of the population. In the case of Lebanon it was the Shi’a; in Iraq the Sunni Arabs. In Lebanon, it was unforgivable that the Marine guards around the barracks did not have bullets in their guns or cement barriers around the buildings. It’s always a steep learning curve in countries like Lebanon and Iraq. I hope Washington picks up on what is happening in Iraq faster than we did in Lebanon.
CZIKOWSKY: A point I found interesting in your article is when you mentioned how we were blaming the Syrians for attacks when it was the Lebanese who were behind the attacks. How good and bad is our intelligence? This issue has been raised again recently concerning weapons of mass destruction. Doesn’t this send a chilling message that we maybe quick to attack someone based on poor intelligence? What can be done to improve this situation?
BAER: If I have my history right, Lebanon, 1983 was not a straight forward intelligence failure. The experts warned that by sending the Marines in we were walking into an ambush. The Reagan Administration wasn’t listening. In the case of Iraq, I recall the CIA Director sent a letter to the Senate stating that Saddam probably wouldn’t resort to terrorism unless attacked. This just possibly could be what we are seeing now. What this administration failed to understand was that this was the worst possible time to put
American troops into the Middle East. They didn’t need intelligence to figure that out. Although we may not have had specifics on threats, we should have had the imagination to see what was coming. As for the WMD, it’s clear to everyone Saddam didn’t have it deployed with his troops. As for WMB programs, the jury’s out. All in all Iraq was a black hole for us.

ANTHONY CORDESMAN, Center for Strategic and International Studies Senior Fellow, August 27, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: If the citizens of Iraq were engaged in the planning of the rebuilding of their country, what do you believe would be their priorities? How involved are the people of Iraq in the planning and implementation of the rebuilding of their country?
CORDESMAN: The CPA has tried to involve as many Iraqis as possible. A number of key elements, particularly Shiite have refused to participate. There are many Sunnis and Saddam loyalists in central Iraq that will not participate at all. The country is deeply divided between Sunni and Shiite and Arab, and minorities like the Kurds. It has no political history where these factions have had to work together. We do know that ordinary Iraqis want ordinary things: security, food, electricity and water, jobs, health and education. The problem is that we not only have to build an economy, we have to build a political system in which the Iraqis have never had the experience of leading and key factions have never had to work together.
CZIKOWSKY: The Congressional Budget Office is warning that we are entering perhaps an even more severe budget crisis than most expected. We may need to seriously consider: how much can we afford to pay to keep the military in Iraq? Do you have any comments on the long term costs of these operations? Next, while we are increasing our expenditures in Iraq, the White House is seeking to reduce the pay to the troops. Has this affected the morale of the troops? When seeking to cut costs, is cutting salaries the best first move?
CORDESMAN: In regard to the first question, the basic problem is we are there. And we simply are going to have to spend what it takes. The bad news is the budget deficit. The good news is we will still spend far less on Defense as a percentage of the GNP than we have over the previous half century. In response to the second question, the issue is not salaries, but how to define combat pay. And those actually in combat are not going to be affected regardless of how this debate comes out.
CZIKOWSKY: If pay is reduced to soldiers who are no longer in combat, which solders in Iraq are considered as no longer being in combat? All soldiers in Iraq are potential targets for terrorists and guerilla attacks. Are all soldiers in Iraq considered as combat soldiers?
CORDESMAN: The exact definition is still being argued out within the Department of Defense. It is simply premature to get into an argument over a series of decisions where we don’t know the details.

YASMINE BAHRANI, Editor, USA Today, October 6, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Your article conveys the doubts and legends circulating among the Iraqi people about Americans. There were those who stated before the war ended that Iraqis would be greeting us with cheers and flowers. Would it be correct to state there is mistrust about the country that now controls their destiny? What, if anything, could Americans do to win greater public support amongst the Iraqi people?
BAHRANI: I can say that most of the people I spoke with in Baghdad had a positive view of Americans when they arrived. They now feel abandoned. I think perhaps if general security, water, electricity and jobs were available to Iraqis, they would feel better about the situation. It’s hard to say whether everyone mistrusts the United States, but many do seem to think that the Americans did not kick out Saddam Hussein simply to liberate the Iraqi people. They suspect the U.S. was motivated by something else.

VERNON LOEB, Washington Post Staff Writer, November 19, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: I keep searching for news for casualty figures of who are fighting in Iraq, including civilian deaths. Am I missing something, or are these figures not being provided or are they well hidden? In particular, how well are we doing against the guerrilla-terrorists who are firing at us? Are they tending to get away, or are they being killed or tending to be killed or captured during these attacks?
LOEB: Very good questions. The U.S. military, I suppose as a reaction to Vietnam, doesn’t do body counts any more. And it certainly doesn’t tally civilian casualties. How well is the U.S. military doing against the guerillas? Well, I was never satisfied that I was getting a good handle on that. Commanders I interviewed consistently argued that they were winning a war of attrition against the insurgents, effectively targeting their operational cells, reducing their numbers, and seizing their weapons. That may be. Yet the number of attacks continued to increase on a daily basis during this same time, and the sophistication of the attacks continued to increase, which said to me that U.S. commanders were being overly optimistic, and that the insurgents were succeeding at replenishing their ranks, and at planning on higher and higher levels. U.S. commanders also continue to argue that their primary opponents are Baathists, not foreign fighters. But I am not convinced they have a good handle on exactly who they are fighting. To me the scariest prospect in Iraq is that, over time, it becomes a Jihan ground for Islamic fundamentalists and terrorist throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia. If that ultimately happens—and again, U.S. commanders believe it has not thus far—the insurgents will be able to replenish their ranks, and victory will be much harder, if not impossible, to achieve.

ROBIN WRIGHT, Washington Post Staff Writer, December 15, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Is there any concern that a new majority within Iraq could display pro-Iranian sympathies and that together a new dynamic could be created within the region? If so, what are the long term plans to forming relations with such a government? If not, what possibilities appear to exist on future relations between Iraq and Iran?
WRIGHT: One of the questions often asked about Iraq’s Shi’ites is what their relationship is with Iran, a predominately Shi’ite country We had one answer during the 1980-1988 war between Iraq and Iran when the Iraqi Shi’ites, who made up the majority of the foot soldiers in Iraq’s army, did fight and not defect or refuse in large numbers.
There does appear to be an Iraqi national identity among Iraqi Shi’ites. Remember, they are also Arabs, not Persians—and there are longstanding tensions between Arabs and Persians. But some of Iraq’s important Shi’ite clerics are Iranian born or trained in Iranian seminaries or under Iranian mullahs, so your question will continue to be asked as the political situation unfolds.

CHARLES FENYVESI, historian, December 16, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: A local newspaper ran a picture of the captured Saddam Hussein next to a picture of a captured Mussolini. Mussolini, in contrast, was wearing his uniform and at least in the picture was attempting to appear dignified before he was killed by a mob of people. Obviously, Saddam Hussein made little attempt to maintain the appearance of dignity while in hiding. Does this provide us with any insight into the type man Saddam Hussein is?
FENYVESI: Mussolini was captured by his dissident Generals, and he did not know in advance that he would be arrested, I think. He was in a military uniform because that’s what he wore during the war. Saddam, on the other hand was hiding, moving around, not receiving visitors, and his morale was probably low, and he didn’t think he needed to worry about his appearance. Besides, why dress up when headed for a spider hole?
Opinions vary although almost everyone in the country was opposed to the war.

ROBERT NOVAK, columnist, December 18, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: How would you recommend we allow Iraq to become a democratic society that respects human rights when our mere presence stirs up such resentment? If a Defense Department study is accurate, over 200,000 civilians died during Desert Storm. As Anthony Shadid of the Washington Post has pointed out, many Iraqis fighting us have had a friend or family member who died at the hands of Americans. Wouldn’t it be better if we allowed the United Nations, with our assistance, reorganize Iraq? Wouldn’t we, in the long term, win more trust in the Middle East if we provided more humanitarian assistance than if we continue to project the image of a country that does what it wants because it has the military power to do so?
NOVAK: Not everybody in Iraq resents our presence, but it doesn’t really matter. We didn’t take a poll in Japan and Germany after World War II to see whether they wanted us. And remember Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Dresden.

MARTIN SMITH, Frontline Producer, February 13, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: I keep hearing we are going to do this, yet I want to know exactly how we are proposing to devise a government that will allow democracy while protecting the rights of minority populations? How do you assure the protection of the Kurds? What protections are there that a new majority government will not slowly manipulate the system into another brutal government?
SMITH: Well, the protections are those of any representative democracy. As people in any multi-ethnic state know, the protection of minority rights is best accomplished through some sort of coalition building among groups. Iraqis are going through the difficult and painful process of learning these ropes. By most accounts, the Shia make up 60 percent of the population. Sunni Arabs make up about 20 percent. Kurds and other minority groups make up the rest. Minorities are going to have to find ways to form alliances and find common interests. Both Kurds and Sunni Arabs are fearful of a democracy. At the same time they recognize there are opportunities.

MICHAEL DORAN, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, February 18, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Is there any possibility that a Kurdish territory, with limited self-governance and American protection, could be established within an Iraqi state such that Turkey would be satisfied there is no independent state, Iraq would be satisfied that Iraq remains whole, and the Kurds would feel protected from any possible future attacks from Iraqis?
DORAN: Yes, such an arrangement can be worked out. But it will be tricky and, as I said before, independent control of oil revenues will make the Turks very nervous.
CZIKOWSKY: I like your mention that the younger generation appears to wish change and will be more willing to accept it. I believe old hatreds will slowly vanish and improved ideas will be accepted by a more open minded new generation. Is this hope real, and what could the U.S, do to encourage freer thinking in other countries?
DORAN: That is the $64,000 question—when adjusted for inflation comes out to be $3,500,212. We are engaged in a struggle that will take at least an entire generation. The entire political and economic system in the Middle East is stultifying. It offers the young generation no hoe. It’s a very tall order.

EAMONN MATTHEWS, Frontline Producer, February 27, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: I recall during the invasion asking if there were counts or estimate of Iraqi deaths—military and/or civilian. No one seemed to know. Finally, one journalist responded that it was policy not to release these figures, because the military did not want to turn Iraq into another Viet Nam where the nightly news would provide the public with daily casualty figures on both sides. Still the question remains: do we have any figures on the number of Iraqi deaths: military and/or civilian?
MATTHEWS: A really difficult question. In the chaos a lot of record keeping fell by the way. I’ve seen estimates of 3,000 up to 10,000. But all of these estimates are heavily qualified.

TUCKER CARLSON, CNN Political Analyst, March 2, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Like you, I am concerned about the intelligence failure regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Yet, it is my recollection that there were intelligence and academic reports, as well as incomplete inspectors’ reports, that all questioned the existence or extent of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Thus, isn’t it less of an intelligence failure and more of a process failure that our leadership chose what it wished to believe from the collective intelligence reports?
CARLSON: That’s partly true. There was debate over Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. And there were some who suggested that maybe Saddam had destroyed some of his chem and bio weapons. But I don’t remember ever hearing anyone even near the mainstream suggest Iraq had no significant quantities of WMD.
In other words, just about everyone was fooled. Again, this is a big deal, made frivolous when it’s leveraged for a partisan attack. Let’s find what happened and how.

