TERRORISM

CLIFFORD D. MAY, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies President, January 30, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What should we be doing to maintain a positive image to Arabs, Muslims, and people outside the United States in general to better educate them of the positives of American goals? I believe we should be reaching out to others at times when it appears to them we are attacking them. No wonder they demonstrate against us because they’ve been taught we are out to destroy their way of life. What can we do to better reassure people that terrorists are the American enemy, and that we respect their lives, cultures, religions, etc.?
MAY: I don’t believe most Arabs and Muslims approve of terrorism.
But you’re right---in many parts of the world, not least the Arab and Muslim worlds, the media and the schools teach hatred of America, or Israel, of Christians, Jews, Hindus, and other “infidels”.
Of course we should respect other cultures---but anyone who knows anything American knows that we are the most tolerant and diverse society on Earth.
At the same time, certain freedoms are fundamental. Where religious freedom is denied---where there is strong religious intolerance---terrorism is likely to breed.
And then women’s rights are totally denied---as they were in Afghanistan and continue to be in some Muslim countries---that, too, has to be a cause for concern.
I’m hopeful that last night, when people around the world saw the new leader of Afghanistan recognized and praised by President Bush, they began to see that we’re not against any culture, nation, or religion.
But I hope they also understand that America will no longer tolerate terrorism and the regimes that support terrorism.

JAY STANLEY, American Civil Liberties Union Privacy Coordinator, March 22, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Is your objection less that the (surveillance) cameras are there, as the (National) Mall could be a potential attack for a terrorist or terrorist wannabe, and more over what the tapes could be used for? Do you have assurances that the tapes will not be used for other reasons, i.e. tracking “fellow travelers” in a reemergence of a modern day McCarthyism paranoia, or leaking the tapes to embarrass political enemies may be filmed even innocently walking with people other than their spouses?
STANLEY: That is right. The ACLU has no objection to cameras in high-profile terrorist targets like the Mall. The fact that there are zero guidelines that restrict how the tapes could be used and shared and stored is, as you suggest, one of our big concerns. The other is that, looking beyond the Mall itself, there is a push to respond to terrorism by blanketing our public spaces, including neighborhoods and normal streets, with surveillance. It is un-American.

ALEXANDER STILLE, Council on Foreign Relations Correspondence Editor, March 27, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Do you believe our government has been straightforward in releasing news on the terrorist attacks?
STILLE: I suspect that we will learn a lot in the next few years about aspects of September 11 and its aftermath that we don’t currently know. Take for example the recent report that the U.S. government had warning of a nuclear device possibly being detonated in New York at some time this fall. The government decided that the warning was not reliable enough to risk panicking New York, and therefore the report was suppressed for a few months. There may be other things of this kind we don’t know. As a citizen I hope that we don’t have too many very big surprises, but so far everything that has happened starting with September 11 has contained a lot of surprises. I really don’t believe that the government has lied about anything fundamental because the political cost would be so enormous.

WILLIAM CHRISTISON, former Central Intelligence Agency Regional and Political Analysis Director, April 10, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: You have studied the root causes of terrorism. From your perspective, what are these root causes? How much does poverty emerge as a factor? If it is a factor, will assistance in raising communities from where terrorists are from out of poverty help? Also, if poverty is a factor, what does it mean when some recent terrorists have been from the middle class and with families?
CHRISTISON: A little introduction might help first. My strongest belief is that military action will not solve the problem of terrorism against the United States (or Israel) more than temporarily. However great the military success of the U.S., a couple of years hence new extremists just as clever as bin Laden and hating the U.S. even more will almost certainly arise somewhere else in the world. That’s why I think we need to understand the root causes behind the terrorism and do something about them.
I have six root causes on my list. Four are major issues in the Middle East, and two are more global in scope. On the Middle East, I’d include the Israel-Palestine issue, the continued bombings of and sanctions on Iraq, the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, and the anger of many Arabs and Muslins with their own authoritarian and often corrupt governments. My two global issues are the U.S. drive to spread its own hegemony and its own version of unregulated, free market globalization worldwide, and the very kind of war the U.S. now wages. On the globalization issue, poverty is THE main factor.

MIKE ALLEN, Washington Post White House Correspondent. May 17, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Prior to this recent revelations (of warning of terrorist activities), the perception was this was an intelligence failure that was beyond the capability of the intelligence community to have predicted as it had never happened on our soil before. Now we learn the failure was not with the intelligence community but with the command structure to properly decipher this information and act. Shouldn’t the White House have acted in some stronger capacity, such as increasing surveillance or taking other steps to prevent what appeared to be a real and devastating threat?
ALLEN: You have put your finger on a central question for the investigation(s) in coming weeks. News reports about an FBI agent in Phoenix who was concerned about flight training by possible terrorists, combined with the suspicions about the so-called 20th hijacker in custody in Minneapolis, combined with the President’s information might have tripped an alarm. But Dr. Rice said yesterday that as best as been determined so far, those first two pieces of the puzzle did not reach the President.

