BELARUS

VITALI SILITSKI, International Forum for Democratic Studies Fellow, April 12, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: To what would Lukashenka respond? Would trade embargos or world criticism mean anything to him? Are there any external pressures that might cause him to be a more responsive leader?
SILITSKI: Lukashenka is not too integrated to the Western world to lose much once sanctions/embargoes are applied. Belarus’ major export item to the Western Europe is processed Russian oil—not something Europeans will be able to abandon for the sake of ousting dictator. He does not cause problems outside of the borders so there is no talk about any military intervention, however much Lukashenka himself insists. And of course, no one is pressing from Kremlin to democratize, especially after the Orange revolution. The external actors can only build the pressure from inside the country—this is one of few available choices for now.

SARAH MENDELSON, Center for Strategic and International Studies Senior Fellow, April 26, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Do you see Russia attempting to influence internal politics in Belarus and, if so, how do you see Russia attempting to accomplish this?
MENDELSON: I am increasingly concerned about this. Just after Secretary Rice was in Moscow, Putin met with Lukashenka. Belarus and Russia are moving ahead with a sort of unification. The lack of freedoms in Belarus is even more striking than in Russia. I don’t see Russia as a sort of model of democracy for Russia. I am worried that there will be a sort of blending of autocratic styles. In terms of specific sorts of influences, this is harder to gage. There might be certain agreements between the Presidents, or sharing of information between the security services that targets civil society.