JOHN V. PARACHINI, RAND Corporation Policy Analyst, March 2, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: It is being reported that some reports are informing the Iraqi public that the Americans are behind the attacks (of shrines in Baghdad and Karbala). There is belief that Muslims could never do this to other Muslims, and thus it had to be Westerners. How are these reports impacting the Iraqi public and our efforts at winning the respect of the Iraqi public? What should we be doing to gain the confidence of the Iraqi public?
PARACHINI: Repots that Iraqis attacked U.S. Army medics as they tried to assist some of the victims in the attacks in Karbala are disturbing. Resentment about American and other Coalition forces in Iraq runs high in different parts of the country, but this is hard to comprehend.
In societies where information is not easily available and suspicions of foreigners run high, a gallop effort often takes hold among a frightened public. Conspiracy theories about U.S. activities are common in the Middle East. This seems to be yet another ugly expression of the presumption many people in the region have about the U.S.’s activities. Additionally, you can imagine the tremendous grief and horror people must have experienced at these sites during the course of religious celebration. The situations were undoubtedly confusing and people were inclined to strike out at anyone the people (see as) a possible enemy. This does not excuse their behavior, but we should attempt to understand it as best we can.
Iraqi attacks on the U.S. military personnel who rushed to sites to render assistance is yet another reminder of the terribly difficult job of communicating the reality of the situation on the ground. U.S. and Iraqi authorities should see these confusing events as an example of the challenge of changing the understanding of Iraqi people of their national situation and the perception they have of who is their enemy.

WALTER PINCUS, Washington Post Staff Writer, March 20, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Scott Ritter and weapons inspectors were saying, before the war that they had yet to find evidence of weapons of mass destruction. My recollection from articles from retired CIA gent Mel Goodman and others was that there were serious questions as to whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, if they had the, they were unlikely to use them. Now, after the fact, we are arguing over the supposed intelligence failure that failed to detect that these weapons did not exist. I am wondering: is it really less of a failure of intelligence of that our leaders decided which intelligence to listen to and which to ignore?
PINCUS: It appears Saddam Hussein’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and any stocks of agents were mostly destroyed in the 1991 to 1998 period while the first United Nations inspectors were in Iraq. Subsequent to their leaving, without proving to the U.N. that the stocks they declared in 1991 were destroyed, Iraq appeared to have continued to buy some dual purpose equipment which because of their former habit of deception, left intelligence analysts with the belief that Saddam Hussein was building his weapons up again. Disbelief based on the past, and lack of first hand information from human sources, was mixed with spy satellite materials to allow analysts to create inferences that more was going on than has proved to be the case.
Those people who said there were no weapons, and there were many inside the intelligence community, have apparently turned out to be right. I saw that because they were the people that led me to write before the war that the intelligence on his weapons was inferential and unproven.
But remember, the search is still on and even the finding of small amounts of some agent would be promoted as making the entire effort worthwhile.

STEVEN A. COOK, Council on Foreign Relations Fellow, March 18, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: How is the press in Iraq and surrounding countries treating these terrorist attacks (in Baghdad)? What news and opinions are being provided to the public about these explosions in specific and about the coalition occupation in general?
COOK: The Arab media has been tough on the U.S. and the U.S. occupation. I am an avid watcher of al-Jazeera. The Arab media portrays events through Arab eyes and in many instances the U.S. is not viewed as a benevolent liberator, but a clumsy occupier that has wrought instability.
Still, 56% of Iraqis believe they are better off today than they were under Saddam.

MEL GOODMAN, Center for International Policy Senior Fellow, April 5, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Was the war in Iraq less an intelligence failure (as most are claiming) and more a failure of those analyzing the intelligence? I ask, because it was my recollection that it was well understood that al Qaeda was not associated with, and indeed supported the overthrow of, Saddam Hussein. Further, while it was uncertain that Saddam Hussein still had weapons of mass destruction, there were some theories that he could be exaggerating his strength in an effort to keep Iran from invading. Thus, it was important that we give the weapons inspectors time to finish their work: something the Bush Administration decided not to wait for. Further, there was even a report from the Army War College claiming it may have been Iran, rather than Saddam Hussein, behind some of the mass killings in Iraq. Finally, it has long been understood that an American presence in an Arab country would be met with resistance and likely would serve as an inducement for increased recruitment for terrorist organizations. Thus, my question: in your opinion, was the war in Iraq an intelligence failure or a failure of the White House to understand their own intelligence?
GOODMAN: The question is not an either/or question. Both the CIA and the White House are to blame for the decision to go to war, particularly the White House. First, the CIA politicized the intelligence, beginning with the phony October 2002 national intelligence estimate, and took a worst-case position on many key issues. Then the White House used misinformation and disinformation, some from the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans, to distort all sensitive information. After all, how did a fabrication get into a State of the Union message (2003) to make the case for Iraq reconstituting its nuclear capability? There was no evidence to make such a case, but even the 2002 estimate referred to the possibility of Iraq obtaining uranium from western Africa. Shabby story all around.

GIDEON ROSE, Foreign Affairs Managing Editor, April 8, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Hasn’t the Bush Administration learned one of the most important lessons from the Watergate crisis: the public dislikes the stonewalling more than the original act? Isn’t this unwillingness to admit mistakes and hide the truth apt to hurt the reputation of the White House more than if they had just come forward from the beginning and explained how the mistakes were made?
ROSE: You’d think so, but I guess not. I joked to somebody the other day that the Bush team refused to learn even those lessons from the Clinton years that were worth learning, such as the importance, during potential scandals, of getting as full and accurate a story out as quickly as possible. As to whether they will pay for being so stingy with information, facts, etc., who knows…that’s the province of the politics, not the wonks.

RICHARD LEIDY, Washington Post Staff Writer, April 23, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: What do you think of the firing of the workers who took pictures of coffins of American soldiers? The Bush Administration learned one lesson from Viet Nam: the daily death reports did a lot to drain support public support for the war effort. Isn’t it interesting that during the revelations of the Richard Clarke book and the hearings, polls show support of Bush’s handling of the war in Iraq was hardly affected. Yet, images of Americans killed and their bodies mutilated caused a sharp, overnight drop in support. Does the American public react more to imagery than to facts. (I further mention the polls stating where people still believe Iraq is behind al Qaeda and that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, but that opens whole new areas.)
LEIDY: I don’t want to talk about Iraq anymore! I get depressed. Seriously. I have good Iraqi friends, I know their families, I worry about them every single day.
But more to the point: Most Americans, I think, don’t relate to this war. They relate to “American Idol” and whether they have jobs. The war is far away, and complicated, and I just don’t think many Americans pay attention.

SEWELL CHAN, Washington Post Foreign Service, May 3, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: I am worried about our disregard for international law. Our government is trying to claim that captured prisoners do not fall under international standards. I fear that if we fail to set an example, how can we expect others to treat American prisoners with the same respect and standards expected worldwide? Now that we not only are telling the rest of the world that we are above international law, we are now showing the rest of the world that some of our soldiers violate normal standards of respect and show abuse and humiliation towards captured prisoners. Do our soldiers fear retaliation if captured, or have you not heard such fears stated?
CHAN: You raise excellent points. The difficulties in classifying these detainees—and the subsequent lack of the due-process rights to which criminal defendants in the United States are entitled—raise profound legal and ethical questions, I believe.

JOHN BRADY KIESLING, U.S. Foreign Service veteran, May 10, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: From a military assessment, doesn’t the knowledge of the abuses of the detainees mean that those fighting us are both more likely to gain in recruitment and that they are more likely to fight to the death rather than to surrender, as they may fear imprisonment now more than death?
KIESLING: Human psychology is odd. In a crisis situation, people don’t have time to think rationally about death versus surrender, and in urban warfare against U.S. firepower the choice often doesn’t exist. But yes, militarily the release of those photographs was a terrible setback. Assume that Iraqis are just as proud as we are, but with stronger taboos about being naked in the locker room. Like Americans, they are heavily armed. And they are occupied by foreigners. A deadly combination.

JEFFERSON MORLEY, washingtonpost.com Staff Writer, May 18, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: The Philadelphia Daily News today reports that the White House debated attacking Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s terrorist camp in June, 2002, but decided against it as they “feared destroying a terrorist camp in Iraq could undercut its case for war against Saddam Hussein.” Please pardon my ignorance, but I don’t understand what the White House meant by that. Aren’t terrorists the primary objective of the American fight against terrorism? Or, do I understand this correctly, and the American objective seems primarily limited to removing Saddam Hussein from office?
MORLEY: I haven’t seen the story and can’t speak for the Bush White Hosue. If the story is true, my guess is that the White House held off because of 1.) uncertain prospects of success and 2.) the certain prospect of international criticism from allies on Iraq was still being solicited.
As for the stated American objective in Iraq, it has changed many times in the past 18 months: From removing weapons of mass destruction to implanting democracy to removing Saddam Hussein. I think you understand correctly that the White House is no longer emphasizing the first two goals.

PETER SLEVIN, Washington Post Staff Writer, May 27, 2004
CZIKOWKSY: The Connecticut press has reported that one of the alleged abusive prison guards in Iraq had a questionable past as a Connecticut prison guard. Has the national press been running background checks on those alleged to have been abusive?
SLEVIN: Newspapers, in many cases led by the post, have been doing just that. And the results have not been pretty, particularly when it comes to the two MP offices believed to have directed much of the abuse.

RICHARD H. SINNREICH, military affairs columnist, June 1, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Isn’t it human nature to expect a country to not trust an invading country, and any government established by an invading country would naturally have difficulty winning widespread public respect? What do you see as the most degree of respect to American interests that Americans can expect to see from a new Iraqi government? Towards what long term goals should we be assisting a new Iraqi government to achieve?
SINNREICH: I think we were naïve to believe that removing Saddam Hussein automatically would generate unreserved support for remaking Iraq’s political culture in a way that would satisfy the President’s objectives. Certainly we were under no such illusions about German and Japanese reactions to the removal of Hitler and Tojo. We understood very well that both societies would have to be compelled to change. Our occupation policies were designed according. Of course, we never claimed to be “liberating “ Germany or Japan.
That said, unlike some skeptics, I do think it’s possible to compel a traditional society to alter its political culture. In a sense, we did that in Japan, and earlier in our own Southern states. It isn’t easy and may well require a level and duration of military coercion that Americans in most circumstances are loath to apply.
Whether, absent that coercion, establishment of a unified and politically moderate Iraqi government inhospitable to terrorists is feasible seems to me very much in question. The President apparently believes it is. Others are less optimistic.

JEFFERSON MORLEY, washingtonpost.com Staff Writer, June 1, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: What is your sense of the reports that Mr. Chalabi’s ties to the Iranian government? Supposedly the CIA warned the White House that these ties existed, yet the White House chose to disregard these reports and allow our policy on Iraq to be guided by information Mr. Chalabi and his associates were providing. Now that his information turns out to be wrong regarding weapons of mass destruction, shouldn’t we be taking a stronger look at how we filter intelligences information of this nature?
MORLEY: Chalabi’s ties to the Iranian government are well-known. The Iraqi National Congress even held a conference in Tehran during the run-up to the war as if to advertise such ties.
As for taking a stronger look at how we filter intelligence information, I don’t think that the system really failed on this point. The CIA and State Department warned that the INC was unreliable and they were right. What we need to look at is who in the Bush White House chose to ignore the intelligence professionals. The intelligence system worked. The question is whether the political system can establish accountability. So far, the answer is no.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, June 3, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: It has been reported that the CIA and State Department warned the White House in 2001 that Mr. Chalabi had ties to Iran. For whatever reasons, the White House likely weighed this information and decided, perhaps in error, to downplay these warnings and to accept information from Mr. Chalabi and his associates regarding the threat Saddam Hussein posed.
The question I have is not what and when the White House knew these suspicions, but when did the public finally learn of these ties between Iran and Mr. Chalibi? Personally, I am only recently reading about this. I ask because I think it may have been useful in forming public opinion over whether we should go to war in Iraq if we, the public, knew that the main source of information regarding the threat Saddam Hussein posed was form sources that were self-serving at best and connected with Iran at worse.
PRIEST: You are right that Chalabi’s ties to Iran were well known for years. In fact, U.S. taxpayers helped fund his office in Tehran.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, June 16, 2004
CZIKOWSY: Was there a gap in time between the time is seemed to be commonly known amongst Washington insiders that Chalabi had ties to Iran and when the press informed the rest of the nation of these ties? I think it would have been crucial to those of us outside the Beltway to have known of the level of credibility that should have been given to claims made by Chalabi and whether we should have followed his claims into going to war in Iraq.
PRIEST: Not really. Reporters who covered Chalabi in exile wrote about his links to Iran—mainly his office and well-known contacts with Iranian intelligence. All of this was the subject of news reports, as were his links to Bush neo-cons (talk about a politician!) Now, getting and giving away such a big secret as he is accused of doing—takes his Iranian connection to a whole new level.