MELVIN GOODMAN, National War College International Studies Professor, May 22, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What creates a terrorist? Would economic improvements in the countries where terrorists breed help resolve their anger? If so, why do we see terrorists emerging from the middle classes? Would enlightening the public in these countries of democratic ideals help, or is that too idealistic an expectation?
GOODMAN: Unfortunately, there is a terrorist element that is nihilistic. That was true in the 1980s regarding terrorism in Europe. (The CIA missed that one also because Bill Casey and Bob Gates blamed the Soviets for everything) and it is true now in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Having said that, however, it should be acknowledged that the United States has to step up to the plate on a series of diplomatic issues, abandon the policy of unilateralism, and try to negotiate some of the key international security problems. Economic support would not address the problem of terrorists but it would make it more difficult for terrorists to find save havens and sanctuaries.

JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate, June 11, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What do you believe motives the terrorists?
CIRINCIONE: Many terrorists are motivated by political causes growing from their national or regional problems. But some, like Al Qaeda, have an apocalyptic view of the world. They seek to provoke a large conflict, a larger war. This they believe, can hurry the final judgment that will lead to the victory of their forces.

DAVID HALBERSTAM, author, June 3, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: There has never been an event such as the September 11 terrorist attacks. We watched on live television as the World Trade Center and surrounding buildings collapsed. You are a resident of Manhattan. If I may, what were your thoughts on that day? Were you in Manhattan that day? When did you decide to write this book (“Firehouse”)?
HALBERSTAM: I was in Manhattan that day. I’d come in the night before from lecturing at Drew University. And oddly enough, I guided in through the twin towers. I walked my dogs in the park, and a friend of mine named John Gregory Dunne called and said turn on the television. First what struck me was that the immunities of America, which had protected it from the carnage of so much of the rest of the world over the last very bloody century, had finally run out. There were no immunities any more. The darkest part of the world had come to us. I remember thinking as well that it could have been worse---that it could have been a nuclear or biological weapon, something I had long feared and had written about in the best that was being published that year. And I remember thinking of the irony of the 39 or 40 years later that in order to sample the conflicts of our time, I had volunteered to go 12,000 miles to Vietnam as a young reporter. And now in my 60s, that conflict had come home, to within four miles of where I lived.
And I knew I wanted to do something about it. Any New Yorker had this feeling that I want to do something. I don’t know what it is that I have that will be of use, but I want to be involved. So when the editors of Vanity Fair asked me to go to the firehouse, and the men at the firehouse made it clear that I would be welcome, from that moment it was very clear to me that I wanted to do this. That in some odd way, that it was therapeutic for me. And I also understood maybe a week into doing it that it wasn’t just a magazine article, that it should be a small book. That I had found something worth writing about in a bit more length.

MICHAEL ISIKOFF, Newsweek Magazine Journalist, September 23, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: Looking at the Clinton Administration in retrospect, how would you rate it?
ISIKOFF: On the specific issue of the Clinton Administration’s handling of terrorism, the record is pretty mixed. There’s ample evidence that top national security officials understood the nature of the threat. There’s little evidence they were willing to take any political risks to do what was necessary to combat it.

MICHAEL RATNER, Center for Constitutional Rights Vice President, September 23, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: It is important that we preserve our Constitutional rights, even in trying times, because mistakes can be made and innocent people can be detained. An unrestrained government might take advantage of their powers and abuse them. How should we create that balance between preserving rights and allowing government to act quickly when dealing with preventing terrorism?
RATNER: I do not think that people should be detained with no charges, no lawyers, and no access t courts. So far the deprivations of liberty are primarily aimed at non-citizens and therefore citizens have not really paid the price or been affected by the balance. I think that until a full investigation is done as to why our FBI/CIA failed us on 9/11 new powers should not be given to the agencies. They have plenty of power---they just can’t use it right.

JOHN BURNETT, author, October 9, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: What are our defenses should a pirate ship steal nuclear material? Are satellites equipped to keep track of the material? Are ships carry nuclear material very vulnerable to successful theft?
BURNETT: These ships owned by British Nuclear Fuels that carry the reprocessed nuclear waste are state of the art and do have aboard redundant transponder systems which transmit the vessel’s location on a periodic basis. Despite being heavily armed they are constantly monitored and their communications with the skipper, the caro owner, and British security is quite secure. However, as the Pentagon report indicates, it would be quite easy nevertheless to attack one of these ships.

PAUL LIGHT, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow, November 21, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: There is a dilemma in situations such as the creation of the Homeland Security Department. In order to be effective, the Homeland Security Secretary will need to, in the interests of public security, order actions taken by any of the agencies underneath the Secretary. Yet, in order to prevent abuse or critical errors, there needs to be a review process, or at least a process whereby someone may send alerts that actions being undertaken may have unforeseen consequences. Further, such review has to occur quickly. Do you think the current structure is designed to handle all these critical elements?
LIGHT: One of my colleagues here compares this problem to repairing an airplane engine while flying it. I rather prefer the analogy about building an airplane while flying it. It ain’t just the engine, that is.
You can build a department like this (or an agency like the Transportation Security Administration) while looking over your shoulder for the army of reviewers, cross-checkers, auditors, and investigators who will chronicle every mistake. I have no doubt there will be errors along the way. Whether you like the reorganization or not, it will be a work in progress.