ROBERT BRYCE and ROD D. MARTIN, authors, September 10, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Do you think President Bush considered a war with Iraq considered a war with Iraq before September 11, 2004? Do you think the war in Iraq diverted any resources from our operations in Afghanistan?
BRYCE: I think it’s clear that Bush was spoiling for a fight with Saddam. President Clinton has said that when he met with Bush right before Bush was sworn into office, that Bush disregarded the threat posed by bin Laden, and said instead he was going to take care of Saddam.
Second, there’s no question that the war in Iraq not only diverted critical resources from Afghanistan, the Iraq war also hurt the war on terror. Look at James Fallows’ current piece in the Atlantic. By fixating on Saddam, Bush and the Pentagon let bin Laden escape. Furthermore, and most dangerous, is that the Iraq war has created a breeding ground for terrorists. Bush has put us into a decades-long war with Islamic fundamentalists and the war will cost Americans trillions of dollars. Our situation in Iraq could not be any worse: we can’t leave and we can’t stay.
MARTIN: I agree with Mr. Bryce to the degree that Iraq was a serious consideration prior to 9/11—as indicated by the Clinton Administration! Bill Clinton has said repeatedly—even as late as a month ago—that though he disagreed with the timing and exact details of Mr. Bush’s actions, he thought all along that Saddam was a dire threat to this country and that regime change was ultimately necessary. Needless to say, the Kerry campaign doesn’t like to quote Mr. Clinton on this issue.
I disagree with Mr. Bryce regarding any supposed diversion of resources. Vladamir Putin tells us that his intelligence service uncovered at least six separate terror plots against the United States by Saddam/s intelligence service between 9/11 and the war. ‘Nuff said: Saddam was after us, and needed taking out. But what’s more, on our Axis of Evil list, taking out Saddam eliminates one source of terrorism, and outflanks an even bigger one, Iran. Look at a map: we now surround Iran. And as we deal with their imminent nuclear threat, that’s going to matter. It will matter even more as their youth look to the successful creation of a democracy in Baghdad as a model for revolution in Tehran.

MICHAEL HIRSH, “Newsweek” Senior Editor, September 27, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: If we permit true and free democracy into Iraq, are we prepared for the possibility that an anti-American government will result? Have we decided how to best reach out to the Iraqi people should that happen?
HIRSH: We had better get prepared for just such a result. No matter who is elected, they will probably have to run on a platform of getting the Americans out.
CZIKOWSKY: If it was our goal to show the Arab world and other countries living under dictatorships how well democracy works and how much America intends to be supportive, wouldn’t it have been better if we delivered quickly on rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure rather than concentrating more on military responses?
HIRSH: Yes, you are exactly right. See the cover story my colleague Rod Nordland and I did in “Newsweek” last November, headlined “Bush’s $87 Billion Mess.” It makes just the point.

SEYMOUR HERSH, author, November 4, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: To me, the report that Secretary Colin Powell stated we are losing the war in Iraq should be bigger news than it has received. I remember this movie before when it was titled “Viet Nam”. How do we convince this Administration of the dangers of sending more troops to fight a nationalistic guerilla opponent in a country where more people have been killed by Americans than by Saddam Hussein and that seems willing to fight us for years if necessary?
HERSH: Tough question, different answer. Kerry certainly did not have one. The answer may come from our military, but they are extremely reluctant to tell the White House the truth. That must change.

WESLEY CLARK, former Presidential candidate, November 15, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Secretary Powell is reported to have privately stated we are losing the war. How would you assess the war overall? Will many more troops be needed in coming months, and is this an engagement that should be expected to last for several years, or might it end soon?
CLARK: It looks like the insurgency has gotten stronger with each passing month, but the insurgents are incapable of standing up to U.S. firepower. So long as they stand to fight, and then are destroyed, we win…It’s too soon to know the ultimate outcome at Fallujah, but it is entirely possible that we will be very successful on the battlefield but that this will give us nothing more in terms of preventing the spread of insurgency or gaining wider political acceptance of Mr. Allawi. Still, as I indicated, the battle at Falluja was simply necessary. We had to!

ANDREA BRUCE WOODALL, Washington Post columnist, November 15, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: You made reference to the abrupt manner in which the military talks to Iraqi civilians. Is this necessary, as our soldiers can not trust who among civilians may be a sniper or an attacker Has there been any effort on the part of the military to soften our image to the Iraqi public, since a primary aim of our occupation is to gain support of the Iraqi people to a democratic government supporter by the United States? If we are viewed as harsh occupiers, they may defeat our main purpose of the occupation.
WOODALL: I think many soldiers don’t know who they can trust among civilians—and tone of voice is often the only way they can communicate. From my experience, missions were either to gain the confidence of civilians or to find “bad guys”. There was usually was no in between.

COLUM LYNCH, Washington Post Staff Writer, November 30, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: How do billions of dollars get siphoned away? Does the United Nations lack proper auditing or lack enough auditors? Or is it accepted that governments will siphon funds in hopes that some funds get through as intended and the United Nations looks the other way?
LYNCH: That’s a good question. The Oil for Food program was established in December 1996, a time when Iraq was plagued with high levels of malnutrition and soaring mortality rates, especially for children. At the time, the Clinton Administration was under extreme pressure from humanitarian groups and other governments to improve the humanitarian situation or end sanctions on Iraq. The Clinton Administration and other governments agreed to establish an imperfect program that provided large scope for profiteering and abuse. But in general the program represented a success for the Clinton Administration. The Oil for Food program relieved political pressure on the Administration by lowering mortality rate. It also allowed the continuation of sanctions. The United States, meanwhile, turned its attention to preventing Iraq from using the program to importing weapons and other military components. On that score, the program was a great success. The United States and the United Nations were aware of the abuses of the program but seemed to agree it was a price worth paying.

MICHAEL EISENSTADT, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Security Studies Program Director, May 2, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Over how much of Iraq does the new government actually have functional control?
EISENSTADT: That is an interesting question, which is not easy to answer from Washington. On the one hand, government ministries are functioning, and are carrying out various projects in many parts of Iraq in conjunction with U.S. government civilian and military organizations. Likewise, Iraqi Security Forces have established a unilateral presence in parts of the country (in both relatively stable regions, as well as parts of the country—including some neighborhoods of Baghdad—which are considered bastions of the insurgency)—although they are backed up by coalition forces.
In other parts of the country (such as large parts of the Sunni triangle—encompassing Anbar, Ninawa, and Saladin provinces—and parts of Baghdad. Babil province, and Diyala province), there is no effective central government presence, and the U.S. military is the only authority. In these areas, because coalition forces are stretched thin, tribal militias, insurgent organizations, political parties associated with the insurgency, and criminal gangs, may be the sole authority.
But beyond this, it is very hard to quantify the extent of government control.

STEVE COLL, Washington Post Associate Editor, May 31, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: There are reports that Colin Powell privately expressed doubts about how well the war in Iraq is going. We have barely secured Baghdad. We do not seem to have the hearts, minds, and support of the Iraqi people for a pro-American government. In your assessment, how are we doing in Iraq?
COLL: I haven’t been over there recently, so I’m really not in a position to say. I did talk to a sober-minded colleague who travels there regularly and who said that in comparison to February, when the elections had given them a sense of new and positive momentum, that today they were comparatively glum/ But who knows. Hearts and minds are volatile organisms, we all know.

NORA BEHSAHEL, RAND Corporation Policy Analyst, June 7, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Part of the long range goal is to create a stable Iraq. Shouldn’t we be doing more to provide Iraq with stable lies, in terms of basic necessities such as public utilities, public safety.? It seems we have concentrated on the military objectives while forgetting the final objective. Plus, wouldn’t we win more respect and confidence of the Iraqi people, and indeed the rest of the world, if we devoted more attention to the social needs of the Iraqi people?
BEHSAHEL: In the long term, power, education, jobs, and opportunities are critical ingredients of a successful and stable Iraq. The problem is, though, that none of those things can be achieved while the security situation is so dangerous. Jobs can’t be created and kids can’t be educated if people are afraid to leave their houses. The United States and the international community are undertaking many, many measures to try to improve the lives of Iraqi citizens, but many of those measures are undermined by the continuing insurgency. The insurgents, for example, have continued to blow up pipelines almost as quickly as they can be repaired, which limits the amount of revenue that the central government has to spend on social services. So, the best way—indeed, the only way—to provide basic social services in Iraq is to create a more stable security position first, so Iraqis feel safe in their own country and believe that any investments they make in the future will not be undone by political instability.

MICHAEL SMITH. Sunday Times of London Reporter, June 16, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: In your research, did you or any reporter you know come across War College or other military-academic research that indicated that Saddam Hussein likely no longer had weapons of mass destruction and that a foreign invasion of a country such as Iraq with a strong anti-American sentiment would be a costly venture? It seems the military academicians and intelligence reports had the facts right, but this information never filtered upwards to the White House or, if it did, it was ignored, nor did the press ever consider any of it useful except for perhaps a one day news spin and then was quickly forgotten.
SMITH: I think it is clear from the documents themselves that the whole venture was widely viewed as being highly dubious with no certainty of what would come of it. The Administration ensured that it only got the answers it wanted. But they either ignored the advice they were getting on the likely cost or managed to filter it out with this highly pressurized regime of come up with the right answers, or we will be on your back to do so all the time. That is what resulted in the National Intelligence Estimated of October 2002 which was designed by George Tenent to get a questioning Congress off the President’s back. Everyone has heard about the British “dodgy” dossiers but the actual intelligence analysis, the so-called JIC report, on which the main dossier was based spoke mostly of weapons programs, i.e. production of the agent that would be put into weapons, rather than actual stockpiled weapons. The closet it came to saying there were actually any weapons was to say there “may be” 1.5 tons of VX gas, a conclusion that went back to the conclusions of the UNSCOM weapons inspectors in 1998. The CIA’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on the other hand, said there were probably up to 500 tons of chemical weapons in Iraq. That gives you a feel of the kind of distortion that was going on. But as for the idea that he has very active programs going on, well everyone, including the French and the Russians, thought that. There was a kind of group think that no one was challenging.
CZIKOWSKY: George W. Bush once slipped during a speech and stated he was upset that Saddam Hussein had tried to kill his father. Is this a possible explanation for his fixation over Saddam Hussein? Indeed, perhaps if he had been more honest about it, it might have been understood more.
SMITH: Maybe. That was clearly the view of Peter Ricketts when he said in one of the memos that it looked like a grudge match.