MARTIN SMITH, filmmaker, November 22, 2002
CZIKOWSKY: It amazes me how you conduct such dangerous work. How much risk do you feel you are at when you are known to be questioning people to learn how terrorists and soldiers have escaped?
SMITH: I would say most people find it easier not to be confrontational or hostile. There are of course risks, but most of the hostility that I ran into was generalized against the U.S. government. I don’t relish danger, but it comes with the work.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, November 22. 2002
CZIKOWSKY: The arrest (of Adb al-Rahim al-Nashiri) restores public faith that al Qaeda leaders can be found. Do you have any feelings as to whether the al Qaeda network can be destroyed, or do you see it as a long term permanent threat?
PRIEST: You’re right. Arrests like that should give confidence that the U.S. and others have incredible capabilities and are aggressively tracing the al Qaeda leaders they know of. Some intelligence analysts argue that the AQ network has, in essence, been destroyed. But it has been replaced by a looser “network” with people who were lower down before now assuming greater importance. Also, they believe a quite different-looking, decentralized body has replaced AQ’s hierarchy. Operatives act more ad hoc, with authority from bin Laden to do so. Also, there are more links with other groups now. In fact, “terrorism” should no longer be equated just with AQ but with a band of groups out there. No one has found a way to name them yet, though. They share an ant-American philosophy and fervor for radical Islam.

BILL MINUTAGLIO, author, February 12, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: You have helped convince most us: ammonium nitrate is very dangerous. Are we, as a nation, doing enough to establish who has it and where it is? Or, is there a problem with lack of supervision on who is handling and storing ammonium nitrate?
MINUTAGLIO: You pose an important and difficult question—and thanks for bringing it up.
Timothy McVeigh used ammonium nitrate (the substance that blew up in Texas City and caused the Texas City Disaster) and terrorists around the globe have been known to seek it out and use it. After the Oklahoma City attack by McVeigh, the government instituted safeguards and “accountability” procedures to avoid future episodes.
The problem, from my perspective, is that the world is, as someone once said to me, “addicted” to ammonium nitrate—it has twin, powerful capabilities. It is one of the most brilliant, beneficial fertilizers known to mankind. In fact, the German chemist who helped to perfect it for commercial use in the early part of the 20th century was awarded the Noble Prize for “saving humanity” and providing a wonderful fertilizer that could increase crop yields around the world—and stem starvation for millions and millions of people. Of course, during World War II, ammonium nitrate’s other capability was on full display—it can also be used as ferocious component in bomb-making. Some military historians theorize that key World War II campaigns would not have been won without the use of ammonium nitrate bombs.
And, again, we saw what happened in Oklahoma City. It seems that evil people are addicted to using it for nefarious purposes-and it seems that good-hearted people rely on it to feed the world.

MARK SIEGEL, Associate Professor of Medicine, New York University, February 12, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: You teach at N.Y.U. in lower Manhattan, which is not too far from the financial district. How are residents in lower Manhattan taking to the heightened security alerts?
SIEGEL: Good question. People that are in proximity to Ground Zero are more susceptible to flashbacks and/or stress, but for them too, it must be business as usual.

KIRK WOLFINGER and MATTHEW COLLINS, producers, February 26, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: How much do we know about dirty bombs, and how do we know it? Has there been anyone who has conducted scientific testing of such devices?
WOLFINGER: The real issue is what do we know about exposure to low levels of radiation. There we don’t know a great deal and everyone agrees we need to do more study about this.
COLLINS: As with most of these pleasant weapons—like chemical and biological—the U.S. Army and the Soviet Union did lots of tests over the last 50 years. Militaries have decided they are not good weapons because they take 20 years to cause cancer, so ya, they have been studied quite a bit. The dirty bomb in our scenarios in our show were basically put together by computer modeling using very common standard wind conditions and blast factors from the explosion. There’s a wide error margin, but scientists are in agreement about how much and how far radioactivity could be spread.

DANIEL BYMAN, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, March 21, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: What, if anything, would cause terrorist cells to fade away on their own without doing harm? Does terminating their leadership cause them to lose direction, or are they capable of operating without instructions? If a Palestinian state is established, does this satisfy much of their political anger, or are their guiding influences more religious or otherwise ideological?
BYMAN: The answer varies by the group, making it difficult to have a single policy that leads groups to fade away. Some groups abandon terrorism in response to political concessions. The Provisional IRA, for example, has gained from the ballot box as well as from the Armalite, leading it to reduce and then suspend attacks. Other groups are simply destroyed by arrests. The once fearsome Red Brigade is another example.
Terminating the leadership can work if the leader was an absolute commander or was particularly skilled. Many groups, however, have shown an ability to recover from the loss of their leaders.
A Palestinian state might satisfy some militant supporters (but not the hard core of militants). However, the terms of such a state would undoubtedly fall short of what they would want.

KEN ALIBEK, Medical Microbiology Professor, George Mason University, March 31, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Is the current Russian government more open towards opening all files concerning Soviet research on biohazards? Has there been a full accounting of where all the biohazards currently are, and, if some are missing, do our intelligence agencies have strong ideas where they are located?
ALIBEK: Russia has never come clean. Russia accuses the U.S. in development and its absurdly untrue. It seems to me that Russia still tries to justify their bioweapons research by saying the U.S. is. But Russia has been doing it for decades.