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, Stanford University Hoover Institute historian, September 6, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: People in Iraq and throughout what used to be Arabia have a long history of resisting the intervention of military forces from foreign nations. Wouldn’t it be better, as a general strategy, to spread democracy and mutual understanding more through economic development assistance, trade, and diplomacy than attempting to force it through military occupation?
HANSON: In an ideal world, yes. But after the 1991 Gulf War, 11 years of occupying his air space, four attacks on regional neighbors, genocide, and legitimate worries over his past record of doing everything from harboring the 1993 World Trade Center bomber, Abu Abbas, Abu Nidal, providing shelter for Afghan terrorists like Zarqawi, and sending Iraq intelligence agents to promote terrorism, the decision was made to remove him, and second, not to leave as in the past, but do the dirty work of staying on, reconstructing the country, and trying to offer a real chance at freedom. I note I was not in favor of the 1998 letter to President Clinton by some asking for Saddam’s removal. I supported the war only in the context of a post-September 11 world.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, September 8, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: I have a question on the security guards protecting business interests in Iraq. They seem to be very close to being military troops without actually being such. As they essentially a private army, or do they coordinate their activities with Defense Department officials?
PRIEST: They are private armies and their coordination with the military has been extremely ad hoc. It sort of depends on the military commanders in a given area and how much they want to coordinate. Some of this depends on personal relations with the men in the private companies, who are generally former military and may know people in uniform on the ground. In the beginning, there were really no runs of the road, no standardized rules of engagement and no real way to hold accountable private security people who broke the law or killed people by mistake (or not by mistake). This is still not a high priority. On the other hand, given the insecurity in the country, many sectors—including the Iraqi government, U.S. diplomats and CIA officials and private, foreign, and Iraqi businesses—could not function without them.

GEORGE PACKER, author, October 10, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Has it ever been concluded whether or not we could have prevented Iraq’s initial invasion of Kuwait? There have been articles written that stated that Saddam Hussein informed the American Ambassador to Iraq of his plans for the invasion and that our government responded that we would not interfere. Do you believe there is truth to that, and, if it is true, do you think we deceived Saddam Hussein into invading so we could then use that as grounds to attack him, or do you think it was a change of policy after the attack that we then felt a need to defend Kuwait?
PACKER: I only know what you do: that the Administration of George H.W. Bush signaled to Saddam that it regarded his dispute with Kuwait as a matter outside American interests. It’s a long way from that to a deliberate effort to deceive him in order to go to war, though. In general, my reporting on Iraq has taught me that ad-hoc improvisation, lack of imagination, and incompetence are far stronger characteristics of the U.S. government than Machiavellian conspiracy.

NATHAN BROWN, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Democracy and Rule of Law Project Senior Associate, October 12, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Terrorists and anti-government militants are flocking into Iraq. How can a Constitution hold together a country with such a large minority that seek to destroy it, regardless?
BROWN: It will be difficult. The hope was that the process of writing a constitution would wean the constituency away from the insurgency and towards parties that are willing to participate. It wasn’t a bad idea, but I don’t think it has really worked.

ZAINAB SALBI, Women for Women International Founder, October 12, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Did you ever meet any of Saddam Hussein’s sons and, if so, how stable (or lack thereof) did you find them?
SALBI: I never had a conversation with his sons. It was hard to miss seeing Udday. He was known as the rapist of Baghdad and he constantly toured Iraqi colleges and different clubs as he hunted women. Udday definitely had a crazy side to him. That’s not only in terms of the stories of his violence towards women, but also in the way he dressed, in the way he had his parties, and the way he forced so many people to dance when he wanted them to dance, to strip when he wanted them to strip. He was feared by every single woman in Iraq. I’m lucky not to have been hurt by him.

BERNARD FINEL, National War College Professor of Military Strategy and Operations, October 13, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Insurgents are hearing rallying cries and are pouring into Iraq. The constitution is but one specific goal they hope to destroy. Is the effort to create a constitutional government in Iraq slowly stabilizing the country, making it less safe, or is this something that only time will tell?
FINEL: Only time will tell. It depends on how the constitutional referendum turns out---do Sunnis vote? If so, pro or con? Is there violence? Do the winter elections come off successfully? Do ideologues or compromisers dominate the new government? And so on.
I do think the Administration is correct in pointing out that violence on the eve of the referendum is probably temporary, although I do have concerns when this argument is spun around to claim that violence is actually a good thing, i.e. “escalating violence shows that the extremists are getting nervous because the tide is turning against them.”

PAUL R. WILLIAMS, American University International Service Professor, October 19, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Would it be a wise strategy of Saddam Hussein to use the tribunal to introduce testimony that would embarrass the United States, especially noting the quiet support the U.S. gave him during the Reagan and Bush Administrations? While having nothing to do with his brutality, could he play for international sympathy by portraying himself as someone who was supported by the United States, even given no objection to invading Kuwait by the American Ambassador, and then was invaded contrary to international law by the current government? Or is the judicial system designed to prevent such unrelated testimony from being introduced? WILLIAMS: Under international law, the defendant generally has wide latitude to argue his defense. In the Yugoslav Tribunal the judges have allowed the defendants to raise the argument of complicity of international actors and forces. The Yugoslav Tribunal has not, however, required international actors to come to the trial and testify. We can fully expect that Saddam will make the argument relating to international support for his activities and it will be up to the Iraqi judges to determine whether these are relevant and admissible.

MICAH GAREN and MARIE-HELENE CARLETON, documentary journalists, October 20, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Would you please describe the moments when you were originally taken hostage? What was going through your mind?
GAREN: Those moments are played out almost in slow motion, you really watch everything in front of you, and the terror becomes something you can almost taste. I knew that I could be killed in an instant in the market as the crowd began to go crazy, and you just hold onto anything to try to save yourself. It is like being caught in a sudden storm and being tossed around violently, and you appeal to anyone who will listen, and say whatever you can to try to regain some control and calm the situation down. My thoughts were focused on “if someone would just listen to reason, they would know they could kill us.” It really was a desperate appeal to reason, but those moments were about anger and deep emotion for those around us, not reason.
CZIKOWSKY: Did you feel resistance was impossible or dangerous?
GAREN: I was really determined to resist and break free through the entire ten days, but I knew it was very dangerous. I put my chances at 10 to 20% of making it out alive if we tried to escape. Still, if I knew for certain they were planning to kill me, that is what I had decided to do.
CZIKOWSKY: It is advised never to pay ransom as it only encourages more kidnappings. Marie, if you could have obtained Micah’s release by paying a ransom, what would you have done?
CARLETON: We are very fortunate that we did not have to make that decision, as Micah’s release was brought about by appeals and the work of journalists and others on the ground in Iraq.
It is impossible to answer a situation that thankfully for us became a hypothetical. There were times when we felt we would do anything to get Micah out, and in fact his kidnappers first talked about money to him, though never to us. But it quickly became political, and the death threat was linked to the Coalition fighting in Najaf against Sadr and the Mahdi Army.
The position to not negotiate with kidnappers and to not pay a ransom does makes sense as a policy, but when a family is faced with the possible murder of a loved one, they of course consider anything. It is difficult to say what one would do when pushed to that extreme, and I would not want to judge anyone who has been forced to make a tortuous decision where a loved one’s life hangs in the balance.

PEGGY BURYJ, mother of solider killed in Iraq, January 19, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: In your efforts (to determine if her son was killed by friendly fire), have you received any information on what proportion of deaths in Iraq are officially due to friendly fire, and how accurate do you believe such figures to be?
BURYJ: I think that Josh White found out there have been just 11 friendly fire cases in Iraq. I find that hard to believe.
CZIKOWSKY: We are sorry for your loss. While figures are hard to ascertain, it should be noted that some military scholars estimate that as high as one fourth of the deaths in some battles are due to friendly fire. We would cast doubt on an estimate that there have only been 11 friendly fire deaths during the Iraq war.
BURYJ: It doesn’t make sense—the numbers don’t add up. I agree.

JOEL CAMPAGNA, Committee to Protect Journalists Middle East and North Africa Program Coordinator, January 30, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Of the 14 journalists killed by American fire, what news agencies were they from and what were the circumstances of their deaths?
CAMPAGNA: They were from various news organizations and the circumstances also differed. Several journalists were killed in crossfire while covering clashes between military forces and insurgents. For notably, during the war in 2003, two journalists, one from Reuters, another from the Spanish television channel Telecinco were killed when a U.S. tank opened fire on Baghdad’s Palestine Hotel. Also, in 2003, a correspondent for al Jazeera was killed when a U.S. military aircraft opened fire just outside of the station’s Baghdad bureau.

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, Yale University History Professor, January 31, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Do you see any lessons from the Cold War, such as what we learned from fighting a guerilla nationalist enemy in Viet Nam, that could be useful in advising current policy makers?
GADDIS: Sure, you can always learn things from history. The most important thing is to be clear on how the current situation is similar to, and different from, the Viet Nam situation. One example of each. A similarity is that what happens on the home front will certainly affect our ability to fight the war in which we’re engaged. A difference is that it’s not the same kind of war: Iraq is not Viet Nam.

BERNARD FINEL, National War College Military Strategy and Operations Professor, March 2, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Do you have an assessment as to the degree to which the Iraqi internal strife is being prompted by foreign sources? Iraq and Iran fought a long and gruesome war and we should presume Iran has a strong interest in Iraq’s future. In addition, there are several countries and organizations without boundaries that have interests in Iraq. Are there estimates as to what percentage of combatants are from outside Iraq, and how must support and what kind of support they are receiving from sources outside Iraq?
FINEL: As you know, this is the source of much, much debate. There are a couple of issues to keep in mind. First, the amount of support may or may not correlate with the importance of the support. In other words, it is possible that even small numbers of outsiders are making a big difference. Second, while it is tempting to blame Iraq’s troubles on foreign trouble makers, it strikes me that there are sufficient domestic sources of tension to result in violence regardless. There are plenty of weapons and disgruntled folks on the grounds. In other words, I don’t think we have a good idea of either the extent or importance of foreign trouble makers at this point.
CZIKOWSKY: To what degree do you think the presence of foreign military powers such as the United States has affecting the infighting within Iraq, and are these affects increasing or decreasing the violence?
FINEL: Interesting question. There is a school of thought that says that external intervention in domestic conflicts just prolongs the conflict. Proponents of this position will argue that it is best to just let conflicts run their course and ‘burn themselves out” more quickly. Maybe. It is hard to tell because the argument relies on a counter-factual claim—that Iraq would or would not be more stable if the U.S. were gone. But we face a moral quandary that complicates the issue. How much responsibility (morally rather than practically) does the U.S. have for the future of Iraq? Colin Powell argued that “if you break it, you bought it.” By that logic, we have to try to actively mitigate the violence, and pulling out on the hope that doing so will make things better is hard to justify. On the other hand, I do think it is worth asking whether we really feel we have “bought it” or whether at some point we can say, “Look, we removed Saddam as a matter of national interest. We’ve given you three years to help you get back on your feet. We’re leaving. Good luck.” If you can get to that point and still look yourself in the mirror, then your question becomes much more decisive.
CZIKOWSKY: How certain are you that majority rule will work in Iraq? The Sunni minority reacted to their past oppression by installing Saddam Hussein, who of course then developed a government that protected minority Sunni rights yet created his own oppressive government. Don’t we need a means to make Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds all feel safe and secure? Majority rule works in America because Democrats and Republicans both know they have the possibilities of electing their leaders. In Iraq, majority rule probably means domination by Shiite leaders. Would that work in Iraq?
FINEL: In the short-run you are right. In the long run, I don’t think you are. After a few elections, I suspect that people will vote on merit and platform rather than just ethnic/sectarian divides. The challenge is keeping the system working until you get to the point where political mobilization is based on issues rather than identity.

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, author, March 28, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: I find it interesting that people claim that “conservatives” are expected to support the war in Iraq. Going to war is neither a liberal nor conservative issue but one based on whether there is a proper need to go to war. As I recall, before we went to war, there were strong reservations expressed about going to war from Patrick
Buchanan, Tucker Carlson, Robert Novak, and other conservatives. More recently, the war has been questioned by William F. Buckley, Jr. and even more conservatives. My question: why do “neocons” seem to think they get to define conservative thought, and why is their defense of the war (as Anne Coulter does) is to challenge the patriotism of those who oppose their way when many of the most patriotic Americans opposed the war from the very beginning?
FUKUYAMA: Your answer is as good as mine. I know many long-time conservatives who opposed the war and there is no reason to question their patriotism whatsoever.

PHIL SANDS, kidnapped journalist, April 3, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: When you stated that no one knew you were missing during the six days you were gone, I began wondering” is no one really keeping tabs of the whereabouts of journalists? Also, I presume this means the kidnappers do not always announce when they have kidnapped someone?
SANDS: No; we keep tabs on ourselves. I mean, the Iraqi government knew where I was, and the US military authorities knew I was in Iraq but we are responsible for ourselves.
The kidnappers can choose their moment for announcing a new victim. They don’t need to hurry, especially if no one escaped (as sometimes happens) to alert the authorities.

PETER GALBRAITH, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Fellow, August 8, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: I agree with you that the solution to the problems in Iraq may be best to partition the country and to allow Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd domination of three new countries. I suggested something similar and an expert stated that we Americans perceive there are more difference between these ethnic groups then really exists and that such an idea was nonsensical. Yet, since these groups are killing each other, doesn’t it indeed make more sense to agree that their differences can not be resolved, at least in the short term, and it may best to separate their leadership and all the leaders of each community to lead their followers? What is your thinking?
GALBRAITH: Kurds and Arabs are quite distinct nations, speaking very different languages. Kurdish is an Indo-European language while Arabic is a Semitic language. The Kurds have never wanted to be part of Iraq and now have a de facto independent state with their own government, army, and flag. Kurdistan law prohibits the Iraqi Army from coming into Kurdistan without permission from the Kurdistan Parliament. Central government ministries do not operate in Kurdistan and the Iraqi flag is banned. In January 2005, Kurds voted 98% for independence in an informal referendum. Kurds and Arabs are not fighting each other now, but the Kurds will never voluntarily agree to any control from Baghdad.
Iraq’s Arabs are 25% Sunni and 75% Shiites. These are religious not ethnic differences but increasing they operate more like ethnic or national differences. As long as the now dominant Shiites define themselves by religion, they exclude the Sunni Arabs who also resent the loss of their historic domination of Iraq.
I believe an independent Kurdistan is inevitable—not this year but likely in the next decade. At the moment, the Sunni-Shiite civil war is a struggle for domination of Arab Iraq. Forming distinct Sunni Arab and Shiite regions—with the weak central government already enshrined in Iraq’s Constitution—is probably the best way to limit the civil war. It is possible—by far from certain—that a Shiite and Sunni entity would become fully dependent.

DANIEL L. BYNAM, Georgetown University Center for Peace and Security Studies Director, August 21, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: What would happen if we were to announce that we declare that Iraq is indeed in civil war and that our military presence from now on will be only of a police nature to protect citizens from being killing by others, yet otherwise we are not interfering except to assist Iraq in its rebuilding of its infrastructure and its economic development?
BYNAM: The practical problems with such an impartial approach are twofold. First, rebuilding Iraq is a political act that threatens some groups—if parts of Iraq are more stable, and better off, some warlords will lose influence. So what seems like an uncontroversial act (building a hospital or a school) will lead some people to use violence to stop it. Second, much of the conflict now involves the sort of policing you describe—so we would still be heavily involved in the day-to-day violence, as we are now.
CZIKOWSKY: What are your thoughts on the proposal of Professor Galbraith and others to divide Iraq into multiple countries with different warring groups in control of their own portion of the country?
BYNAM: I wrote a piece ten years ago that basically said “if Iraq falls into three pieces, it is not bad for U.S. interest.”
I’ve changed my views in a number of ways since then. First, I overestimated the solidity of the Iraqi Shi’a. Shi’a infighting is horrendous, and it is not clear whether there could be a “Shi’astan” that comes out of Iraq. The Kurds have the capacity and probably the unity to pull it off, but I’m not sure about the rest of the country. Second, when I wrote the piece, I did not think this would be done after the United States occupied Iraq. Having partition occur is one thing…creating a mess and then having it occur is another.
This is compounded by the practical difficulties of partition. Who gets what? What do you do about pockets of one community living inside areas dominated by others/ And, of course, partition might lead some neighboring states, particularly Turkey, to meddle even more.
But Iraq may end up partitioned in the end, at least in a de facto sorta way. (Right now, the Kurdish north enjoys a high degree of autonomy, and it is reasonable to call it a de facto state.) If the U.S. leaves (and even if it doesn’t), the war could go in about 20 different directions, some of which lead to partition.

T. CHRISTIAN MILLER, Los Angeles Times Investigative Reporter, September 5, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Are our reconstruction efforts what the Iraqi people want, or are they what we want them to have? Do we guide our construction efforts towards what we can build and should we spend more time figuring our types of needs, building design, open spaces, parks, etc. that the Iraqi public might prefer? When I read about a country that needs schools, electricity, and infrastructure, I wonder to what degree our construction is meeting their most urgent needs, and whether we are mostly building bricks and mortar that only becomes an open invitation for terrorists to destroy?
MILLER: All very good questions.
First, Iraqis have had only limited participation in the rebuilding, especially in the days after the invasion. Iraqi frequently complaint that they have had no input, and don’t know what’s going on.
Second, most international development specialists that I have talked to said that the Pentagon’s reconstruction philosophy was simply wrong. Building large infrastructure projects in 2nd and 3rd world countries usually results in lots of white elephants. The Iraqis need basic, simple improvements that deliver immediate results, rather than what we gave them.
CZIKOWSKY: Who is overseeing what is being spent in Iraq and how it is being spent, and why does it appear that the audits only find outrageous expenditures long after they have been made?
MILLER: Stuart Bowen was appointed by the Pentagon to be the Special Inspector General for the Reconstruction of Iraq. It’s Bowen’s job to oversee spending for the rebuilding project, now worth about $30 billion.
Your point on the time lag is well made. .Bown has frequently said that he wants to be a “real time” auditor. During interviews, he has told me that he has tried to speed up the process and frequently communicates his findings as soon as he finds them. I tell in my book how he’s won over many of his critics by his willingness to criticize waste and abuse in Iraq.

CINDY SHEEHAN, activist, September 25, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: This is not a question for you, but for your critics who presume that any criticism of our country means that we do not love our country. Why do such critics think we can not attempt to improve this country that we love by recommending changes that will improve it? We do so because we love our country. Please do not attempt to label any critic as one who does not love his or her country, and please do not especially do so to the families of those who have put a family member forward in defense of this country.
SHEEHAN: I agree. I think our country has been founded on dissent and shaped by dissent and patriotic people who are trying to make our country a better place.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, September 28, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Obviously, President Bush disagrees with the intelligence report that his policies have spread terrorism. What is the general feeling among the rank and file in the intelligence community: do they believe the White House is ignoring them, or how do they feel about the interpretation of their data by the decision makers?
PRIEST: Ignoring them. Just read the NIE and decide for yourself. No amount of spin can undo what is written there. It’s pretty darn clear.

JIM VANDEHEI, Washington Post National Political Reporter, October 20, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Yesterday President Bush was in Pennsylvania claiming that Democrats who want to withdraw troops from Iraq are essentially unpatriotic. Today, it appears possible that the white House may be considered withdrawing troops just before the elections? Is the President and his speechwriters the last to know of possible changes in policy?
VANDEHEI: Several GOP strategists have told me in recent days that they are very concerned that Bush appears disconnected from what is happening on the ground in Iraq. Ed Rogers, a prominent GOP adviser, said Bush should telegraph now that changes are coming so voters don’t think GOPers are offering more of the same. This is another of the worse kept secrets in Washington: changes are coming AFTER the election.

MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, Time Magazine Senior Correspondent. October 26, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: I understand the protective vests are saving lives in Iraq, but the public seems not to be aware that there are very high injury rates. The vests do not protect limbs. How many soldiers have been injured in Iraq, and are there figures on how many soldiers have lost hands, feet, legs, and arms? Is it true the Pentagon would prefer we not know these numbers?
WEISSKOPF: More than 20,000 American soldiers have been wounded in action. Roughly 500 of them have lots limbs-arms or legs. The rate of amputation is twice that of other wars in the past century, except for Viet Nam, for which there are no good statistics.
CZIKOWSKY: Where do the plans to close Walter Reed Hospital stand? What will happen to the people in the amputation ward, patients and staff, and how do they feel about the planned closure?
WEISSKOPF: The place is scheduled to be closed in the next few years, but government procurement often moves slower than that. As long as the expertise is shifted to a military center in Bethesda, I am confident the service will be as excellent. However, it will be sad to see an institution that has cared for wounded soldiers since the first World War be closed.

ANTHONY SHADID, Washington Post Staff Writer, October 30, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Have you been estimates in the Iraqi press or Iraqi sources as to the number of civilian casualties during the current conflict and during Desert Storm? There are controversial reports that 600,000 have died during the current fighting and that 200,000 died during Desert Storm. Do you believe that the American public has a clear understanding of the degree of civilian deaths in Iraq from these conflicts?
SHADID: I can’t really speak to the number, but I could say something about the last part of your question. I’ve spent a lot of time in Iraq and try to follow it as best I can. And I was struck by how violent the city has become, the extent of the killing and the fear, distrust, and even paranoia it has bred. Virtually every person I talked to while I was there knew a friend, a relative, or a direct family member who had been killed. I’m not sure if I came across an exception to that.

PETER SLEVIN, Washington Post Staff Writer, November 1, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: I was reading Michael Weisskopf’s “Blood Brothers” yesterdayl. One thing I noted was how he mentioned that some of the wounded soldiers return with less fanfare than the unwounded. It seems we wish to hail our heroes but hide the fact that war means death and injury. The returnees get warm organized welcomes while the wounded return without much notice. What receptions did the wounded you interviewed find upon their return? SLEVIN: That’s an interesting point. More than a dozen Lima Marines were wounded seriously to be sent home early, many of them unwillingly. In organizing the company’s return to Columbus on Oct. 7, 2005, Lima leaders arranged for as amny of the wounded as possible to be there when the Marines touched ground.
It was a powerful sight, returning Marines said, to see their friends waiting for them. A number of the wounded Marines said the same. Many of Lima’s men have said that the solidarity of the company and the support of the city has meant more than they can convey.

LARRY KAHANER, author, November 27, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: What were the most popular paths that AK 47s took to reach Iraq? How profited from these sales?
KAHANER: It’s never certain how AKs reach their final destination because of the secretive nature of illegal arms trade. We do know that when the U.S. bought AKs for the Iraqi army they bought them from a dealer in Jordan who in turn bought them from Germany.

NORA BENSAHEL, RAND Corporation Senior Political Scientist, November 27, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Henry Kissinger has written that the United States should turn over the determination of the security of Iraq to the countries of the Arab region. How widespread is attention being provided to this idea?
BENSAHEL: In the past week or so, there has been serious discussion of involving Iraq’s neighbors, particularly Iran and Syria, in discussions about how to quell the ongoing violence. Both countries have interests in a stable Iraq, despite their ongoing policy differences with the United States on other issues. However, I’m not aware of anyone other than Kissinger who has advocated turning over the entire question of Iraq’s future to its neighbors. Right now, Administration policy seems to be to start exploring some engagement with Iraq’s neighbors, and that will likely be one of the major recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Commission report.
CZIKOWSKY: There has been various proposals that suggest that we divide Iraq into semi-autonomous regions by creating Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd sectors. Is some variation of this idea under consideration and, if so, how much attention does it seem to be receiving?
BENSAHEL: There have been several proposals for the partition of Iraq into three regions, based on the major ethnic divisions. I do not know how seriously this idea has been taken by the Administration, but most Iraq experts and military analysts believe that it is not practical and would actually incite a great deal more violence. There is a lot of intermixing of ethnic groups in Iraq, particularly but not only in Baghdad. So any partition of the country along ethnic lines would likely spark violence against the minorities in each area (Shiites living in Sunni region, Kurds in the Shiite region, and so on). Furthermore, the Sunni area has far fewer resources than the other two areas, which would most likely lead some elements of that community to resist any partition by force.