MARILYN W. THOMPSON, Assistant Managing Editor, Washington Post
CZIKOWSKY: I am concerned the police and investigators have never figured out who sent the anthrax. What does that state about our investigative abilities?
THOMPSON: That is certainly a valid concern. The FBI has devoted huge resources to trying to solve the anthrax case—they have pursued leads all over the world and devoted hundreds of agents to it. But they still have no definitive evidence that would guarantee a prosecution. The big question is not the number of FBI agents pursing the case or the dedication or competence of those agents. It is why the FBI was so slow out of the gate. It took agents months to get around to interviewing Fort Detrick veterans who worked on weaponized anthrax and might have known how this material was processed. It took months for agents to get to laboratories known to possess the Ames strain. Why?

PETER BERGER, Senior Fellow, New America Foundation, April 16, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Thank you for informing us about some of the threats we face. How well are we doing at detecting when these threats move into the United States? Are these chemicals, etc. easy to hide, or are they easy to detect? What more should or could we do to catch these materials?
BERGER: Since 9/11, U.S. customs has implemented a program to make sure that these kinds of materials don’t come into the country. You can’t search everything, but they search 2 percent of the containers. But if a container has a red flag, it will be searched. So there are programs in place to do this. Cities around the world have conducted exercises to (simulate) a WMD. However, we saw with the anthrax attacks after 9/11 that seemingly one person was able to cause a huge amount of panic in Washington and New York, though the attacks only killed five people. But experts talk about weapons of mass “disruption” and clearly although WMD attacks don’t kill a lot of people it is a very effective means of terrorizing them.

STEVEN BRILL, author, May 2, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: Having seen Tom Ridge in the hallways just hours before he was named to direct Homeland Security, it was definitely a surprise and one of the few times a story did not leak out ahead of time. What can you tell us about Tom Ridge?
BRILL: There is a scene in the book (“After”) that recounts Ridge deciding in the space of just 21 hours to leave his Governorship—and his family—to take that ill-defined job. He and his wife even talked about how she would now have to become a working mom rather than the First Lady of a state because they would have the additional expense of renting a house in Harrisburg while the kids finished out the school year, while he had to rent an apartment in D.C. I admire that commitment to public service at a time of national emergency—a lot.

LAWRENCE ASHMEAN, Vice President, HarperCollins Publishers, May 20, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: The kidnapping and deaths of the Israeli athletes at the Olympics was one of the tragic stories of the 20th century and that was followed by the world on their television sets. How did this event impact Mr. Roone Arledge?
ASHMEAN: He was there and he filmed it. They stayed up night after night for 24 hour coverage so it was one of the great television coups of all time. There he was with a team to cover the Olympics and it just turned out to be one of the great news stories. When you look back, it was the first major terrorist activity that was taped live and shown around the world.

DAVID ROTHKOPF, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Visiting Scholar, November 21, 2003
CZIKOWSKY: In addition to the necessary police actions and increased intelligence efforts to reduce terrorism, do you believe the public accepts the positions of those who advocate long term strategies (improving our international image, finding ways too reduce the reasons why people decide to become terrorists, etc.)? Or is the public more attuned to short term, visible responses, such as increased inspections of people and goods entering the country, more security forces, etc., and this may be preventing focusing on long term strategies?
ROTHKOPF: The public seems to be comparatively unresponsive to longer-term solutions and addressing the problem at its core because it sounds sympathetic to terrorists. And frankly, there is zero constituency in the U.S. for terrorists. Nonetheless, the public is also losing confidence in certain elements of our military response (not in our excellent military but in how they are being used) and thus, there may be an openness to addressing a more balanced approach.
CZIKOWSKY: What is your assessment of the political future of Tom Ridge? It is well rumored he would like to be selected for Vice President. Yet, do you believe the Homeland Security position represents the end of his career? He is not in a position to prevent future terrorist attacks, his attempts to deal with the problem, while serious, have ruined his image as the color coding (for which he is best known) is being treated as a joke by most. Finally, should there ever be another terrorist attack on American soil, I fear Tom Ridge will become the fall guy. Do you have further perspectives on Tom Ridge’s future?
ROTHKOPF: I don’t. In the end, the calculus about his future will be a combination of his personal ambition and the political calculus of those around the President regarding what will help them most in the election. My uneducated guess is that he has gone about as far as he can go.

TERRENCE McKENNA, Frontline Producer, April 23, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: As I have read of varying estimates of the size of al Queda, does Abdurakman Khadr provide any information as to how many members there are, at least that he has seen?
McKENNA: Khadr dealt with hundreds of people that he would consider part of al Qaeda when he lived in Afghanistan and Pakistan. One of the key factors here is that al Qaeda did not issue membership cards. Many Muslim extremists around the world have now attached themselves to the al Qadea cause—even if their activities are not directly controlled by bin Laden or his associated. At the 9/11 Commission hearings former head of counter-terrorist at the White House, Richard Clarke, said that Islamic extremism had now become a multi-headed monster that was multiplying in strength and in numbers quickly and was becoming much more difficult to fight every day. I don’t think anyone could put a real number on the people who support al Qadea.