DAVID ROTHKOPF, Carnegie Endowment Visiting Scholar, December 11, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Is there a way that we can redefine our role in Iraq, such as form one with a military presence to one that is based only on humanitarian assistance and economic development, that might defuse the anger our presence brings yet will allow us to help guide Iraq towards a stronger society without our military forces being involved?
ROTHKOPF: We should certainly seek a more balanced involved in Iraq and across the region…one that is more oriented towards the diplomatic, political, and economic tools in our arsenal and one the seeks to restore our role as being a more constructive actor in the region. There is no way to eliminate the military component in a region where many factions and states are willing to take hostile and destructive actions that threaten our real and lasting interests. So, again….balance.

KAREN DeYOUNG, Washington Post Associate Editor, March 20, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: I have heard discussions on why Saddam Hussein would indicate he had weapons of mass destruction when it turns out he did not have them. This question seems to have perplexed people. My question: Do you think Saddam Hussein did that, not because he feared American retaliation if he had such weapons, but because he more feared Iran, and thought Iran would be less likely to attack if they thought he could respond with such weapons?
DeYOUNG: Lots of different opinions on this one. Some say he faked it because it gave him power over his own people. Others believe it was to intimidate the neighborhood. Still others that he had grandiose ideas about his global stature. I suspect all are true.

DEBORAH SCRANTON, director, March 12, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Was there a focus on the footage (in “The War Tapes”) that was shot, i.e. what percent was shot in barracks, what percent was shot on patrol, were they shots during battle?
SCRANTON: Filming took place over a year and a half. Ten soldiers initially agreed to take cameras, Steve Pink, Mike Moriarty, Zack Bazzi, Brandon Wilkins, and Duncan Domey filmed the entire year. In total 21 soldiers from Charlie Company, 3rd of the 172nd Mountain Infantry filmed for the project. The soldiers themselves filmed over 800 hours of footage, we filed an additional 200 hours statewide with both them and their families. The soldiers filmed whenever they could and felt like doing it. It was pretty across the board as far as in the barracks, on patron, and during battle.

THOMAS E. RICKS, Washington Post Staff Writer, April 17, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: What do you see as some of the unintended consequences of our policies in Iraq in different countries? What do you see would be the reaction throughout the Middle East if, in the future, we acted primarily on providing humanitarian assistance and much less on military response except to protect threatened communities?
RICKS: The interesting thing is to a surprising degree, what you are describing here is now the U.S. military policy in Iraq. The most important aspect of the so-called surge isn’t the increase in troops, it is the changed U.S. posture and mindset that moves troops off the big bases and into smaller outposts across Baghdad—and then focuses them on protecting the people. General Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, has made that mission explicit in his letters to his troops. There are mixed signs as to whether this is working.
If you ask U.S. commanders where they would like to be in a few months. It would be to have the bulk of their troops dedicated to protecting the people and backing up Iraqi security forces confronting insurgents and militias, with only a small Special Operations force focused on hard-core terrorists and foreign fighters. Those foreigners have never been as big a part of the enemy as many Americans seem to believe, U.S. commanders in Iraq have told me.

LOIS ROMANO, Washington Post National Political Reporter, May 7, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Don’t Minority Leader John Boehner’s comments that he expects to see success in Iraq by the fall effectively place a date on Bush’s Iraq policy? Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates is telling Iraq they need to create a timetable on taking over from our troops. Whatever you call it, it seems that just about everyone except the White House is in at least conceptual agreement that there needs to be a future arrangement with the next year or so when we need to start brining at least most of the troops back. Or am I wrong?
ROMANO: Republicans are just as frustrated as Democrats about what is happening in Iraq. The common mantra these days is to wait for September to see what is happening. There is a view (and hope) among Democrats that if the situation in Iraq does not improve by then, Republicans will start breaking with the President openly. Right now, they are still sticking together to give him the funding he wants.

THOMAS E. RICKS, Washington Post Staff Writer, May 8, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: What is the latest on the private security forces in Iraq? Do they still act independently from military operations? I ask because previous articles have observed that some of these security forces more resemble soldiers of fortune who are fighting an almost separate war in protecting business interests. Is it good or bad that businesses use private security forces? RICKS: This is a very important subject. I think of the aspects of the Iraq War that historians will note is the heavy reliance of the U.S. military on contractors—not must for logically support, as in other ways, but also as “trigger pullers” guarding VIPs and other contractors.

BOB WOODWARD, Washington Post Assistant Managing Director, May 8, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Are you aware of any reactions that George Tenet had towards your review of his book (“At the Center of the Storm”)?
WOODWARD: Other words, what’s the review of the review? I have no idea.
The review does not that some of the chapters, particularly on terrorists possibly obtaining nuclear weapons, are worth the price of the book all by themselves. Tenet comes out quite strongly and makes a compelling case that terrorism directed in the U.S. is not over. I unfortunately think he’s right.

RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN, Washington Post Associate Editor, May 29, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: If we withdraw from Iraq, what are the capabilities and trustworthiness that nearby countries may be able to take more active roles in keeping Iraq as calm as possible?
CHANDRASEKARAN: Very slim, in my opinion. While the neighbors say they want Iraq to be more stable, it’s not at all clear all of them really want that. Even if they do, there is no definition of stability to which they would all agree. Iran wants to continue expanding its influence in Shiite-dominated Iraq. The Sunni neighbors—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria—are very concerned about the growing influence of Iran in Iraq, and even more so by what they regard as the persecution of Sunnis by Shiite militias. Those nations are already funneling aid to Iraq’s Sunnis. If they deem Iraq’s Sunnis to be under greater threat from an Iranian-backed, Shiite-led Iraqi government, those nations almost certainly will increase support for Iraq’s Sunnis. It’s hard to see either side backing down. Bottom line: Iraq’s neighbors are doing—and likely will continue eto do—more harm than good in Iraq,

RAY TAKEYH, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, June 18, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: To perhaps oversimplify the problem in Iraq, there are two sides, each of which has a “winner take all” strategy. What strategies do you see that will get each side to agree to find some compromise, or do you think this is not something that cannot expect to change, at least during the current generation?
TAKEYH: The sectarian conflict in Iraq unfortunately will likely be mediated through a degree of violence. At this point a civil war is not to be avoided.

THOMAS E. RICKS, Washington Post Staff Writer, June 19, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Seriously, is there any proposed solution to Iraq that does not involve the likely result of a long and bloody civil war? If so, what is it?
RICKS: I think the beginning of wisdom is to recognize that there aren’t a lot of options left. The question is, what is the least bad option available?
As one official put it to me when I was out there last month, ‘We can leave in such a way as to make the situation worse, or we can try to develop an approach the mitigates the damage we have done.’
What we are trying to do now is operate tactically in such a way as to create breathing space for strategic political movement. (That is, the goal of the so-called “surge” isn’t simply to make Baghdad safer, it is to try to lead to a political accommodation of some sort.) So far, that isn’t happening.
So the thinking about a post-occupation force of perhaps 40,000 or 50,000 troops is trying to answer, OK, what do you do next year? I think it is as much about preventing negative outcomes as trying to win positive ones. That is, in many ways, the American goals in Iraq are now to prevent various forms of disaster: genocide, full-blown civil war, or a regional war. Not nice, but there you are. If you can get more than that—like a stable Iraqi government trusted by the people and able to reduce violence—that is just frosting on this sorry cake.

STEVE FAINARU, Washington Post Staff Writer , Jul 20, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Do I understand correctly that security contractors are absolved from liability for their actions? If so, what limitations are placed on them? Surely they are not allowed to torture, shoot civilians, or shoot even our own troops.
FAINARU: Under Order 17, a law created by the old US occupation authority, contractors are immune from Iraqi law, that is, they can’t be prosecuted in Iraq. One Triple Canopy guy said he was told by the company that if something went awry he would be spirited out of the country in the back of a truck. The US laws are more confusing. There’s been efforts to place the contractors under military law (UCMJ) or a law that applied to civilians under contract to the military (MEJA). There’s a MEJA case ongoing, but the issue hasn’t been resolved. It’s murky, for sure.

CHARLES FERGUSON, documentary producer, July 30, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Prior to the war in Iraq, there were academic reports from the War College questioning the need and success of a war in Iraq, and the press presented several reports from intelligence officials and experts that also both questioned whether there was a need to attack a Saddam Hussein who had been stabilized and was unable to move without immediate and fierce retribution. Does your film revisit some of these experts who were, correctly it turns out, warning that destabilizing Iraq with an attack was both unnecessary and very risky and would not be resolved in a couple of days with people greeting us with flowers (as Cheney predicted)?
FERGUSON: Several studies including one from the Army War College examined the challenges posed by an occupation of Iraq and all recommended a much large occupying force as well as a variety of other measures ignored by the Busy Administration. Several warned of the risk of sectarian conflict, of looting and of the need to demonstrate immediate tangible benefits to the population. In general, they concluded that a successful occupation was possible but would be risky, difficult, and would require enormous resources.
CZIKOWSKY: Does your film (“No End in Sigh”) look into one question that I believe has never been fully answered: since it turns out that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction (and probably only pretended he might have them to increase his standing with his neighboring countries, as some had speculated), why did we not wait until the inspectors finished their job of searching for the weapons? If we had put off the invasion until the inspectors had finished their job, we would have had a better knowledge of the threat—or lack of a threat—that Saddam Hussein posed.
FERGUSON: The Bush Administration was eager to invade and felt pressured to do so before the summer when heat and wind would make military operations extremely difficult. The Administration also felt that it would be too expensive to keep 150,000 soldiers in place, which is ironic, given the current state of affairs.

SHANNON SCRIBNER, Oxfam American Senior Policy Advisor, August 14, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: It amazes me when our leaders believe that a country will greet us with flowers and open arms when they saw, according to Defense Department estimates of approximately 200,000 deaths the previous time we were there in Desert Storm. Now the Iraqis have seen more deaths and serious disruptions of their lives. This question should be obvious, but I ask it because still don’t realize it, but: don’t we win more friends in other countries by aiding the country and improving the lives of their people? Shouldn’t we do more for humanitarian efforts, both to help others, yet also to serve as a model for other countries that the way to better diplomacy is through assistance?
SCRIBNER: Oxfam opposed the war from the beginning due to concerns about the disproportionate effect the war would have on civilian lives. Today in Iraq this is what we are seeing. 70% of people are without adequate water supplies compared to 50% in 2003, 80% lack sanitation, 43% live in poverty. Of the 180 hospitals countrywide, 90% lack key resources including basic medical supplies, 28% of children are malnourished today compared to 19% in 2003 and 92% of children suffer from learning problems mostly due to the climate of fear.

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, State Department Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion Member August 21, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: What is the policy of the State Department towards using more humanitarian assistance to win international respect? More specifically, when will we put a greater focus on rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq? I know we have made a lot of efforts in that direction, yet a lot remains to be done.
MURAVCHIK: As I understand, we’ve been trying like heck, and spending accordingly, to rebuild infrastructure but the efforts have been undermined by lack of security and sabotage. Perhaps with Petraeus’s new strategy we have begun providing the needed security in some places.

CRAIG WHITLOCK, Washington Post Berlin Bureau Chief, September 10, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: You are in Berlin. What do people you meet on the streets think of our presence of troops in Iraq?
WHITLOCK: Well, put it this way: I’ve lived in Germany for more than three years. So far, I’ve met two people here who supported the idea of US troops in Iraq. One was a German military officer. The other was an Iranian cab driver who was exiled from his country three years ago. So the US mission there isn’t popular here, to say the least.

JIM GOLBY, 25th Special Troops Battalion Company Commander, October 16, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Have there been any major shifts in any direction in the public sentiment of the Iraqis with whom you are familiar through the duration of the current war and, if so, what have been these shifts?
GOLBY: I have developed many positive relationships with local Iraqis. As my soldiers and I have been able to help them improve security and jump-start their economy, we have developed strong relationships built on mutual respect and increasing trust.

BILL NAGLE, Small Wars Journal Publisher, November 13, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: What is the best case scenario, and what is the realistic possibility that Iraq can become a stable country—or does it appear hopelessly bound to continue ethnic fighting?
NAGLE: I think our entire species is hopelessly bound to continue ethnic fighting. We’ve been at it for eons, and even in the heart of the first world we are rife with tensions.
However, once you get out of the Logan’s Run concept and identify with an acceptable level of violence, the answer is definitive—yes, Iraq can become a stable country.

ANNE V. HULL, Washington Post Reporter, December 4, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Would you state that it is fair to assume that the Defense Department wants the public to think that war is all glory and wants the deaths, wounded, and mental illness caused by war to be hidden as much as possible? Sometimes I think one of the lessons the military learned from the Viet Nam War is to not let the cameras onto the battlefield. Coffins cannot be photographed. The wounded do not come back heralded by parades but are sent back individually to their families or stateside hospitals. Is it fair to state this is a deliberate policy?
HULL: It is a deliberate policy to block some access, including the coffins of deceased soldiers. On the other hand, the embedding of reporters during the invasion of Iraq gave great (through controlled) access to the battlefield. Many reports are still embedded with units now. On wounded soldiers, they have been glad to trumpet the medical advances that have kept soldiers alive. But we found it impossible to openly examine what happens after their lives are saved.

BOB DROGIN, Los Angeles Times National Security Correspondent, December 5, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Does your book (“Curveball”) examine the role that Chalabi played in advocating a war, and if so, what are your views on what Chalabi did?
DROGIN: I hope you’ll read the book. Curveball’s brother worked for Chalabi’s organization, the Iraqi National Congress. The CIA became exceptionally concerned that Chalabi sent Curveball out to provide disinformation to the West, as other defectors did. In the end, the CIA interviewed the brother at Chalabi’s Hunting Club residence in Baghdad.
As for my views, I consider Chalabi a charlatan who proved exceptionally capable at convincing many in Washington to support his goal of taking over Iraq.
CZIKOWSKY: Are you familiar with “Ali”, who provided intelligence information to Rep. Curt Weldon? If not, I ask because it is interesting that one anonymous source sees to be able to attempt to influence our decision makers. What should be done to better ascertain the credibility of someone who is the only source of a piece of intelligence?
DROGIN: I recall the case, but not the details. There is nothing inherently wrong with relying on a single-source information if you know the source is reliable, has known access, can document or otherwise provide proof, and the information can be verified through independent means. None of that happened here.
CZIKOWSKY: Are there lessons to be learned from your book for a current intelligence system that states Iran is not a nuclear threat, versus on Executive branch that fears Iran may be pushing us towards World War III?
DROGIN: I hope so. But I wrote my book as a spy story, not a book on policy. It describes how intelligence is supposed to work, and how in this case, it went so catastrophically wrong.

GEORGE PACKARD, New Yorker staff writer, February 11, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: What is your sense of the role of the private security contractors who were able to protect American interests in Iraq without fear of prosecution? I know some soldiers in Iraq who believed they were fighting their own separate, personal war, and that it was not coordinated with military efforts. What is your perspective on their role?
PACKARD: They haven’t really protected American interests in Iraq. Keeping their “clients” alive at any cost—even in ten or twenty Iraqi civilians have to die as a result—is ultimately bad for American interests. I don’t think any security jobs in a war zone should be done by private contractors, for just this reason—their motives are not those of the military or of the U.S. government.

DAN SERWER, United States Institute for Peace Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations Vice President. February 19, 2007
CZIKOWSKY: Is it possible to get the sides in Iraq to agree to stop killing each other, or is that a hopeless cause? If it is possible, what will it take to get the most extreme violent groups to stop their violence?
SERWER: Violence has dropped dramatically in Iraq, in particular inter-sectarian violence. We are now doing many of the right things: deploying troops into neighborhoods alongside Iraqi security forces, encouraging the ceasefire by Moqtada al Sadr’s Army, enabling Sunni and Shia tribesmen to guard their own communities. The big question is: what next? How do we withdraw from a situation that seems to depend heavily on our presence for stability?
CZIKOWSKY: Is it true that one problem with bricks and mortar construction by Americans is that these projects then become targets for terrorists? Yet, aren’t there other things we could be helping the Iraqi population with where we seem to have fallen behind, such as providing basic services and training teachers, health care employees, and public servants?
SERWER: The short answer to this is “yes”. We should have worried much less about building objects that can be attacked and much more about reconstructing a society that had been devastated by Saddam Hussein.

ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, Center for Strategic and International Studies Chair in Strategy, March 4, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: How much does our military presence in Iraq serve as an inducement for terrorist groups to organize and rally their forces in Iraq? Would it be possible for us to diminish our military support while keeping a secondary presence that does not attract and mobilize the enemy as much? By that I mean fewer brick-and-mortar targets being built by us, but more training, basic services, etc. Would a less physical American military presence and fewer physical terrorist targets deflate the enemy?
CORDESMAN: These are the goals and the current U.S. joint strategic plan for Iraq.
It is far from clear, however, that Iraq has really had a decisive impact on global terrorism. The number of outsiders has never been more that 10% of AQI, if that; the flow of foreign volunteers has been in tens of men per week, and most insurgents have been Iraqi.

SUDARSAN RAGHAVAN, Washington Post Baghdad Bureau Chief, March 25, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: I know this is all speculative, but to what degree do you see the absence of foreign troops depressing the strengths of groups seeking their ouster and how much will deflating them on this issue minimize their impact To what degree do you see the Iraqi government being able to create a police-military force that will be able to handle the security and criminal threats within Iraq in the absence of foreign troops?
RAGHAVAN: Let me tell you what many ordinary Iraqis think. For now, they see U.S. troops as the best means of security. This doesn’t mean they like the U.S. occupation, but rather they feel the alternative could be worse. There’s little confidence in the government or its security forces. At the same time, I am noticing the Iraqis stand more up in some areas. In Baghdad, Iraqis control virtually al the checkpoints backed, of course, by U.S. troops.
But you’re right, the million dollar question on the minds of many Iraqis is” What will happen when U.S. troops leave?

REIDAR VISSER, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Research Fellow, April 8, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: What are the ingredients to getting the vast majority of the citizens of Basra to support a national Iraq government, and approximately what timetable might that require? VISSER: Even though the people of Basra have some regionalist ideas they are also quite fierce in their attachment to Iraqi nationalism. What they object to is discrimination by outsiders, whether from Baghdad or Najaf, Shiite or Sunni. They are increasingly conscious about the fact that most of Iraq’s oil is in their area and they want to see some real improvement in living standards in return. But the “Basra question” is certainly something that can be solved within the framework of a unified Iraq, as long as Basra representatives are taken seriously in key processes, such as the drafting of oil law.

BRIAN TURNER, poet, April 22, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: How many poems did you write while in Iraq? I also see you receive your MFA prior. Did you focus on poetry in your studies?
TURNER: I wrote all of “Here, Bullet” while in Iraq (71 pages, including preface material, etc.) plus about 10-15 poems which, as the poet Joe Millar suggested to me, were better off left ‘as woodchips left in the woodshed.’
I also wrote another 10, roughly, in the month we returned. Two or three made it into the final manuscript.
Mostly, though, I wrote journal entries, like a diary. Some pages included diagrams drawn also—of ambushes, patrols, things like that.
My MFA was at the University of Oregon, where I received an MFA in Creative Writing (with an emphasis on poetry/poetics).
All of this began as a teenager—when I started a band, playing bass guitar and trying to write lyrics. The lyrics were horrible, and I stopped writing them. I still play in the band though, and our guitarist writes the lyrics!

JED L. BABBIN, former Deputy U.S. Defense Secretary, April 24, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: Why aren’t more drones used, especially to patrol routes to keep alert for terrorist actions along the routs? I see the Air Force is under criticism for not having enough drones in service. Will the new leadership be able to better implement what it seems more everyone agrees will save lives and improve our military operations, which is by placing more eyes in the sky alerting the ground forces as to what is going on around them?
BABBIN: Really good question. I certainly think we need more unmanned aerial vehicle operations,; the issue is crew training and rest. You shouldn’t have to be a rate F-16 pilot to fly a Predator and those who do fly Predators need crew rest like anyone else. They are, I’m told, falling asleep after too many hours in dark rooms.

MARY TILLMAN, mother of the late Army Ranger Pat Tillman, May 12, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: One of my prized possessions is a football card that your son signed for me. I think you for being with us for what I know must be a hard subject to continually speak about. Would you please tell us a little about how your son felt about football and how he put service to his country above even his career?
TILLMAN: Pat loved playing football, however, after the September 11th tragedy, Pat and his brother felt football and baseball were no longer important. Many young men and women were giving up the really important things in life: their freedom, their voice, and time with their families and friends to serve their country. Pat and Kevin felt they should do the same. However, they did not know the Administration would change course and go to Iraq.

RICARDO SANCHEZ, former Coalition Ground Forces Commander, May 13, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: What are your thoughts on the prison abuse scandal? How would you recommend that we can build the confidence of a large segment of the population throughout the Middle East that now views us negatively over these prison photographs?
SANCHEZ: The prison abuse scandal was a grotesque, shameful event that became a strategic defeat for America. There is no question in my mind that the root causes are the elimination of the Geneva Convention and the subsequent lack of implementation instructions from the Service Headquarters that may have mitigated the loss of the foundation of our interrogation training, policies, and procedures. We leave the soldiers and commanders in the field to fend for themselves with a totally unconstrained interrogation approach that has no safeguards and oversight mechanisms. Rebuilding America’s image will have to begin with an acceptance that we unleashed abuse and torture with the publication of those policies. It will be very difficult to communicate the realities of what happens to us in Bagram and Abu Gharib—the combination of MPs punishing detainees who were never interrogated and the abuse of detainees that occur in those pictures will forever hound us as a nation.

LINDA BLUM, clinical psychologist, June 30, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: I would like it if you would be able to confirm or explain stories from returning Iraqi veterans have told me. I think if these comments are accurate, it may help the public to understand the degree to which posttraumatic stress disorders and other mental challenges are even more of an issue than most realize.
First, I understand some of the bombs that the soldiers are exposed to cause atmospheric rattling, which literally rattles the brain.
Second, the soldiers go on patrol and face potential fire on such a regular basis that many have faced more days of combat than did soldiers in previous wars.
Third, the body gear saves lives but is not protecting limbs, meaning we have a higher survival rate yet a higher several injury rate.
Are all of these points true? These veterans are returning home, and some of them will have very serious issues they are bringing back with then, and we need to be there for them.
BLUM: All of the above are true. I would add, though, that soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan have a very broad array of experiences with some going out on daily missions, with constant exposure to danger; others are protected on post.
Additionally, some U.S. bases are subject to considerably more incoming mortars and rockets and others,
CZIKOWSKY: The Veterans Administration has a backlog of 400,000 claims for disability, and it may take six months until the VA gets a claim. Does this VA backlog affect the health care that veterans are receiving?
BLUM: The delays in obtaining benefits and the arduous process involved certainly add to the stress level for many injured vets, but they can begin psychological treatment through the VA or Veteran’s Centers before getting disability.