RICHARD LEIBY, Washington Post Staff Writer, June 4, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: The Homeland Security office states we should be on the lookout for people wearing several layers of clothing in warm weather who smell funny. There is at least one person per downtown block who fits that description. Should I make a telephone call for each individual, or can one phone call for all these people take care of my civic duty?
LEIBY: Yes, you should alert Tom Ridge personally! Call 202-28208010—that’s the number for Homeland Security’s public affairs office. And you must act especially quickly if any of those rank-smelling potential human bombs are text-messaging Clash lyrics to each other.

DANA PRIEST, Washington Post Staff Writer, June 16, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: There are conflicting reports as to whether al Qaeda had meetings in Prague. The 9/11 Commission has concluded these never happened. Earlier, there was a report the source for these meetings was highly questionable. Do you have any more information on the history of these allegations and whether you believe they have been disproved?
PRIEST: I believe they have been disproved with this final commission report. I have looked at this a lot, as have other journalists. Search The Washington Post and New York Times and you’ll get many stories. Most say the link was always dubious. So I see this as reaffirming that view. I would bet, though, that this will not stop Vice President Cheney from referring to it again. He seems to be convinced it happened, and has used the Prague meeting often. I think this reflects, in part, his view that the CIA just didn’t look hard enough to make the connection. That’s an attitude that runs through much of the difference of opinion over circumstantial or inconclusive intelligence (which much of it is, by nature).

SHERRY JONES, “NOW With Bill Moyers” Producer, September 10, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: Do you have any reactions to Senator Bob Graham’s book that claims the involvement of the Saudi government in supporting terrorists was deleted from the official record?
JONES: I read articles about it with interest, but haven’t had time to read the book.
One quite serious investigation that has been somewhat overlooked once the 9/11 Commission reported its investigation is that there was a joint House/Senate inquiry into 9/11 and the commission acknowledged that much of the ground-breaking investigation was done by the joint inquiry. Those who are interested, the report is posted online at the GPO website. It is fascinating as well. Sen. Graham was a part of that investigation. But I know nothing of the truth or lack of truth of the complaints about some of the information not being included in the final report.

JOHN GERSHMAN, Foreign Policy in Focus Interhemispheric Resource Center Co-Director and JAMES CARAFANO, The Heritage Foundation Senior Fellow, September 15, 2004
CZIKOWSKY: We spend more on two days on the war in Iraq than we did all last year on security our ports. While that is nice rhetoric, isn’t there also a lot of truth to that? If we are fighting a war in Iraq to make us safe from terrorists, wouldn’t it have been a better priority to have instead invested those resources elsewhere: greater intelligence and, importantly, securing our ports, not only from terrorists, but also from smugglers and illegal drugs importers?
GERSHAM: I know that Stephen Flynn, a retired Coast Guard officer and an author of a recent book on Homeland Security and a number of other pieces which gives roughly this figure.
I think your supposition is basically accurate, that Iraq has been a major diversion of resources away from critical homeland security expenditures, as well from reconstruction in Afghanistan, let alone the broader political costs of the war.
CARAFANO: This is a criticism you hear a lot and it makes little sense from a strategic standpoint. This would be like saying during World War II, “every cent spent in the war against Germany is a dollar wasted in the war against Japan.”
Strategy is about making hard choices and setting priorities. There are infinite numbers of homeland security needs and anyone can make a case on why spending money on their priority makes sense. You have to ask the question of where are you going to get the biggest bang for the buck and what will make the nation safer: over the long term.”
Debating spending on Iraq at this point also makes little sense. Having occupied the country we now have a legal and moral obligation to fulfill our responsibilities as occupying power. Spending on Iraq is not optional.
GERSHAM: It seems there are two questions, one about the decision to go into Iraq and the other now that we are there. Does Jim agree that going into Iraq was a poor strategic choice in the context of how he describes strategies (prioritizing among needs, making hard choices). Was that not in fact a poor strategic choice?
CARAFANO: In terms of our responsibilities as occupiers, I would agree that we have an international obligation as an occupying power, but how that obligation is actually met does not necessarily involve large numbers of U.S. troops being there. It also means making choices between large tax cuts and homeland security, and a large Pentagon budget, some of which may have nothing much to do with terrorism (or any other plausible security threat (that could also be trimmed. Our immediate favorite is missile defense, but that could just be a start.

OMAR KHAN, Sensei International Senior Partner, April 29, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Ann Coulter wants airport screeners to discriminate according to race. Our local paper reported she had a fit when she got patted down by an airport screener at Harrisburg International Airport. I guess blonde females should be given a free pass, according to her. What is your advice to Ms. Coulter?
KHAN: It’s an unfortunate stance she’s taken. There are many African Muslins, and presumably she would consider them a potential threat. If we assume Africans then become a ‘race under scrutiny’ as per Ms. Coulter, then every African American would be stopped, as we couldn’t be sure if they are Americans, or visitors. And how far should the research go? If today they are American citizens, should we check to see when they came over?
Now let’s move on to Asians. Are all Asians suspect, or only those that look Middle Eastern? Even if the latter, then everyone who looks as if they didn’t come from the American heartland gets checked out? I guess Hispanics as well, because some of them might look like Asians?
There could be a European who might be enlisted by a terrorist network. So if they’re blond haired and blue eyed, we have no reason to check? What happens when the next terrorist strategy is to go for that profile? There are disaffected people with all kinds of allegiances everywhere.
So I’d like to know what race, what definition of ‘race’ she wants to apply, and how far back do we go? If you’re a third generation South Asian American, how long do you have to hang out here, before you’re ‘cleared’ according to Coulter?
It’s silly. We need to exercise some judgment, and those of us with olive skin, hailing originally from these shores, need to be a bit more forbearing certainly when we’re checked out more thoroughly than the 70 year old grandma. But to do it exclusively on race would be, I believe, not only discriminatory, but potentially dangerous as an assumption for the future.

WILLIAM DeRISO, World Trade Center attack survivor, September 12, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: As I recall, Manhattan was closed that day. Where did you go after you escaped the building?
DeRISO: I walked with a fellow coworker to his apartment on 77th and 3rd Avenue. It was about 100 blocks. My co-worked had run the NYC Marathon in under three hours.
I had not.
He was a bit faster than me, to say the least.
CZIKOWSKY: I saw photographs taken from someone who escaped from the World Trade Center. The photographs from that close-up are unlike any I have seen elsewhere. Indeed, many of these pictures, such as the people falling to their deaths. And the terror that close up, are considered too graphic for the public to see. Do you think there should come a time when the public should see what happened at that close a level?
DeRISO: I believe that many of the photos of the terror close up are probably too strong for the families to see. I think we can all imagine as to what the devastation was like. Those photos would only help our curiosities. We don’t necessarily need to see those photos to know what the horror was like.
CZIKOWSKY: Is it correct that an initial decision was made to evacuate the South Tower but that after the initial evacuation message was sent, someone decided (which was not necessarily that illogical a decision given that no one knew there was a second plane coming) that the South Tower was in no danger from the fire in the North Tower and that a later message was given for people to return to their offices?
DeRISO: There was never an announcement to leave the South Tower. In fact, many of us had left on our own, and only later thought we had made the wrong decision.
An announcement was in fact made that said that the South Tower was safe and secure, which was a logical assumption given that we didn’t know a second plane was coming.

FAWAZ GERGES, author, October 11, 2005
CZIKOWSKY: Do you believe our invasion of Iraq has served to recruit more people to anti-American organizations, including terrorist groups, or do you believe the war in Iraq is helping to defeat terrorism?
GERGES: The consensus among American, European, and Arab intelligence services as well as independent scholars is that the American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq has increased the flow of recruits to militant organizations; Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as a recruiting tool and ground for jihadist action. I would go further and argue that the Iraq war has given Al Qaeda a new lease on life; it has supplied Al Qaeda with more ammunition to use its war against the far enemy---the United States. The Iraq war has also radicalized mainstream Arab and Muslim public opinion and deepened anti-Americanism throughout the world, not just in Muslim lands. As a senior Al Qaeda operative put it, by invading Iraq the United States fell into our trap.
CZIKOWSKY: Curt Weldom claims that terrorist groups, from Hammas to Al Qaeda to Hezbollah, have unified into one super-organization. I should think it would be difficult to get groups with dissimilar specific goals to agree to work together. Is he correct and these groups have found a common cause and working in coordination with one another?
GERGES: One of the major arguments advance in my book, “The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global”, is that there exists no jihadist superstructure, no unified Islamist front. The jihadist movement is splintered and fragmented along ideological, geographic, personality and social lines. In fact, I show that the 9/11 attacks cannot be understood except by appreciating the fissures and cleavages within the jihadist movement, particularly the divide between local jihadists and international jihadists. I spent a great deal of time and space showing how in the late 1990s Al Qaeda tried to hijack the jihadist movement and change its direction and destination. The overwhelming number of militants, local. as opposed to international, jihadists opposed the globalization of jihad and taking war to America. Since 9/11 the local-international divide among jihadists has become wider and deeper; now a bitter civil war is raging among jihadists and Islamists. The outcome of this civil war will likely determine the future prospects of international jihadists like Al Qaeda, which do not seem very promising. Neither Hamas nor Al Qaeda sees eye-to-eye on the dominant issues of the day; they possess different interests and strategies.

ROBERT O’HARROW and SCOTT HIGHAM, Washington Post Staff Writers,
CZIKOWSKY: Would it be fair to say that in the rush to create homeland security programs that there was a tendency to allow rules to be bent in order to achieve objectives, and that there were people waiting to take advantage of the bent rules for a profit to themselves?
O’HARROW and HIGHAM: That’s a fair analysis. Homeland Security officials have said repeatedly that starting a host of urgent projects was the most important thing at the time.

DANIEL BYMAN, Brookings Institution Fellowship, January 30, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Do states that support terrorist groups do so because they agree with these groups’ independently determined goals, or do the states have policy conditions tied to their assistance?
BYMAN: States support terrorist groups for a range of reasons. The most revolutionary states may see terrorist group members as their brothers in arms, but that camaraderie rarely lasts. Most states support terrorist groups for their own strategic and political reasons and do not hesitate to impose numerous conditions as part of their aid.