KIMBERLY DOZIER CBS News Foreign Correspondent, July 8, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: Don’t some of the returning Iraqi veterans face rather unique psychological problems that we need to recognize and handle? Don’t some of the bombs create compressions around them that literally rattle the brain inside the head, which can create medical problems that aggravate psychological problems?
DOZIER: I believe both Iraq and Afghan veterans face unique challenges in that many have gone through multiple explosions and therefore MAY have some degree of TBI—which depending on the degree of it, you can recover from if you can detect it and give your bruised brain time to recover in the field. (I understand that now, some commanders are keeping guys off patrol for a few days, if their brain got rattled by an IED to give it time to heal.) The more severe injuries, however…the military is still catching up on diagnosing. I keep asking every official I talk to about the subject: how about the folks with TBI from early on in this conflict, when we didn’t yet recognize the severity/frequency of the syndrome?
There’s a second problem—the ambush nature of insurgent/guerilla attacks…and the very nature of counter-insurgency theory, which wins over the population by putting troops AMONG the population to provide security.
All the time…U.S. troops must be both on their guard, and yet understanding of the people they are protecting—their culture and motivations. They’re not allowed to depersonalize them by calling them “hajis” or similar. They have to see them as people…who are sometimes friendly and welcoming, and then can in the next instant turn on them.
That must do your head in, in a unique way. Who is the enemy?
CZIKOWSKY: How are you doing, and how do you feel looking back? DO you find many people willing to listen and help?
DOZIER: I’m back to 100%...no limp, no pain, and I’m actually training for a 10K, and just found a decent aikido dojo, so life is good. I can almost do the child’s pose in yoga again, although Lotus is a struggle. Then again, Lotus was always a struggle.
Re: the attack. No bad memories, no flashbacks, no repetitive thoughts, no desire to self-medicate, etc. etc. As many people in the public assume that everyone develops PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) after a traumatic incident, I’ve done what I can to educate people that there are ways to avoid developing it…(for me, talking about the incident with friends, family, and anyone who walked into my hospital room helped, writing about it helped even more—defusing the pain/nightmare of the original trauma).
And if a soldier/Marine/airman/diplomat/contractor or journalist face a war zone does go on to develop PTSD, I’ve also tried to point out that there are some amazing treatments for it now. Many medical professional believe you can get beyond it, or at least mitigate it so it doesn’t affect your daily life.
My discussion of this has angered some in the Viet Nam vet community, who thought I was lecturing them on the subject—I hope they see I’m simply trying to use this tragedy to bring attention to an important subject, that a new generation of troops needs to hear about, so maybe they can avoid what happened to so many veterans who came home from Viet Nam.

WARREN ZINN, Former Army Times photojournalist, July 14, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: I hope you do not consider blaming yourself (for photographing a soldier who gained notoriety yet later committed suicide). The emotional distress of returning veterans is a complex issue. Some have faced more days of combat or potential engagement with an enemy than soldiers of other wars. This is a stressful war, as the enemy does not wear a uniform and engage in defined battles. I am sure the whole experience caused any emotional distress, and not a particular non-injury event. If anything, you gave this soldier moments of recognition in a job where few realize the extent of that with which they are coping. Thank you for your photograph.
ZINN: Thank you. Yes, that was one of the big things when I was with the Cavalry is that the fighters attacking them were not wearing uniforms. In fact before this photo was taken they were hiding behind the village launching attacks at the Cav. This then lead to the bombing which hurt the boy.

KENNETH M. POLLACK, Brookings Institution Middle East Policy Research Director, July 29, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: If we, and most of the rest of the world, are able to reduce our demand for oil, is the Iraqi economy prepared to move into other sectors? What will happen to their economy should there be a significant drop in demand for oil?
POLLACK: Iraq will succeed or fail before the United States significantly reduces its oil exports, so I think it useful to broaden the aperture of this question a bit, because it does get at a few issues facing the region.
There is no question in my mind that the United States must reduce its dependence on energy from oil and we need to be LEADING a global effort to help other countries do the same. Burning hydrocarbons is environmentally and economically foolish, and the dependence on unstable countries like those in the Middle East, with which my new book (“A Path Out of the Desert”) deals, is potentially disastrous. For that reason, there is absolutely no reason not to do so, and every reason to do so.
Nevertheless, you have raised an important question that gets to the long-term future of the Middle East. All of the economies of the region are dependent upon oil to a greater or lesser extent, because even those without oil rely on remittances from their citizens working in the oil states, aid from the oil-producing states, and trade with them. As I describe in the book. All of the states of the region (expect for the smallest and richest of the GCC states like Kuwait and the UAE) are experiencing serious economic problems of one kind or another and those economic problems are already causing severe social and political unrest. The oil revenues flowing to help mitigate that unhappiness, but if the developed world does being to shift toward alternative energy sources, which is one of the principal problems I argue in the “Path Out of the Desert”, that the U.S., our allies, and the states of the region need to fashion a long-term grand strategy to address. And the reason that we have halved our dependence on oil, we and every other nation in the world will still be dependent on oil. So major problems in the Middle East will still be a threat to our vital interests, and the threats may be worse if the economic, social, and political problems have not addressed but the price of oil is plummeting because of conservation efforts in the developed world. Again, it is why we MUST think long-term about our approach to the Middle East and get away from our typical, short-term approaches.
CZIKOWKSY: How has Iraqi oil production been affected by the war? How much of Iraqi oil profits have been able to be channeled into the reconstruction of Iraq?
POLLACK: The chaos the U.S. created in Iraq hurt Iraqi oil production in three ways. First, the destructive dismemberment of the Iraqi bureaucracy meant that for many months, no one was taking care of the Iraqi oil infrastructure which reduced production and exports. Second, the insurgents (principally Sunni groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq) actively attacked Iraq’s production and export infrastructure which further depressed oil production. Third, because of the misguided way that the Bush Administration handled the oversight of the Iraqi government initially, HUGE amounts of oil and money from oil was stolen by a vast range of people from guys pulling up to refineries with tanker trucks and demanding that they be filled at gunpoint, to bureaucrats funneling millions to Swiss bank accounts.
Third, thanks to a whole series of new initiatives by the U.S., led by our very able Ambassador in Baghdad, Ryan Crocker,, and his team, and the greater security created by the surge, Iraqi oil production is now at about pre-war levels. Because the price of oil is so high, the Iraqis are now making a lot of money and paradoxically, many of the measures that we demanded they put in place to prevent theft and corruption in the oil sector is how hindering their ability to use that money to pay for reconstruction. This is being further hamstrung by political differences and the still-limited capacity of the Iraqi bureaucracy. As a result, there is something like $50 billion of Iraqi money sitting in New York, just waiting for the Iraqis to spend it. That is why a lot of American Congressmen are demanding that we cut our own spending and force the Iraqis to pay not only for their own reconstruction expenses but for the costs of our troops and our programs as well. So the bottom line is that while the Iraqis are doing better on exporting oil and using it to pay for reconstruction, there is still a long way to go.

STEVEN MADSEN, Washington Post staff writer, July 28, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: Has the war disrupted oil production in Iraq and how of any influence has any lowered Iraqi oil production been on the market?
MADSEN: The war did disrupt oil production in Iraq, but it has recently crept back up to where it was before the U.S. invasion. It’s important to remember that even before the war, Iraqi oil production was lower than it could have been thanks first to the Iran-Iraq war in the early 1980s, then the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the first Gulf War. Most oil executives and analysts I talk to believe a peaceful Iraq could produce 6 million barrels a day, which would have a huge impact on oil markets. Hard to say when we’ll see that, though.

JOHN CHARLTON, Army Colonel, and SARAH COHEN, Washington Post Staff Writer, August 11, 2008.
CZIKOWSKY: How many of the physical construction projects become targets of terrorist attacks? Does there appear to be a problem that terrorists target American built projects, and does this mean they need more security?
CHARLTON: The key to any type of reconstruction or stabilization project is to establish a secure environment first. In Ramadi, we spent several weeks clearing terrorists out of the city. Once we cleared those areas, we then used Iraqi police to maintain security in those communities. Once we had established a secure environment, we were then able to work with the Iraqis to rebuild. All of our projects used local contractors and were planned with community leaders. This meant that the Iraqis were major stakeholders in these projects and had a vested interest in making sure they were completed. Because of this, none of our projects were attacked by terrorists.
CZIKOWSKY: When can we be expecting the Iraqi government to increase its expenditures on these projects?
COHEN: Iraq has started picking up more, but there are members of Congress who would like the pace to pick up. In recent funding laws, there are some restrictions on how much U.S. money can go into various reconstruction programs. Right now, CERP is exempt from that. But Iraq has started pitching in money for this program as well. A version of next year’s funding law also addresses this.

RON SUSKIND, journalist, August 12, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: What were the threat assessments from Iraq before the war? It seems to me Saddam Hussein was contained, that the no fly zones were working, and that the situation was relatively stable? How much of a threat did leaders really think Saddam Hussein posed?
SUSKIND: That’s a very interesting point. In large measure, my investigations are fairly consistent. The view was that Saddam Hussein was the “easy mark” in the region. The President also personally wanted to finish unfinished business. The view was that Saddam was someone we could make an example of. One of the threats at the start of the Administration that they felt was hard to contain was the spread of weapons of mass destruction, like spores in the wind. Memos from the early part of the Administration stated clearly that we didn’t really see a remedy for this, and that we needed to find a way to dissuade our enemies from getting these weapons and denying us primacy in many parts of the world. By making an example of Saddam, we could dissuade other rogue states from similar confrontational temerity. One neoconservative official I spent some time with said an apt definition of what they were thinking was that it would be an experiment in behavior modification. Those experiments don’t work with three people in a locked room, but ultimately we try it in one of the world’s most troubled and strategically important regions.
So interesting when Habbush says Saddam doesn’t have WMD at this point, and when we find out he’s concerned with other countries in the region—Iran and its nascent nuclear program—and that he didn’t want them to know he had no such weapons, it fits the idea we had that he was caged, a toothless tiger, shooting at our planes overhead by largely contained. So all of that remains consistent/.
CZIKOWSKY: Weren’t there those who argued that the war would pay for itself from Iraqi oil production? Well, if their oil is back to where it was before the war, and if their government is running a budget surplus, what happened?
SUSKIND: That’s a good question. Of course that’s just happening now in terms of the industry there getting back on its feet. Over this period there was such profound destruction in the country, primarily caused by the U.S. not thinking clearly about what owning such a country would entail. Hundreds of millions of dollars have vanished into Iraq. There’s a meeting in the book (“The Way of the World”) from 2002 when Rumsfeld is overseeing a big Pentagon meeting with State, the CIA, etc., which is about steps C and D, right after the coming invasion (which they’re planning then in January 2002). At this point, it’s the spring of 2002 and they’re talking about stabilizing and rebuilding the country, steps C and D of the Iraq plan. Rumsfeld has people from State and the CIA pressing him and Casey that ownership of Iraq will be a very complicated endeavor. These of course are people who have been there, and they say “you can’t do these things with PowerPoint presentations.” Rumsfeld responds “we will impose our reality on them”. This sums up the Administration’s hubris in this period, that the U.S. as a lone superpower, could shape reality. Of course, we learned otherwise, and five years later are dealing with those lessons.
CZIKOWSKY: It is the duty of a soldier to disobey an illegal order. Do separate rules apply to the CIA? If an agent is ordered to forge a memo, what are the duties of that agent to carry forth that order? How did you get the CIA to then confirm they obeyed a possibly illegal order?
SUSKIND: When you look at the nuances of this thing, I even have two of the folks who cooperated on the project talk about the fine line of what is not legal and what was done here. One of the sources says in a kind of self-defense that it was intended to effect opinion in Iraq, which of course would not violate CIA statute that it’s illegal to run disinformation campaigns in the U.S. One of the other sources on the Habbush letter says that’s ridiculous, that this was clearly designed to solve a political problem at the White House, which they were focusing much of their energy on.
Let me just say that these are particularly good questions, which are revealed in the book regarding some of the thorny issues involving this letter.