C. FRED BERGSTEN, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States Former Chairman, February 28, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Shouldn’t more attention be paid on the issue of port security that this is not just a homeland security issue, but one that assist in reducing smuggling, drugs, and even human trafficking that could be better detected if we did a better job at inspecting goods shipping into our country?
BERGSTEN: You are precisely correct that Port security extends well beyond terrorism to include much more mundane, but also more frequent, problems of smuggling of the types you indicate. This is yet another reason to strengthen the capabilities of the American agencies that are responsible for Port security. I hope that the current Congressional attention to this issue will have a constructive outcome by moving in this direction.

CRAIG WHITLOCK, Washington Post Foreign Service, June 8, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Do we have much reliable data on the succession of power (after the death of al-Qaeda leader Al-Zarqawi) and who will be taking over the leadership of planning and executing the terrorist activities and how well organized the reaminder of the group appears to be?
WHITLOCK: Simple answer: no. At least I don’t. Over the past three years, Zarqawi has gone through a large succession of “lieutenants” and “emirs” who served close to him and were killed. He seems to have been able to replace them quickly.

RON SUSSKIND, author, June 23, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: In theory, I would personally agree with the one percent theory, for the potential devastation that would occur from nuclear terrorism makes even a one percent chance that it could occur unacceptable. Yet, how is that one percent calculated? Are we at the point where terrorists are capable of building, hiding, and exploding a nuclear weapon?
SUSSKIND: There’s no doubt that we’re at the point where groups of individuals have the capability to do that. The question is will they have the opportunity. Certainly it’s not easy—you need expertise—but it’s not expertise that is all that specialized.
The big question on the nuclear front is can the U.S. manage to lead international efforts to account for and control enriched uranium or plutonium around the world. Up to now the reviews on such efforts have been pretty dispiriting.

LAWRENCE WRIGHT, author, September 11, 2006
CZIKOWSKY: Do you think al Qaeda expected the damage to be so extensive? I ask because Bin Laden states on tape he was surprised the towers fell (indeed no one expected they would fall). If the goal was to maximize deaths, why didn’t they attack later in the day when the buildings were full and why didn’t they hit into the lower floors and trap people above rather than hit in the upper part of the buildings? What was the actual goal that day of hitting the World Trade Center?
WRIGHT: If you read the Al Qaeda theorists and the memoirs of some of the leadership, one theme is how shocked they were by the extent of the damage, and how angry many of them were with bin Laden for steering them into what they thought was a losing battle with the U.S. Of course, the Towers were on the AQ hit list because they were so evocative of America’s economic dominance. The targets were deeply symbolic—the Pentagon, representing U.S. military power, and the Capitol, which was the intended target of the fourth plane, which represented the seat of American government. Al Qaeda is addicted to symbolism, and it is important to keep that in mind when anticipating future attacks.

ALEXANDER W. JOEL, National Intelligence Civil Liberties Protection Officer, April 11, 2007
CZIKOWKY: Obviously, isn’t the lesson that, when one has so much information that you can’t use it, that one needs to learn the filter the information to what can be used? Isn’t your agency going through review processes to better target and filter information, so that real security difficulties can be discovered?
JOEL: That is a challenge that affects many aspects of intelligence. Intelligence analysts have to sift through large quantities of foreign intelligence reports, raw intelligence, etc., to extract useful information for their reports. On the other hand, we have strict rules in place to collect, retain, and disseminate information about “United States persons”, meaning U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, U.S. corporations, and unincorporated associations consisting of American and LPRs. The rules are sometimes referred to as our “U.S. personal rules”. It is important for agencies to follow these rules as they consider how to “better target and filter information” as you put it.

JENNIFER L. DORN, National Academy of Public Administration President, June 26, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: What should be the emphasis of homeland security? Should it concentrate on a nationwide effort , or should it be targeted to specific areas?
DORN: The Panel believes that the emphasis right now should be on addressing the gaps that currently exist in the Department’s transition efforts. Much work has been done—still lots to do. And unfortunately, the new realities of a terrorist environment mean that each Presidential candidate has to begin thinking about their homeland security teams now…That way, security clearances can be completed and these teams can begin the significant work of understanding the complex intelligence involved…building relationships with players at every level of government takes time, as well.
CZIKOWSKY: Are homeland security programs in danger of becoming something were we need a homeland security program in every Congressional district, or is Congress going to accept a national priority list?
DORN: Communities all over America already are intricately involved in homeland security. That’s one of the reasons the Academy Panel felt strongly that incoming Presidential appointees and transition teams be very familiar with the National Response Framework, that’s the very comprehensive document that lays out the roles and responsibilities of the all the players—Federal, state, local, private, and non-profit—in homeland security preparedness and response.

MATTHEW ROJANSKY, Partnership for a Secure America Executive Director, and BRIAN FINLAY, The Henry L. Stimson Center Senior Associate, September 9, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: What are our protections against weapons of mass destruction? How well or poorly are we able to detect their locations? If they are used, what are our limitations on protecting ourselves?
ROJANSKY: Barry Kellerman, our bio-weapons expert says: “With regard to detection of biological weapons, we are essentially in the dark. We don’t know where they might be released or even when. Once a release happens, it won’t likely be detected for days until sick people pile into emergency rooms. Indeed, at first, it might look like a natural disease outbreak—only later will it be obvious that we’ve been attacked. Finally, the attacker can attack at numerous locations at different times, causing massive confusion about the nature of the attack itself.
The U.S. government has, in the last few years, substantially increased our stockpiles of vaccines and antidotes for some of the prominent biological agents. If one of those agents is used, we likely have a public health capacity to minimize the consequences. However, if the attack involves an agent for which we do not have a vaccine or antidote, then we are essentially defenseless. Moreover, a contagious disease could be released outside the U.S. where public health capacities are minimal, and a pandemic could be started that would work it’s way to the U.S., destroying U.S. partners and interests along the way.”
FINLAY: The U.S. government has been investing heavily in these technologies since 9/11. For instance, the Simson Center is undertaking a study (and collaborating with the Department of Energy) on an initiative that seeks to redirect some of the capabilities of our nuclear weapons laboratories in this country into new missions—such as detecting WMD. While we’ve made significant progress, we’re far from close to having anything close to a perfect detection capability.

JAMES BAMFORD, investigative journalist, October 14, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: Why was unrelated domestic surveillance undertaken? It seems to me this was not even a priority in the scheme of gathering intelligence on foreign-directed operations. Is this a case where agencies undertook the easier route of obtaining data that was easier to gather rather than concentrating on obtaining data that would require more effort?
BAMFORD: I write about interviews with NSA intercept operators who describe eavesdropping on personal communications between Americans—aid workers, soldiers, journalists, businesspeople—and their families, coworkers, etc. with no intelligence value. They said they did this because they were told to do it. One reason is probably because there was no oversight or FISA Court to go through. The decision was made to eavesdrop on everything. That’s the problem when controls are removed.
CZIKOWSKY: How well coordinated are operations between the NSA, CIA, FBI, Homeland Security, State Department, and Defense Department? Is there a lot of turf protecting and is that interfering with the exchange of information?
BAMFORD: Pre-9/11, the NSA was one of the worse agencies in terms of turf protection—and one of the causes of 9/11. Since then I think coordination has greatly improved but there is still need for improvement.

BRUCE SCHNEIDER, security researcher, October 31, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: Are there other means of detecting bombs, such as bomb sniffing dogs, that could be implemented as another means to assist in preventing bombs from entering transit stations?
SCHNEIDER: Sure, You could add dogs, x-ray machines, metal detectors, explosive trace detectors---all sorts of things. That’s not the issue; the issue is “why bother?” Why is this particular movie plot threat worth all these resources and attention, and all the other millions of possible threats not?
That’s the problem with movie plot threats; they require us to guess the plot and tactic correctly. Counterterrorism is most effective when it doesn’t make arbitrary assumptions about the terrorists’ plans. Stop searching bags on the subways, and spend the money on 1.) intelligence and investigation---stopping the terrorists regardless of what their plans are, and 2.) emergency response---lessening the impact of a terrorist attack, regardless of what the plans are. Countermeasures that defend against particular targets, or assume particular tactics, or cause the terrorists to make insignificant modifications in their plans, or that survey the entire population looking for terrorists, are largely not worth it.

KAJ LARSEN, Current TV International Correspondent, November 20, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: Shouldn’t there be a United Nations or some other international force that can patrol areas and respond to pirate ships and attack ships that pirate others?
LARSEN: It’s in the works, but remember that this is a huge area of water and difficult to patrol regardless of the force. It becomes even more complicated when you throw in the fact that its complex for different Naval forces to patrol an area. The UN is not equipped in this area so they have to convince other countries to supply the resources.

KELLY McEVERS, freelance journalist, December 4, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: I found the economics of pirating interesting, If they don’t/can’t make expenses they could go into debt. It would be interesting if there was some way pirating could be made economically unlikely to make a profit. I also found it interesting that the big city life motivates some pirates. It almost seems as if the city would often more lucrative employment the pirates would leave their careers. Might this be a possibility?
McEVERS: If you’re uneducated and have no connections in a place like Singapore, it’s not very likely you’ll be able to get a job. Indonesia is the world’s 4th largest country (while Singapore is a city-state of just a few million people), and in this region most of the people live beneath the poverty line. Needless to say, there is fierce competition for jobs that pay a living wage.
I have friends in Indonesia’s capitol, Jakarta, who have the same job. I do, the same education level, and make about a third as much I do. They have to commute to work hours each day, just to live in a place then can afford. This is the situation in a country that’s just now struggling out of its corrupt past.

SHANKAR VEDANTAM, Washington Post Staff Writer, December 8, 2008
CZIKOWSKY: How would you compare the economic motivation arguments with the psychological motivations of becoming a terrorist? There used to be a conventional wisdom that terrorism was a response of someone economically and politically powerless and deprived who have no reaction left but to respond in terror. Yet we are finding terrorists coming from a variety of backgrounds that suggest as individuals they had options. How do you explain this?
VEDENTAM: I think the idea that terrorists necessarily come from poor or powerless backgrounds has been pretty thoroughly debunked in recent years. We have all seen examples of architects, physicians, and even doctors taking to terrorism. Osama Bin Laden comes from a family with an enormous fortune. It is true that terrorists often speak in the name of the powerless and the poor, but that does not mean they are themselves individually powerless and poor….